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Abstract  
 
Technology has developed rapidly over the last three decades.  Information is regularly 
transmitted and stored electronically – and only electronically.  The use of mobile phones, e-
mail, social media, and various electronic messaging services are ubiquitous.  However, there 
are several areas of confusion and inconsistent application in the regulation of electronic 
evidence in South Africa.  As a result, the South African Law Reform Commission (‘SALRC’) 
has suggested three different methods for law reform, and recommends the most aggressive of 
these options in the form of a Law of Evidence Bill. In this thesis, I agree with many of the 
findings made by the SALRC, but I disagree with the option selected for law reform. As 
suggested by several other stakeholders, rather than a drastic overhaul of the current legal 
framework, a more cautious amendment of existing legislation would be the more preferable 
approach.  
Electronic evidence is primarily regulated by the Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act 25 of 2002 (‘ECT Act’), and although it is ageing, it still achieves one of its 
primary functions, namely facilitating the admissibility and evidential weight of electronic 
evidence.  However, there is room for improvement. 
This research addresses six primary questions relating to electronic evidence: Namely, 
whether the definition of data message requires amendment; whether the ECT Act liberates 
data messages from the exclusionary hearsay rules; whether a presumption of regularity exists 
in South Africa; whether section 15 of the ECT Act requires amendment; whether it is 
appropriate to apply different evidentiary considerations to electronic evidence in civil and 
criminal proceedings; and finally, this research considers the SALRC’s selected option for law 
reform.   
This thesis, which adopts a descriptive form of desktop research, concludes that the 
ECT Act is sufficient to regulate the admissibility of electronic evidence, but that it requires 
amendment in certain areas, together with the amendment of related legislation in relation to 
1) the definition of data message; 2) the hearsay exceptions;  3) terminology and consistency 
in relation to electronic evidence in South African legislation; and 4) the discovery of electronic 
evidence.    
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CHAPTER 1: ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA – AN INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH CONTEXT 
Technology is inseparably integrated into our lives,1 and has become an indispensable part of 
modern life.2  As a result, we have witnessed a sea-change in relation to methods of 
communication3 – societies’ increasing reliance on technology and electronic devices4 means 
that basic communication, interaction and transaction methodologies have been indelibly 
altered.5  There is no going-back; and although this shift in communication norms is sometimes 
described with exaggeration,6 growth will likely continue.7 It seems certain that future 
generations will be increasingly technologically reliant and sophisticated.8  Consequently, the 
law must adapt.9   
                                                             
1 E Casey Digital Evidence and Computer Crime 3 ed (2011) xxi. 
2 P Schwikkard & S van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 4 ed (2016) 437.   
3 T Holt et al Cybercrime and Digital Forensics (2015) 1 – 3. 
4 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 2 at 437 – 438; A Bellengère et al The Law of Evidence in South Africa 
(2013) 73; D van der Merwe et al Information and Communications Technology Law 2 ed (2016) ch 5; S 
Papadopoulos & S Snail (eds) Cyberlaw@SA III (2012) 315. See also See also D Zeffertt & A Paizes The South 
African Law of Evidence 3 ed (2017) at 455 – 460, 976 – 981. 
5 CMC Woodworking Machinery (Pty) Ltd v Pieter Odendaal Kitchens 2012 (5) SA 604 (KZD) para 2; Heroldt v 
Wills 2013 (2) SA 530 (GSJ) para 8; Trustees for the time being of the Delsheray Trust v ABSA Bank Limited 
[2014] 4 All SA 748 (WCC) para 18 where the court noted: ‘It is well known that modern technological 
developments have brought about a revolution in the way that information, including legal information, is captured 
and disseminated.’  
6 W Jacobs ‘The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act: Consumer Protection and Contracts’ (2004) 
16 SAMLJ 556 – 557. 
7 Internet World Stats 2018 http://www.internetworldstats.com/africa.htm#za, accessed on 17 April 2016 and 31 
July 2018. Roughly 53.7% of South Africa's population had Internet access as at December 2017. In 2008, the 
South African internet penetration rate was approximately 9%.  
8 Ketler Investments CC t/a Ketler Presentations v Internet Service Providers Association 2014 (2) SA 569 (GSJ) 
para 19 where, obiter, the court noted: ‘information technology and the use of the internet is now commonplace’ 
and para 28 where it is noted that ‘email is perhaps the most convenient means of communicating whether for 
work-related activities or socially’.  See also D De Villiers ‘Old 'Documents', 'Videotapes' and New 'Data 
Messages' – A Functional Approach to the Law of Evidence (part 1)’ (2010) 3 TSAR 558 – 575; D De Villiers 
‘Old 'Documents', 'Videotapes' and New 'Data Messages' – A Functional Approach to the Law of Evidence (part 
2)’ (2010) 4 TSAR 720 – 735; J Hofman ‘Electronic evidence in criminal cases’ (2006) 3 SACJ 257 – 275. 
9 Heroldt v Wills supra note 5 at para 8 where it was stated: ‘The pace of the march of technological progress has 
quickened to the extent that the social changes that result therefrom require high levels of skill not only from the 
courts, which must respond appropriately, but also from the lawyers who prepare cases…’ See also CMC 
Woodworking Machinery supra note 5 para 2 where it was stated, in the context of technological change, that ‘it 
is therefore not unreasonable to expect the law to recognise such changes and accommodate it.’  See further C 
Theophilopoulos ‘The admissibility of data, data messages, and electronic documents at trial’ (2015) 3 TSAR 461; 
J Hofman & J de Jager ‘South Africa’ in S Mason (ed) Electronic Evidence 3 ed (2012) 761. 
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In a legal context, the transformation of communication methodologies has affected the 
administration of justice,10 presented some challenges11 to various fields of law, and 
necessitated a plethora of new legislative instruments.12  In particular, the law of evidence and 
the law relating to information, communication and technology (ICT) are faced with several 
unique and novel challenges.13  
With the exponential increase in internet use (read together with the inevitable change 
in communication methodologies),14 one would expect concomitant amendments to the 
legislative environment regulating the characteristics and admissibility of electronic 
evidence.15  However, the required change to the legal framework in the ICT environment has, 
thus far, been conservative16 and hesitant17 – presumably to ensure legal certainty, and clarity. 
As at October 2018, the regulatory environment governing electronic commerce is 
dated and showing its age – it requires amendment to accommodate technological 
development, and in order to ensure consistency and clarity.  In this regard, the South African 
Law Reform Commission (SALRC) suggests three different methodologies for law reform, 
and ultimately recommends the most aggressive of these three options18 in the guise of a Law 
of Evidence Bill.19  Although this research, holistically, agrees with the SALRC and its 
findings, it disagrees with the selected option for law reform.  Rather than a drastic overhaul 
of the current legal framework, to ensure internationally compliant and conceptually sound 
                                                             
10 M Beazley Social Media and the Courts: Service of Process Fourth Judicial Seminar on Commercial 
Litigation (2013) http://www.supremecourt.justice.nsw.gov.au/Documents/Publications/Speeches/Pre-
2015%20Speeches/Beazley/beazley_160513.pdf, accessed 17 April 2016. 
11 Heroldt v Wills supra note 5 at para 9 where the court noted that there is a ‘dearth of case law on the question 
of social media’. See further Van der Merwe et al op cit note 4 at 1 and 14; De Villiers (1) op cit note 8 at 558.    
12 For example, in South Africa: the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002; the Protection 
of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013, and the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Communication Related Information Act 70 of 2002. 
13 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 2 at 437; D Zeffertt and A Paizes Essential Evidence (2010) 268-270; 
S Papadopoulos & S Snail (eds) Cyberlaw@SA III (2012) 315 – 317. 
14 CMC Woodworking Machinery supra note 5 at para 2. 
15 As an umbrella term, and for purposes of this research, the terms data message and electronic evidence will be 
used interchangeably. See, for example, S v Meyer 2017 JDR 1728 (GJ) para 298 where the court uses the term 
electronic evidence.  See also Hofman & de Jager op cit note 9 at 761 where the authors use the same term, and 
note that ‘data messages do not fit comfortably into the traditional categories of excluded and admitted evidence’.  
As to terminology (data messages and electronic evidence), see further the discussion in chapter 2 below in 
paragraph 2.1. 
16 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 2 at 438. 
17 M Watney ‘Admissibility of Electronic Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: An Outline of the South African 
Legal Position’ (2009) 1 Journal of Information, Law and Technology 3. 
18 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) 86 – 88 for a summary of the three proposed options for law reform.  
19 Attached hereto as Annexure A. 
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legislation, a more cautious amendment of existing legislation is the preferable approach in the 
short to medium term.20   
1.2 NATURE OF ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE 
In terms of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 (ECT Act), the 
correct term to describe electronic evidence is data messages and/or data.21 This follows the 
position of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), and the 
Model Law on Electronic Commerce of 1996 (Model Law, 1996).22 Although there is no one 
single, definitive definition for electronic evidence, in the latest edition of Electronic 
Evidence,23 the authors define it as: 
data (comprising the output of analogue devices or data in digital form) that is manipulated, 
stored or communicated by any manufactured device, computer or computer system or 
transmitted over a communication system, that has the potential to make the factual account of 
either party more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence 
There are a number of devices and technologies that produce electronic evidence: They are too 
numerous to exhaustively catalogue.24  However, most modern legal disputes appear to contain 
one or more of the following types of electronic evidence: Mobile phone data and/or records;25  
data produced from a software programme;26 e-mail data and/or e-mail access data;27 social 
media and messaging services communication data;28 data contained on a person’s laptop or 
                                                             
20 The analysis of foreign law in this thesis is deliberately within English speaking countries with a common law 
heritage – aspects of the law in United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand and the United States of America will be 
reviewed herein.  The reason for this is to focus on law as similar as possible to South Africa given that the country 
is in the throes of attempting to introduce legislation relating to electronic evidence when this is arguably not 
necessary at this time.  
21 See section 1 of the ECT Act. 
22 Article 2 of United Nations ‘UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment’ 1996 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/electcom/05-89450_Ebook.pdf accessed on 5 April 2016.  See also the 
discussion in Chapter 2 paragraph 2.1 below. 
23 B Schafer & S Mason ‘The characteristics of electronic evidence’ in S Mason & D Seng (eds) Electronic 
Evidence 4 ed (2017) 18 – 34. 
24 B Schafer & S Mason ‘The characteristics of electronic evidence in digital format’ in Mason (ed) Electronic 
Evidence 3 ed (2012) 23 – 69; G Weir & S Mason ‘The sources of digital evidence’ in S Mason (ed) Electronic 
Evidence 3 ed (2012) 1 – 21.  See also the fourth edition of this text: Schafer & Mason op cit note 22 at 18 – 34; 
G Weir & S Mason ‘The sources of electronic evidence’ in S Mason & D Seng (eds) Electronic Evidence 4 ed 
(2017) 1 – 17. 
25 S v Miller 2016 (1) SACR 251 (WCC); S v Panayiotou [2018] 1 All SA 224 (ECP). 
26 LA Consortium & Vending CC v MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd 2011 (4) SA 577 (GSJ). 
27 General Council of the Bar of South Africa v Jiba 2017 (2) SA 122 (GP); Mnyandu v Padayachi 2017 (1) SA 
151 (KZP); S v Meyer supra note 15. 
28 RM v RB 2015 (1) SA 270 (KZP); Isparta v Richter 2013 (6) SA 529 (GNP). 
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personal computer;29 or data that may be contained on a remote server, a so-called cloud based 
service – such as DropBox, Amazon Cloud and Google Drive.30  
Electronic forms of evidence have traditionally been viewed with scepticism.  
Primarily, because of the perception that evidence in electronic form can be easily 
manipulated31 – the key evidentiary concerns relate to authentication and reliability of the 
evidence.32   
1.3 ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Technology has developed rapidly over the last three decades.33  Over the last decade in 
particular, information is regularly transmitted and stored electronically – and only 
electronically.  The use of mobile phones, e-mail, social media, and various electronic 
messaging services are ubiquitous.  This current norm will more than likely change and 
transform as society develops (and with the effluxion of time), but for the short to medium 
term, electronic forms of evidence will be critical in all types of legal proceedings.   
Post the promulgation of the ECT Act, despite some confusion around business records 
and its interaction with hearsay, as well as some debate as to the precise meaning of s 15 of the 
ECT Act, more recent case law34 suggests a maturing approach to electronic evidence.  South 
Africa’s judiciary has adapted to the needs of a modern, quickly-developing society with an 
ageing legislative environment.  
The first reported case dealing with electronic evidence in South Africa was Narlis v 
South African Bank of Athens (Narlis).35  Ultimately, bank records in the form of computer 
                                                             
29 Harvey v Niland 2016 (2) SA 436 (ECG). 
30 C Theophilopoulos ‘Electronic documents, encryption, cloud storage and the privilege against self-
incrimination’ (2015) 123(3) SALJ 596 – 599. 
31 South African Law Reform Commission Issue Paper 27 (Project 126) Electronic Evidence in Criminal and 
Civil Proceedings: Admissibility and Related Issues (2010) 7 – 13.  Although not exhaustive, further challenges 
include: rapidly evolving technology, fragility of the media, dependency on certain specific hardware and/or 
software, and fact that data on networked environments is regarded as dynamic. See further Watney op cit note 
17 at 1 – 13. 
32 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) 20 – 25. 
33 South African Law Reform Commission Issue Paper 27 (Project 126) Electronic Evidence in Criminal and 
Civil Proceedings: Admissibility and Related Issues (2010) 7.  For the basics on computer technology, and the 
sources of electronic evidence, see Schafer & Mason op cit note 23 at 18 – 34. 
34 S v Panayiotou supra note 25; S v Miller supra note 25; S v Brown 2016 (1) SACR 206 (WCC); Delsheray Trust 
supra note 5; ABSA Bank Ltd v Le Roux 2014 1 SA 475 (WCC); Harvey v Niland supra note 29; Spring Forest 
Trading 599 CC v Wilberry (Pty) Ltd t/a Ecowash 2015 (2) SA 118 (SCA). 
35 1976 (2) SA 573 (A). See also South African Law Reform Commission Issue Paper 27 (Project 126) Electronic 
Evidence in Criminal and Civil Proceedings: Admissibility and Related Issues (2010) 7. 
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print-outs in Narlis could not be admitted to court as evidence. Since then, it appears that 
electronic evidence in South Africa has been looked at with a sense of caution – however, 
recent case law36 suggests this attitude does appear to have changed (or is in the process of 
changing).   
Following Narlis, South Africa promulgated overly-technical legislation in the form of 
the Computer Evidence Act.37  General consensus was that this legislation failed38 – it was 
repealed entirely in August 2002 with the promulgation of the ECT Act.39  Read together with 
related legislation,40 the ECT Act is the primary legislation in South Africa regulating 
electronic evidence. Although the ECT Act is ageing, it still achieves one of its primary 
functions in facilitating the admissibility of electronic evidence.  However, there is room for 
improvement in the current legislative environment – particularly in so far as hearsay electronic 
evidence is concerned. Moreover, there are several other areas of confusion and/or 
inconsistency that require amendment and further consideration by an expert working-group.41  
1.4 AN OUTLINE OF KEY RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
This research will attempt to answer six primary questions relating to electronic evidence, the 
answers to which will ideally add to the current discourse.  Ultimately, this research will 
suggest several areas of law reform, but will disagree with the suggested approach put forward 
by the SALRC.  However, this research does support the SALRC’s overall position that reform 
is required, and further supports the suggestion that a working group of information technology 
and legal experts should be established to review this dynamic environment periodically. 
Consequently, the primary aim of this study is to suggest law reform that will develop 
electronic evidence in South Africa in a manner that is clear, consistent, and where appropriate, 
compliant with international norms. In order to achieve this, this research is separated into the 
following questions: 
1. What is the current legal position in so far as the admissibility and evidential 
weight of data messages in South Africa is concerned?  
                                                             
36 See note 34 above. 
37 Act 57 of 1983. 
38 S v Brown supra note 34 at para 16.  See also Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 2 at 440. 
39 Section 92 of the ECT Act.  See further the discussion in chapter 2 para 2.2 below. 
40 Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965; Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977; Law of Evidence Amendment 
Act 45 of 1988.  These regulatory instruments will be discussed in chapter 2 para 2.2 below. 
41 See chapter 8 para 8.2 below for a summary of law reform recommendations arising from this research. 
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1.1 What reform, if any, is required to the definition of data message? 
1.2 Does the principle of functional equivalence apply in South Africa?  
2. Should electronic evidence constitute hearsay within the meaning of section 3 
of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act? 42  
2.1 In the context of hearsay electronic evidence, to what extent, if any, does 
the ECT Act ‘liberate’43 data messages from the exclusionary hearsay 
rule? 
2.2 Irrespective of hearsay, how does one consistently determine whether a 
data message is documentary evidence or real evidence? 
3. In the context of data messages, does a presumption of regularity exist in South 
African law? 
3.1 Is the law reform proposed by the SALRC regarding presumptions 
necessary? 
3.2 Is the law reform proposed by the SALRC regarding presumptions 
desirable? 
4. In so far as authentication and weight of electronic evidence are concerned, does 
section 15 of the ECT Act require amendment? 44  
5. Is it appropriate to apply different evidentiary considerations to electronic 
evidence in civil and criminal proceedings? 
6. Regarding the SALRC’s recommendations (the proposed Law of Evidence Bill), 
what are the difficulties with the proposed law reform? 
  6.1 In the context of law reform, what approach should South Africa adopt? 
                                                             
42 This issue is drawn from the South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) The 
Review of the Law of Evidence (2014) Issue 6 at 62 – 67. 
43 D Zeffertt & A Paizes The South African Law of Evidence 2 ed (2009) at 432. 
44 This issue is drawn from South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) The 
Review of the Law of Evidence (2014) Issue 8 at 71 – 74. See also, South African Law Reform Commission Issue 
Paper 27 (Project 126) Electronic Evidence in Criminal and Civil Proceedings: Admissibility and Related Issues 
(2010) at 41 – 46. 
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6.2 What urgent law reform is required in the context of electronic 
evidence? 
1.5 RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The SALRC process of reviewing electronic evidence has spanned several issue and discussion 
papers from 1982 to date.45 The current recommendations made by the SALRC are pending 
before the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, under the Minister of Justice 
and Correctional Services.  
The current proposals have received feedback from, inter alia, the National Prosecuting 
Authority (NPA), the Law Society of South Africa (LSSA), the South African Police Service 
(SAPS), commercial business, academia, private attorney practice, and the Johannesburg Bar 
Council.  In my view, the nature of the review together with the plethora of responses received 
indicates a national importance – particularly when one considers areas of confusion and 
inconsistency in electronic evidence.  
Moreover, if one has regard to the explosion of internet usage over the past decade,46 it 
is reasonable to infer that we are entering a time (or have already entered a time) where the use 
of electronic communication technologies are critical to a fully functional, modern society.47  
As noted by the KwaZulu-Natal High Court in Durban: It is not unreasonable to expect the law 
to recognise [technological] changes and accommodate them.48  
The research conducted for this thesis is qualitative in the form of descriptive desktop 
research.  There will be an extensive analysis and critical review of the current South African 
legal position relating to the admissibility and evidentiary weight of electronic evidence.  In 
order to draw definitive conclusions, and offer recommendations on appropriate law reform, it 
                                                             
45 The SALRC has explored the issue of electronic evidence since its inception in 1982.  See, for example, South 
African Law Commission (Project 6) Report on the Admissibility in Civil Proceedings of Evidence Generated by 
Computers (1982) and South African Law Commission Report (Project 6) Review of the Law Evidence (1986).  
See also: South African Law Commission Working Paper 60 (Project 95) Investigation into the Computer 
Evidence Act 57 of 1983 (1995); South African Law Commission Issue Paper 14 (Project 108) Computer-related 
crime (1998); South African Law Commission Discussion Paper 99 (Project 108) Computer-related Crime 
(2001); South African Law Reform Commission Issue Paper 27 (Project 126) Electronic Evidence in Criminal 
and Civil Proceedings: Admissibility and Related Issues (2010); South African Law Reform Commission 
Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) The Review of the Law of Evidence (2014). 
46 See note 7 above, Internet World Stats 2018 http://www.internetworldstats.com/africa.htm#za, accessed on 31 
July 2018. 
47 Hofman & de Jager op cit note 9 at 761.  
48 Steyn J in CMC Woodworking Machinery supra note 5 at para 2. 
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will also be necessary to review South African law reform research, as well as international 
resolutions, international legislation, and international case law relating to electronic evidence. 
1.6 THESIS OUTLINE 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters, the first of which is this chapter, electronic evidence 
in South Africa – an introduction, which sets out the work’s primary purpose, and relevant 
research questions.   The second chapter explores terminology relating to electronic evidence, 
and considers whether functional equivalence is applicable in South Africa.  The third chapter 
analyses hearsay electronic evidence, and assesses the application of the hearsay rule in the 
context of electronic evidence. 
 The study then proceeds to examine electronic instruments in chapter 4, and considers 
presumptions, judicial notice and the application thereof in relation to electronic evidence.  
Next, in chapter 5, the study moves naturally to consider admissibility and weight of electronic 
evidence holistically.   
 Chapter 6 considers whether a court should apply different evidentiary considerations 
to electronic evidence in civil and criminal proceedings, and examines whether all data 
message evidence should be proved beyond reasonable doubt in a criminal trial.  Thereafter, 
chapter 7 analyses the SALRC’s most recent law reform recommendations, and deals with each 
of the eleven questions posed.  Finally, chapter 8 provides a summary of this work’s findings 
and recommendations for law reform. 
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CHAPTER 2:1TERMINOLOGY, AN OVERVIEW OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL 
POSITION IN RELATION TO DATA MESSAGES, AND FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENCE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Electronic evidence is increasingly relevant in all forms of legal dispute.  Accordingly, this 
chapter starts with an examination of the relevant terminology in the context of electronic 
evidence.  The chapter then proceeds to provide an overview of the regulatory framework 
governing electronic evidence in South Africa in both civil and criminal proceedings; and 
concludes with a discussion on functional equivalence (considering whether this principle is 
applicable in South Africa).  The primary objective of this chapter is to set out the basic legal 
framework applicable to electronic evidence in South Africa. 
2.2 DATA MESSAGES  
In a South African context, it is prudent to deal with terminology, then to analyse the genesis 
of the regulatory environment relating to electronic evidence.  This will allow a thorough 
identification of the current areas of confusion and inconsistency, and facilitate clear and 
consistent law reform suggestions. 
Computer or machine related evidence2 is often referred to as electronic evidence,3 
digital evidence,4 ESI evidence5 (electronically stored information), computer evidence,6 or 
                                                             
1 A version of this second chapter was published as L Swales ‘An Analysis of the Regulatory Environment 
Governing Hearsay Electronic Evidence in South Africa: Suggestions for Reform – Part One’ (2018) 21 PELJ 2 
– 24. 
2 C Theophilopoulos ‘The admissibility of data, data messages, and electronic documents at trial’ (2015) 3 TSAR 
462 – 463 where the admissibility requirements for an electronic document to be presented at a trial are discussed.   
3 J Hofman & J de Jager ‘South Africa’ in S Mason (ed) Electronic Evidence 3 ed (2012) 761 – 796 where the 
authors review electronic evidence (data messages) in a South African context. 
4 P Schwikkard & S van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 4 ed (2016) 437. 
5 S Papadopoulos & S Snail (eds) Cyberlaw@SA III (2012) 315. 
6 The term used by van Zyl J in S v Ndiki 2008 (2) SACR 252 (Ck) para 4.  This case is also reported as S v Ndiki 
[2007] 2 All SA 185 (Ck). 
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ICT7 evidence – none of these terms exist in South African statutes, rather, the term data 
message8 is used.9 South Africa drew this definition from the UNICTRAL Model Law, 1996.10 
The first introduction11 of the term data message12 to South African law was on 30 August 
2002 with the promulgation of the ECT Act.  
Interestingly, the promulgation of the proposed Cybercrimes Bill13 in its current form 
will lead to the term data message having conflicting definitions – the current definition in the 
ECT Act reads as follows: 
‘data message’ means data generated, sent, received or stored by electronic means and 
includes-  
(a)  voice, where the voice is used in an automated transaction; and  
(b)  a stored record  
The Cybercrimes Bill14 defines the term as: 
 
                                                             
7 D van der Merwe et al Information and Communications Technology Law 2 ed (2016) 107 – 111. 
8 See the sections containing definitions (section 1) in both the ECT Act and the Cybercrimes Bill B6B – 2017.  
The term electronic evidence does not exist. The term used is data message; see also South African Law Reform 
Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence (2014) para 3.2 at 27; D Zeffertt 
& A Paizes The South African Law of Evidence 2 ed (2009) at 843 – 847. 
9 Or more broadly, the term data is used, and is defined in the ECT Act as ‘electronic representation of information 
of any form’.  See also D Zeffertt & A Paizes Essential Evidence (2010) 268 – 270; Schwikkard & van der Merwe 
op cit note 4 at 437 – 438. 
10 United Nations ‘UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment’ 1996 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/electcom/05-89450_Ebook.pdf accessed on 5 April 2016; South African 
Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence (2014) ch3; see also 
United Nations ‘Status: UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce (1996)’ 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/electronic_commerce/1996Model_status.html, accessed on 4 
August 2018 where the Secretariat lists member states that comply with the Model Law, 1996.  There are 71 
States in a total of 150 jurisdictions that have adopted it. South Africa is largely compliant: ‘…except for the 
provisions on certification and electronic signatures.’ 
11 The ECT Act followed the Computer Evidence Act 57 of 1983, which did not attempt to define electronic 
evidence – rather, it defined the broad term of information as ‘any information expressed in or conveyed by letters, 
figures, characters, symbols, marks, perforations, patterns, pictures, diagrams, sounds or any other visible, audible 
or perceptible signals.’  See also D Zeffertt & A Paizes The South African Law of Evidence 3 ed (2017) at 976 – 
981. 
12 South African Law Reform Commission Issue Paper 27 (Project 126) Electronic Evidence in Criminal and 
Civil Proceedings: Admissibility and Related Issues (2010) 31 – 33; South African Law Reform Commission 
Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence (2014) paras 4.23 – 4.40 at 52 – 55. 
13 B6B – 2017. 
14 The first version of the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill released for public comment (referred to as ‘B-
2015’) used the same definition of data message as was contained in second version of the Bill, B6-2017.  The 
most recent version of the Bill, the B6B – 2017 version was approved by the Justice and Correctional Services 
committee on 7 November 2018.  It will likely be promulgated in 2019.  Interestingly, the Bill no longer makes 
provision for cyber response infrastructure such as a 24/7 point of contact, a Cyber Response Committee, and 
various government structures supporting cybersecurity.  As a result, the proposed law has changed names from 
the ‘Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill’ to the ‘Cybercrimes Bill’. 
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‘data message’ means data generated, sent, received or stored by electronic means, where 
any output of the data is in an intelligible form  
Section 58 of the Cybercrimes Bill15 does not repeal or amend the definition of data message 
contained within the ECT Act – this misnomer, although a minor oversight, and of little 
practical effect, should be corrected as soon as possible.    
Moreover, the words ‘where any output of the data is in an intelligible form’ are 
probably not necessary and include a condition to a data message's admissibility that is 
arguably not necessary, or applicable to traditional evidence.16  If data is not in intelligible 
form, it may render the evidence almost meaningless in any event, and it would probably carry 
very little evidentiary weight if it were to be admissible.   However, it may also be the case that 
the apparently unintelligible data is required to prove some or other relevant issue in dispute – 
the admission of a data message that is unintelligible may provide context or add a strand of 
cable to the narrative.17 One must ask: Is this type of condition to admissibility found with 
paper or traditional evidence?  No. Paper-based evidence need not be intelligible to be 
admissible.  However, if a court is to admit data messages in unintelligible form, the inclusion 
of theoretically meaningless evidence has the potential to undermine the common law of 
evidence,18 and has the potential to increase the time a court will require to dispose of a matter.   
Be that as it may, in my view, a concise and simple definition is preferable – with as 
few limiting features as possible – and adding a further layer or condition to the definition is 
not necessary or in accordance with international best practice.19   
The current proposed definition of data message contained in the Cybercrimes Bill (as 
well as those in the previous Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill) represents a departure from 
                                                             
15 Section 58 (read together with the appropriate Schedule thereto) does not list the definition of data message in 
ECT Act in the list of repeal or amendment of laws.  There are, however, a number of provisions in the ECT Act, 
for example those relating to cybercrime that will be repealed. 
16 Although no definition for unintelligible data is provided by the SALRC, the ordinary meaning of the word 
suggests it would refer to data that cannot be read on a screen or used in a software programme.  However, 
unintelligible data (such as a corrupt e-mail message or inaccessible software file) may well, in theory, be useful 
in proving some other fact at issue.  Further, the metadata attached to the data message may also be relevant in 
proving or disproving some issue in dispute. 
17 A Paizes ‘The law of evidence: Seven wishes for the next twenty years’ (2014) 3 SACJ 281 where reference is 
made to the Australian cases of Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573 and Edwards v The Queen (1993) 
178 CLR 193. 
18 The common law of evidence in South Africa can be summarised with reference to R v Trupedo 1920 AD 58: 
all relevant evidence is admissible – the converse will equally apply: namely, all irrelevant evidence is 
inadmissible; see also South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 113 Project 126 Review of the 
Law of Evidence—Hearsay and Relevance (2008) 14. 
19 See, for example, art 2 of the Model Law, 1996. 
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what was recommended in the ECT Amendment Bill 2012,20 where it was suggested that the 
definition of data message should be amended to: 
‘Data message’ means electronic communications including:  
(a)  voice, where the voice is used in an automated transaction; and 
(b)  any other form of electronic communications stored as a record 
 
The ECT Amendment Bill, 2012 was withdrawn21 due to the development and imminent 
promulgation of comprehensive cybercrime and cybersecurity legislation, namely the 
Cybercrimes Bill.   
Arguably, all three of these South African definitions are overly complicated. By way 
of example, the United States comparable definition22 (the concept has a different name – 
electronic record) is concise – it reads: ‘a record created, generated, sent, communicated, 
received, or stored by electronic means’.  
Further, the Model Law, 1996 defines the term as:    
(a) Data message means information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, 
optical or similar means including, but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), 
electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy 
  
While the UNICTRAL definition above does appear somewhat dated – verbose even – South 
Africa has an opportunity to produce a modern, streamlined definition when the Cybercrimes 
Bill is promulgated as an Act of Parliament. Holistically, any definition should be neutral, 
concise, and comply with functional equivalence where possible.   My suggestion, which is 
consistent with the most recent SALRC recommendation,23 is: ‘data message’ means data 
generated, sent, received or stored by electronic means.  
 
 
                                                             
20 GN R888 in GG 35821of 26 October 2012. 
21 Advised by the Parliamentary Monitoring Group in August 2015 that the Amendment Bill was withdrawn. 
22 In terms of section 2 of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, 1999. 
23 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) 52 – 55. 
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2.3 OVERVIEW OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK GOVERNING ELECTRONIC 
EVIDENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA: CIVIL PROCEEDINGS  
The South African law of evidence is not codified in one single statute24 – the Constitution,25 
a variety of statutes,26 the common law,27 and applicable case law must be considered to form 
a view on whether potential evidence is admissible, and if admissible, the weight it should be 
accorded.   
In general, South Africa takes an exclusionary28 approach to evidence in civil and 
criminal proceedings – this position mimics the English common law.29 Evidence will only be 
considered admissible if it is relevant to a fact at issue,30 and even if relevant, the evidence will 
only be admissible if it is not excluded by a common law or statutory rule precluding the 
admissibility of a certain type31 of evidence, or precluding the admissibility of evidence 
obtained in a certain manner.32  
Typically, the admission of evidence to civil or criminal court occurs in one of three 
ways: as oral evidence from a witness,33 documentary evidence in the form of a document,34 
                                                             
24 A Bellengère et al The Law of Evidence in South Africa (2013) at 4; P Schwikkard & S van der Merwe Principles 
of Evidence 3 ed (2009) 24 – 31. 
25 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 4 at 27. 
26 Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965; Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977; Law of Evidence Amendment 
Act 45 of 1988; Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002; and where applicable, The 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
27 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 4 at 26 – 27. 
28 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 4 at 438; Papadopoulos & Snail op cit note 5 at 317; van der Merwe 
et al op cit note 7 at 107; Hofman & de Jager op cit note 3 at 761; M Watney ‘Admissibility of Electronic Evidence 
in Criminal Proceedings: An Outline of the South African Legal Position’ (2009) 1 Journal of Information, Law 
and Technology 3. 
29 S v Ndiki supra note 6 para 21 where the common law position with regard to evidence is stated as follows: 
‘evidence tending to prove or disprove an allegation which is in issue is admissible unless a specific ground for 
exclusion operates’. See also R v Trupedo 1920 AD 58 at 62; Hofman & de Jager op cit note 3 at 761; 
Papadopoulos & Snail op cit note 5 at 316. 
30 R v Trupedo supra note 29 at 62; Ndiki supra note 6 para 21. 
31 For example, hearsay evidence, as a default position, is not admissible unless an exception applies. For more 
on hearsay evidence in general, see: Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 4 at 287-304; Zeffertt & Paizes op 
cit note 8 at 385 – 441; Bellengère et al op cit note 24 at 234 – 245; Zeffertt & Paizes The South African Law of 
Evidence 3 ed (2017) at 399 – 470. 
32 Evidence obtained in an unconstitutional manner is generally inadmissible, but subject to the overriding factor 
of the administration of justice balanced against the right of an accused to have a fair trial – consequently, even 
evidence obtained in an unconstitutional manner may (in certain instances) be admissible. For example, see 
Harvey v Niland 2016 (2) SA 436 (ECG) where evidence that was unlawfully obtained by hacking into a person’s 
private social media account (and in violation of the right to privacy) was found to be admissible.  For more on 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence see Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 4 at 198 – 283; Zeffertt & 
Paizes op cit note 8 at 721 – 736; Bellengère et al op cit note 24 at 292 – 305. 
33 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 4 at 388 – 420. 
34 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 4 at 431-436; Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 8 at 827 – 843; Watney op 
cit note 28 at 5 – 11. 
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or real evidence in the form of a tangible thing.35  There is no sui generis category36 for 
electronic evidence and many courts have reached differing conclusions37 on how best to 
classify and treat electronic evidence.  
The classification must depend on the type of electronic evidence, and its nature38 – once 
this is established, the admissibility requirements for that type of evidence must be assessed 
(in light of any concessions provided for in related legislation such as the ECT Act).  As noted 
by Bozalek J in S v Brown:39  
… the admissibility of an electronic communication will depend, to no small extent, on 
whether it is treated as an object (real evidence) or as a document. 
Electronic evidence has been treated with caution40 and conservatively41 – a prominent South 
African resource on evidence even remarked, in 1997, that in leaving paper, there will be no 
‘guarantees of authenticity and reliability.’42 Skepticism of the medium notwithstanding, the 
default position is that subject to express guidance in applicable legislation such as the ECT 
                                                             
35 Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 8 at 849 – 862; Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 4 at 421 – 430. 
36 Watney op cit note 28 at 11 where the author does not support the creation of a sui generis category for electronic 
evidence; see also P Fourie Using Social Media as Evidence in South African Courts (LLM thesis, North-West 
University, 2016) 12; G van Tonder The admissibility and evidential weight of electronic evidence in South 
African legal proceedings: a comparative perspective (LLM thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2013) 59. 
37LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA Enterprises v MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd 2011 (4) SA 577 (GSJ) 
para 12 where a full bench of the South Gauteng High Court in Johannesburg stated: ‘The data messages relied 
upon in this case are not only real evidence but include hearsay’; Ndiki supra note 6 para 20 & para 33 where the 
court concluded that a data message can be either real or documentary evidence, depending on its purpose and 
nature; but then commented further, obiter, that to avoid a difficult distinction between what would constitute 
hearsay evidence and what real evidence, computer generated evidence should always be treated as hearsay. This 
obiter statement is not supported and should be avoided to ensure South Africa remains consistent with its 
common law, and with international best practice – see a sample of the international legal position discussed 
below in chapter 3 at para 3.6.  See also S v Brown 2016 (1) SACR 206 (WCC) para 20 where the court noted: 
‘Given the potential mutability and transient nature of images such as the images in this matter which are 
generated, stored and transmitted by an electronic device, I consider that they are more appropriately dealt with 
as documentary evidence rather than “real evidence”. I associate myself, furthermore, with the approach followed 
in [Ndiki supra note 6 para 20] where Van Zyl J expressed the view that the first step in considering the 
admissibility of documentary evidence is to examine the nature of the evidence in issue in order to determine what 
kind of evidence one is dealing with and what the requirements for its admissibility are.’ 
38 Ndiki supra note 6 para 20; Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services [2006] 4 All SA 165 (W) 18; Brown 
supra note 37 para 20; S v Meyer 2017 JDR 1728 (GJ) para 299 – 304.  See also van der Merwe et al op cit note 
7 at 124 – 130; Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 4 at 445 – 446. 
39 Brown supra note 37 para 18. 
40 S v BM 2014 (2) SACR 23 (SCA) para 33 where the court noted: ‘Whilst the best evidence rule seems 
everywhere to be in retreat, that does not mean that a court must accept as accurate secondary evidence of a 
document or other form of writing, such as a text message. The fact, that it has been thought necessary to make 
elaborate provision in a statute for the admissibility in evidence of such messages,  demonstrates the need for 
caution in this regard.’ Hofman & de Jager op cit note 3 para 18.04 at 762; Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit 
note 4 at 438. 
41 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 4 at 438. 
42 Hofman & de Jager op cit note 3 para 18.04 at 762; J Hofman ‘Electronic evidence in criminal cases’ (2006) 3 
SACJ 267 – 268. 
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Act, the normal South African legal position in relation to the admissibility of evidence also 
applies to data messages.43 
2.3.1 The Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 
The first computer arrived in South Africa in the 1950’s,44 and one can trace the statutory 
evolution of electronic evidence in South Africa to the civil decision of Narlis v South African 
Bank of Athens (Narlis).45  
Prior to Narlis, the primary legislative instrument regulating electronic evidence was 
the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965 (CPEA). On 30 June 1967 the CPEA was 
promulgated with the goal of codifying evidentiary issues pertaining to civil matters – it did 
not provide expressly for electronic evidence, and an amended version of the legislation is still 
in effect.  In its current form in 2018 it still does not expressly provide for electronic evidence 
– it does, however, provide for the admission46 of evidence relating to civil matters, particularly 
documentary evidence (whether the evidence is electronic or otherwise). 
In Narlis, the key issue was the existence of a principal debt47 owed by a surety and co-
principal debtor to the South African Bank of Athens.  The decisive evidence took the form of 
computerised bank statements, submitted to court by a bank manager.  The lower court had 
ruled that the computerised evidence was admissible and decided in favour of the bank.  
However, the Appellate Division, as it was then called, found that s 34 of the CPEA provided 
no basis for any discretionary admissibility of computerised statements.48 As a result, because 
a ‘person’ had not made the ‘statement’, the evidence was inadmissible, and the appellant 
successful. The court famously noted:49 ‘a computer, perhaps fortunately, is not a person’50 and 
                                                             
43 van der Merwe at al op cit note 7 at 130; Hofman & de Jager op cit note 3 para 18.12 at 766. 
44 Y Lulat United States Relations with South Africa: A Critical Overview from the Colonial Period to the 
Present (2008) 73 where date is stated as 1952; Hofman & de Jager op cit note 3 at 761 where the date is stated 
1959 and Mybroadband 2015 https://mybroadband.co.za/news/hardware/132408-south-africas-first-
computers.html, accessed on 25 July 2018 where the date is also stated as 1959. The actual date is of little 
consequence to this research, but it appears it was at least in the 1950's. 
45 Narlis v South African Bank of Athens 1976 (2) SA 573 (A); van der Merwe at al op cit note 7 at 111; Watney 
op cit note 28 at 3 – 6. 
46Trend Finance (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service [2005] 4 All SA 657 (C) para 
36 – 42. 
47 Narlis supra note 45 at 154. 
48 Narlis supra note 45 at 157. 
49 Narlis supra note 45 at 156. 
50 This dictum was repeated in Ex parte Rosch [1998] 1 All SA 319 (W) at 328 where the court again noted that: 
‘The computer is not a person.’ 
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further remarked that the matter (electronic evidence) might well engage the attention of the 
legislature in South Africa.51  And engage the legislature it did.   
In so far as the CPEA is concerned, although dated, the primary sections still applicable 
to electronic evidence are contained in Part I, particularly section 2 thereof, and Part VI, s 33 
– 35.52 Section 2 of the CPEA restates the common law regarding evidence, but its wording is 
negative, rather than positive.53 Section 33 defines a document54 as ‘any book, map, plan, 
drawing or photograph’.  This section and the entire Part VI also applies to criminal 
proceedings, as per s 222 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (CPA).55  Confusingly, s 
22156 of the CPA defines a document as ‘any device by means of which information is recorded 
or stored’. On the face of it, the definition of document in the CPEA is not wide enough as it 
currently stands to include a data message. Moreover, and strangely, it appears that the 
definition of document in the CPEA for civil proceedings is more restrictive (and narrow) than 
the definition contained in the CPA for criminal proceedings – this is not a sensible position. 
For the sake of completeness, there should be an amendment to the term ‘document’ in 
both the CPEA and the CPA.  Although, in practice, given the emergence of the ECT Act, and 
wide interpretation57 on the meaning and extent of the word ‘document’ this amendment would 
have very little practical effect – barring, of course, that it would ensure the CPEA and CPA 
are conceptually sound and up-to-date.   
2.3.2 The Computer Evidence Act 
Following the decision in Narlis, the Clearing Bankers Association approached the South 
African Law Commission (as it was then called)58 to investigate the need for legislative reform.  
                                                             
51 Supra note 45 at 157. 
52 Zeffertt & Paizes op cit 8 at 721-736; Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 4 at 439-440. 
53 Section 2 is entitled ‘evidence as to irrelevant matters’ and reads: ‘No evidence as to any fact, matter or thing 
which is irrelevant or immaterial and cannot conduce to prove or disprove any point or fact in issue shall be 
admissible’. South Africa’s common law of evidence revolves around relevance – see Ndiki supra note 6 at para 
21 where court sets out South Africa’s common law in one of the early (and seminal) electronic evidence cases. 
54 Watney op cit note 28 at 5. 
55 Shaik v S [2007] 2 All SA 9 (SCA) para 180. 
56 This section deals with the admissibility of business records and will be discussed in detail in chapter 3 below 
in the context of hearsay electronic evidence.  
57 Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2014 (1) SA 191 (GSJ) where the South Gauteng High Court in Johannesburg 
found that a data message is a document for purposes of Rule 35 of the Uniform Rules of Court.   
58 The South African Law Commission changed its name to the South African Law Reform Commission in 2002. 
see South African Law Reform Commission 2013 http://salawreform.justice.gov.za/anr/2012-2013-anr-salrc.pdf 
at 7, accessed on 5 April 2017.  
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The Commission was of the view that legislative reform was required and suggested the 
promulgation of a separate statute.59 
As a result, the Computer Evidence Act 57 of 198360 commenced operation on 1 
October 1983 and was South Africa’s first attempt at legislating rules and norms for computer 
and/or electronic based evidence.   
The Computer Evidence Act only applied to civil proceedings.61 While it was in effect, 
it was roundly criticised by a variety of academics,62 and even courts,63 for being overly 
technical.64 The understandably cautious approach was based on the general belief that 
alterations (or manipulation) of electronic data is far harder to detect than an alteration made 
to a paper-based document.65   
The promulgation of the Computer Evidence Act notwithstanding, the SALRC 
continued investigating evidence, and in particular electronic evidence through the 1980’s66 
and into the 2000’s.67  As was predicted in Narlis, computer evidence did indeed engage the 
attention of lawmakers in South Africa. 
                                                             
59 South African Law Commission (Project 6) Report on the Admissibility in Civil Proceedings of Evidence 
Generated by Computer, Review of the Law of Evidence (1982). 
60 For a perspective on the now repealed Computer Evidence Act, see S Mapoma A critical study of the 
authentication requirements of Section 2 of the Computer Evidence Act No 57 of 1983 (LLM thesis, University 
of South Africa, 1997) 3 – 32. 
61 Bellengère et al op cit note 24 at 74; Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 8 at 843; South African Law Reform 
Commission Issue Paper 27 (Project 126) Electronic Evidence in Criminal and Civil Proceedings: Admissibility 
and Related Issues (2010) 19 – 20.  
62 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 4 at 440; van der Merwe et al op cit note 7 at 112, South African Law 
Reform Commission Issue Paper 27 (Project 126) Electronic Evidence in Criminal and Civil Proceedings: 
Admissibility and Related Issues (2010) 19; Hofman & de Jager op cit note 3 at 763. 
63 Ndlovu supra note 38 at 171 where the court noted that the Computer Evidence Act had two major shortcomings: 
first, that is was ‘cumbersome’ to comply with its provisions, and secondly, that it only applied to civil 
proceedings. See also Brown supra note 37 para 16 where it was stated that the Computer Evidence Act ‘was 
generally considered to have failed to achieve its purpose’. 
64 Hofman & de Jager op cit note 3 at 762 – 763. 
65 Theophilopoulos op cit note 2 at 467 – 468. 
66 South African Law Commission (Project 6) Review of the Law of Evidence (1986).  
67 South African Law Commission Discussion Paper 99 (Project 108) Computer related crime (2001); South 
African Law Commission (Project 126) Report on the Preliminary Investigation into the Review of the Rules of 
Evidence (2002); South African Law Reform Commission (Project 113) The Use Of Electronic Equipment In 
Court Proceedings Postponement Of Criminal Cases Via Audiovisual Link (2003); South African Law Reform 
Commission Discussion Paper 113 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence Hearsay and Relevance (2008). 
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A limited number of reported decisions dealt with the Computer Evidence Act,68 but in 
Ex Parte Rosch, the court tried to bypass the cumbersome69 nature of the admissibility 
provisions by interpreting the statute to be a facilitating Act not a restricting one.70   
 This type of interpretation, although twenty years old, is consistent with what may be 
described as the ideal philosophy in electronic evidence – a facilitating approach, attempting 
functional equivalence,71 while ensuring that one type of evidence is not preferred over the 
other. 
2.3.3 The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act72 
The ECT Act repealed73 the Computer Evidence Act entirely when it came into effect on 30 
August 2002 following global trends,74 judicial calls,75 and law reform recommendations.76 
The ECT Act is the primary legislative instrument regulating electronic evidence and, 
although not expressly stated, applies to both civil and criminal proceedings77 – addressing one 
of the primary flaws of the now defunct Computer Evidence Act. It seeks to comprehensively 
regulate all aspects of electronic commerce, and but for two areas,78 follows the UNCITRAL 
Model Law, 1996. 79 
                                                             
68 See Ex parte Rosch [1998] 1 All SA 319 (W); Ndiki supra note 6 para 2; Ndlovu supra note 38 at 171. 
69 Supra note 68 at 327 – 328; see also South African Law Reform Commission Issue Paper 27 (Project 126) 
Electronic Evidence in Criminal and Civil Proceedings: Admissibility and Related Issues (2010) 20. 
70 Ex parte Rosch supra note 68 at 327.  
71 See the discussion on functional equivalence at para 2.4 below. 
72 Section 15 of the ECT Act, and admissibility of data message evidence in general is discussed in detail in 
chapter 5 below. 
73 Section 92 of the ECT Act. 
74 Based on the Model Law, 1996. 
75 S v Mashiyi 2002 (2) SACR 387 (Tk) 393 where Miller J noted: ‘all that I can do is add my voice to the call 
that this lacuna in our law be filled and for new legislation relating specifically to computer evidence in criminal 
cases.’   
76 See note 66 and 67 above. 
77 Section 4 of the ECT Act states that it applies in respect of any electronic transaction or data message. See also 
the general discussion on the ECT Act in South African Law Reform Commission Issue Paper 27 (Project 126) 
Electronic Evidence in Criminal and Civil Proceedings: Admissibility and Related Issues (2010) 16 – 17, and 29 
– 49 where the SALRC also conclude that the ECT Act applies to both civil and criminal proceedings; see further 
Theophilopoulos op cit note 2 at 461.   
78 According to the Secretariat of the United Nations, electronic signatures and certification are two areas that 
the ECT Act does not follow the Model Law, 1996.  See United Nations ‘Status: UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Electronic Commerce (1996)’ 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/electronic_commerce/1996Model_status.html, accessed on 5 
April 2018.    
79 Jafta v Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife (2009) 30 ILJ 131 (LC) para 62 – 99 where the Model Law, 1996 is discussed 
in detail with one of the delineations being: the ECT Act is primarily based thereon. 
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One of the primary purposes of the legislation (and the Model Law, 1996), is to 
facilitate functional equivalence80 by, inter alia, providing an electronic equivalent81 for paper-
based documents while recognising the inherent distinctions between written and electronic 
evidence.  Moreover, in terms of section 2(e) of the ECT Act, one of the specific reasons for 
the promulgation of the Act is to promote legal certainty.82  
The ECT Act83 is the only South African legislation that specifically regulates 
electronic evidence84 and can be described as facilitating85 e-commerce, and more specifically 
in this context, facilitating the admission and evidentiary weight of electronic evidence.  
Section 3 (interpretation) expressly makes this intention clear: it must not be interpreted so as 
to exclude any statutory law or the common law from being applied to, recognising or 
accommodating electronic transactions.  
The Supreme Court of Appeal86 has had limited opportunity to deal with the ECT Act,87 
but has noted: 
One of the [ECT] Act’s aims is to promote legal certainty and confidence in respect of 
electronic communications and transactions, and when interpreting the Act, the courts are 
enjoined to recognise and accommodate electronic transactions and data messages in the 
application of any statutory law or the common law. 88 
Further, in Firstrand Bank Limited v Venter,89 the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed that 
section 15 of the ECT Act: 
1. facilitates the use of and reliance on a data message; 
2. deals with the assessment of the evidential weight of such a message; and 
                                                             
80 See para 2.4 below for a detailed discussion on functional equivalence. 
81 Papadopoulos & Snail op cit note 5 at 318. 
82 South African Law Reform Commission Issue Paper 27 (Project 126) Electronic Evidence in Criminal and 
Civil Proceedings: Admissibility and Related Issues (2010) 29 – 30. 
83 For further background on the ECT Act see South African Law Reform Commission Issue Paper 27 (Project 
126) Electronic Evidence in Criminal and Civil Proceedings: Admissibility and Related Issues (2010) ch 6.  
84 Papadopoulos & Snail op cit note 5 at 317; Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 4 at 441-446. 
85 As envisioned by the court in Ex Parte Rosch supra note 68, in the technological environment, legislation ought 
to be facilitating – notwithstanding our common law heritage; see also Papadopoulos & Snail op cit note 5 at 318. 
86 Spring Forest Trading 599 CC v Wilberry (Pty) Ltd t/a Ecowash 2015 (2) SA 118 (SCA) where the court dealt 
with electronic signatures. 
87 See also Sublime Technologies (Pty) Ltd v Jonker 2010 (2) SA 522 (SCA) at para 13 – 14 where the primary 
issue dealt with an undertaking to pay costs as a result of a Practice Directive in the North Gauteng High Court, 
but where the definition of data message was mentioned.  In my view, the decision of the court a quo in this matter 
is clearly incorrect, namely that ‘evidence of bank records will be inadmissible unless the prescribed notice has 
been given’ (notice in terms of the CPEA).  Section 15(4) of the ECT facilitates the admission of this type of 
evidence without the need for notice if the section is complied with.  The underlying decision of the court a quo 
does not appear to be reported and is not material to this contribution.  
88 Spring Forest Trading supra note 85 para 16. 
89 [2012] JOL 29436 (SCA). 
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3. lays down the minimum requirements for admissibility. 
In addition, in S v Brown,90 the Western Cape High Court noted: 
Clearly, the overall scheme of the [ECT Act] is to facilitate the admissibility of data 
messaging as electronic evidence.  
The primary provisions of the ECT Act relevant to electronic evidence are found in Part 1 of 
Chapter III (facilitating electronic transactions), particularly sections 11 (legal recognition of 
data messages), 12 (writing), 14 (original) and 15 (admissibility and evidential weight of data 
messages), together with Part II which deals with the communication of data messages.91 
Principally, the ECT Act provides that data messages are legally binding and will have 
full legal force and effect – moreover, that a data message will be considered in writing, can 
be considered an original, and in certain instances a data message will qualify as an ordinary 
signature. In summary, the ECT Act attempts to provide a regulatory framework that facilitates 
data messages (electronic communications) being treated the same, in law, as traditional forms 
of communication.  
For example, in Jafta v Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife92 the Labour Court found that the ECT 
Act is consistent with global law.93  Further, that given s 11, which provides that a data message 
will have legal force and effect, even though SMS and e-mail often contain colloquial or 
relaxed language: ‘treating them [data messages] as having no legal effect would be a 
mistake.’94 
Sihlali v South African Broadcasting Corporation Ltd95 is instructive as it confirmed 
the fact that a data message (whether informal, SMS, e-mail, or howsoever transmitted) will 
carry all legal implications that would otherwise be the case with traditional and more formal 
communication.96 Further, in Spring Forest Trading 599 CC v Wilberry (Pty) Ltd t/a 
                                                             
90 Supra note 37 para 19. 
91 See van der Merwe et al op cit note 7 at 112-130 for an overview of the ECT Act in the context of evidentiary 
issues. See also Papadopoulos & Snail op cit note 5 at 317-330; Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 4 at 
441 – 446; Theophilopoulos op cit note 2 at 464 – 465. 
92 [2008] ZALC 84. 
93  Jafta v Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife supra note 92 para 62 – 99. 
94 Jafta v Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife supra note 92 para 78.  Although, see the recent reported arbitration of Gaxa 
and Kaiser Chiefs Football Club (2017) 38 ILJ 1221 (ARB), where a statement on social media platform Twitter 
by Kaizer Chiefs Football Club indicating that it had renewed the contract of Gaxa was not binding in the 
circumstances.  However, Gaxa’s decision was primarily based on contractual principles (reasonable reliance) 
and is not material to this research. 
95 (2010) 31 ILJ 1477 (LC). 
96 In this matter, a legal advisor for the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) sent an SMS message to 
the CEO indicating that he ‘quit with immediate effect’ – the primary issue was whether an SMS sent by the 
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Ecowash,97 the Supreme Court of Appeal found that e-mail communication will be regarded 
as reduced to writing and signed by the parties – if ‘the data in an email is intended by the user 
to serve as a signature and is logically connected with other data in the email.’98 Invariably, in 
my view, when a user types her name at the end of an e-mail, that action will be with the 
intention to serve as a signature and there will be data logically connected therewith – 
consequently, as a default position, in almost all cases, a person's name at the end of an e-mail 
will qualify as an electronic signature in terms of section 13 read with section 1 of the ECT 
Act.99  
In so far as electronic evidence is concerned, the critical provision in the ECT Act is s 
15 which prohibits the exclusion of evidence on the mere grounds that it is generated by a 
computer and not by a natural person;100 and prohibits the exclusion of evidence on the grounds 
that it is not original – if the evidence is the best evidence reasonably available.101  
Section 15 seeks to facilitate102 the admissibility of data messages, and follows an 
inclusionary rather than an exclusionary approach.103  That said, s 15 does not seek to override 
the normal principles applicable to hearsay104 – data messages must be treated the same as any 
other evidence and the admissibility thereof must follow the ordinary rules applicable105 to the 
South African law of evidence (except where concessions are made in the ECT Act: for 
example, with the concept of original, and with the ‘business-records’ exception). 
2.3.4 The Law of Evidence Amendment Act 
The Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 was assented to on 15 April 1988 and 
became effective on 3 October 1988 – it is still in force in 2018, and applies to both civil and 
criminal proceedings.  It is exceptionally short and deals with only two matters of evidence: 
                                                             
applicant (Sihlali) to the SABC constituted a valid resignation.  It was held that a communication by SMS, in 
terms of the ECT Act, is a communication in writing, and the SMS was binding. 
97 Supra note 86. 
98 Spring Forest Trading supra note 86 para 17 – 19 and paras 27 – 29. 
99 An electronic signature should not be confused with an advanced electronic signature.  For more on the 
distinction between the two, see S Eiselen ‘Fiddling with the ECT Act – Electronic Signatures’ (2014) 17 PELJ 
2805 – 2820; L Swales ‘The regulation of electronic signatures: Time for review and amendment’ (2015) 132 
SALJ 257 – 270; Y Mupangavanhu ‘Electronic signatures and nonvariation clauses in the modern digital world: 
The case of South Africa’ (2016) 133 SALJ 853 – 873. 
100 Section 15(1)(a); Ndlovu supra note 38 at 172; Meyer supra note 38 at para 299 – 301. 
101 Section 15(1)(b); Ndlovu supra note 38 at 172; Meyer supra note 38 at para 297; Brown supra note 37 para 17. 
102 Ndlovu supra note 38 at 173; LA Consortium supra note 37 at para 17. 
103 Brown supra note 37 para 17. 
104 LA Consortium supra note 37 para 13; Ndlovu supra note 38 at 18-19, Ndiki supra note 6 at 31; Meyer supra 
note 38 para 298 – 301.  See also Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 4 at 445 – 446.   
105 Hofman & de Jager op cit note 3 at 766 – 767. 
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Judicial notice and hearsay.106  In so far as hearsay is concerned, the Act regulates the 
admissibility of any hearsay evidence and provides judicial officers with a general discretion 
to admit hearsay as admissible if it proves to be in the interests of justice.107 
The Act does not expressly refer to electronic evidence and its application has been the 
subject of judicial, policy and academic debate108 – although it now appears settled, even 
though not expressly stated, the Law of Evidence Amendment Act does apply to data 
messages.109 
In LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA Enterprises v MTN Service Provider (Pty) 
Ltd110 (LA Consortium) it was held that: ‘any hearsay contained in a data message must pass 
the criteria set out in s 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988.’111   
Earlier, in Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services (Ndlovu),112 it was held that s 3 
of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act provides a court with a broad discretion to admit 
hearsay evidence if it is of the opinion that the hearsay evidence should be admitted in the 
interests of justice after having regard to certain factors.113  Ultimately, a trained and 
experienced judicial officer is left with large swathes of discretion when deciding whether to 
admit hearsay evidence.   
As noted by the court in Ndlovu, s 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment114 provides a 
court with a wide discretion to admit hearsay evidence.  A court must assess the relevance of 
the evidence – which means they must use a blend of ‘reason and common sense’ in deciding 
whether the evidence should be admissible.115 This test is flexible, and much will depend on 
the facts of the case, and the nature of proceedings; it should be noted that courts are more 
reluctant to accept hearsay in criminal matters.116  
                                                             
106 Van der Merwe et al op cit note 7 at 113 – 114. 
107 Section 3 (1)(c) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act. 
108 Hofman & de Jager op cit note 3 at 770 – 771. 
109 LA Consortium supra note 37 para 13-14; Ndiki supra note 6 para 7; Ndlovu supra note 38 at 165 – 166. 
110 Brown supra note 37. 
111 Brown supra note 37 para 13. 
112 Ndlovu supra note 38 at 165 – 166. 
113 The factors a court must have regard to are: (i) the nature of the proceedings; (ii) the nature of the evidence; 
(iii) the purpose for which the evidence is tendered; (iv) the probative value of the evidence; (v) the reason why 
the evidence is not given by the person upon whose credibility the probative value of such evidence depends; (vi) 
any prejudice to a party which the admission of such evidence might entail; and (vii) any other factor. 
114 See chapter 3 below where this section of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act is reproduced in full in 
paragraph 3.3, and hearsay electronic evidence discussed in detail.   
115 Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 8 at 247. 
116 Ibid at 417. 
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Specifically, s 3 (1) (c) (vii) provides that a court must consider whether ‘such evidence 
should be admitted in the interests of justice.’  This is a value judgment that will be made on a 
case-by-case basis assessing the overall relevance of the evidence.  A court will ultimately be 
considering whether the evidence is relevant to an issue at trial, and whether the benefit of 
accepting the evidence will outweigh its potentially prejudicial effect.   
In my view, this position is satisfactory – South Africa no longer has to guard against 
jury members being influenced or poisoned by hearsay evidence, and a judicial officer (who is 
trained and experienced) is best placed to make a case-by-case determination on whether the 
hearsay evidence should be admissible in the interests of justice.  
Even if all electronic evidence were to be categorised as hearsay117 (which view is not 
supported), then conceivably, it could still be admissible under the exceptions contained in this 
section. Ultimately, a judicial officer will always have the discretion to admit hearsay 
electronic evidence if he or she feels it to be in the interests of justice – and rightly so in my 
view.   
 However, the discretion to admit hearsay electronic evidence notwithstanding, it is 
conceptually incorrect to insist that all electronic evidence is hearsay – this is akin to saying all 
documents produced by a type-writer are hearsay, and does not properly consider South 
Africa’s common law relating to real evidence.118  The technology is merely a tool to deliver 
the information; if the information contains hearsay, it must be subject to the hearsay rules.  
However, if the information produced electronically does not contain hearsay, its admissibility 
should be determined by reference to how one would typically determine admissibility – for 
example, in the case of information created electronically, but reduced to paper for production 
in court, one would need to determine whether the contents of the document were relevant (and 
otherwise admissible), to confirm authenticity of the document, and to produce it.119 
 
                                                             
117 Ndiki op cit note 6 para 33 where the court quotes Bilchitz’s contribution to the Annual Survey of South Africa 
Law in 1998 and comments, obiter, that all computer based evidence should be treated as hearsay.  The court was 
of the view that such a classification would do away with a necessity to distinguish whether the evidence is real 
or documentary in nature.  See also South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) 
Review of the Law of Evidence (2014) 63 – 64.  See also Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 8 at The South African Law 
of Evidence 3 ed (2017) at 455 – 460.  
118 See paragraph 3.3 – 3.5 below for a more detailed discussion of these issues. 
119 S v Meyer 2017 JDR 1728 (GJ) para 299.  
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2.4 OVERVIEW OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK GOVERNING ELECTRONIC 
EVIDENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA: CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
 
The major distinguishing factor between criminal and civil matters relates to the onus of 
proof120 – that aside, the regulatory framework and applicable common law governing 
electronic evidence is similar. 
In addition to the common law and Constitution, the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 
and the ECT Act apply to both civil and criminal matters – the primary distinction from a 
legislative perspective is that in criminal matters the CPA will find application, as opposed to 
the CPEA in civil matters. However, holistically, the legislation and considerations are similar 
regardless of whether the matter is civil or criminal in nature. 
2.4.1 The Criminal Procedure Act 
Chapter 24 (s 208 – 253) of the CPA deals with evidence.  Section 210, titled irrelevant 
evidence inadmissible, confirms South Africa’s common law position: the basic rationale being 
that only relevant evidence will be admissible. 
The principal sections in the CPA relevant to electronic evidence are s 221, 222 and 
236, read together with s 246 and 247.121 Primarily, these sections create an exception to the 
hearsay rule in the form of business records (that have been duly authenticated), as well as 
making the CPEA applicable to criminal proceedings (in so far as documentary evidence is 
concerned).122 
 In so far as electronic evidence is concerned, section 221(5) of the CPA defines a 
document as ‘any device by means of which information is recorded or stored’.  This was one 
of the central issues in S v Harper,123 where the court found that a computer could not be a 
document for purposes of the CPA, but that a print-out by a computer could be a document – 
                                                             
120 Although trite, it is worth repetition: in criminal matters, the State must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 
In civil matters, a litigant must prove their case on a balance of probabilities.  See further the discussion in chapter 
6 below which poses the following question: Are there different evidentiary considerations applicable to data 
message evidence in civil and criminal proceedings? 
121 Watney op cit note 28 at 2 – 7.  S v De Villiers 1993 (1) SACR 574 (Nm) 367 – 368; S v Harper 1981 (1) SA 
88 (D) para 46 – 52. 
122 For a full discussion on the impact of the CPA on the law of evidence, and traditional forms of hearsay, see 
the ordinary academic sources dealing with hearsay evidence: Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 4 at 440 
– 441; Bellengère et al op cit note 24 at 301 – 305; Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 8 at 399 – 470. 
123 Harper Supra note 121 para 46 – 52. 
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and that the word document should be interpreted ‘in its ordinary grammatical sense’.124 
Consequently, there are different definitions for the word document in civil and criminal 
proceedings, and it is an area that concerns the SALRC, and one that should be rectified with 
statutory amendments.125  
2.4.2 Cybercrimes Bill (Previously known as the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill) 
According to a discussion document126 released by the Department of Justice in January 2017: 
The laws dealing with electronic evidence are, in general, sufficient for the purposes of 
criminal proceedings. However, certain improvements can be made to cater for new 
technologies.  
This perception that the current position in so far as electronic evidence is adequate is further 
borne out by the marked difference in the evidentiary provisions of the first two versions of the 
Bill released for public comment.  In the first iteration, the B-2015 version, then called the 
Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill, Chapter 8 evidence127 contained three comprehensive 
sections dealing with evidence: s 61 (admissibility of affidavits); s 62 (admissibility of 
evidence obtained as result of direction requesting foreign assistance and co-operation); and s 
63 (admissibility of evidence).  
Conversely, the next version of the Bill, called the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill 
B6-2017 contained only one section under the heading, Chapter 8 evidence – s 51 (proof of 
certain facts by affidavit).  This is the current position in s 53 of the most recent draft of the 
Cybercrimes Bill B6B – 2017 – that is, only one section under the heading evidence (the Bill 
changed names from the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill to the Cybercrimes Bill in the 
third version).  The B6B – 2017 version of Bill was approved by Parliament’s Justice and 
Correctional Services committee on 7 November 2018, and further approved by the National 
                                                             
124 Ibid. 
125 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) 83.  
126 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development ‘Memorandum on the objects of the Cybercrimes and 
Cybersecurity Bill 2017’  available at 
http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/bills/CyberCrimesDiscussionDocument2017.pdf, accessed on 12 April 
2018. 
127 The erstwhile provisions were predominantly applicable to criminal proceedings.  See the B-2015 version of 
the Bill, particularly Chapter 8.  Department of Justice and Constitutional Development 2015 
http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/invitations/CyberCrimesBill2015.pdf, accessed on 25 July 2017.  
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Assembly on 27 November 2018:128 It appears likely the bill will be promulgated in its current 
form. 
The section’s current wording means it will only be applicable if civil or criminal 
proceedings are instituted in terms Chapter 5 or 6 of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 
121 of 1998 (‘POCA’).  The explanatory memorandum129 released by the Department of 
Justice and Constitutional Development states as follows: ‘[This clause] aims to regulate the 
proof of certain facts by affidavit... if relevant to criminal proceedings.’  However, the section 
itself contains a limiting feature, and reads as follows: 
Proof of certain facts by affidavit 
53. (1) Whenever any fact established by any examination or process requiring any 
skill in— 
(a) the interpretation of data; 
(b) the design or functioning of data, a computer program, a computer data 
storage medium or a computer system; 
(c) computer science; 
(d) electronic communications networks and technology; 
(e) software engineering; or 
(f) computer programming, 
is or may become relevant to an issue at criminal proceedings or civil proceedings as 
contemplated in Chapter 5 or 6 of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act, 1998, a 
document purporting to be an affidavit made by a person who, in that affidavit, states that 
he or she— 
(i) is in the service of a body in the Republic or a foreign State designated by the 
Cabinet member responsible for the administration of justice by notice in the 
Gazette; 
(ii) possesses relevant qualifications, expertise and experience which make him or 
                                                             
128 Parliament of the Republic of South Africa ‘Several Bills get the nod from parliament this afternoon’ 
https://www.parliament.gov.za/press-releases/several-bills-get-nod-parliament-afternoon, accessed on 29 
November 2018. 
129 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development ‘Memorandum on the objects of the Cybercrimes and 
Cybersecurity Bill 2017’  available at 
http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/bills/CyberCrimesDiscussionDocument2017.pdf, accessed on 12 August 
2018. 
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her competent to make the affidavit; and 
(iii) has established such fact by means of an examination or process, 
is, upon its mere production at such proceedings, prima facie proof of such fact. 
 
As it stands, the section will only be applicable if criminal action is instituted in terms of 
Chapter 5 of POCA to recover the proceeds of unlawful activities, and where civil action is 
instituted in terms of Chapter 6 of POCA for the civil recovery of property. 
The only inference one can draw is that the legislature appears satisfied130 that the 
current position regarding electronic evidence in civil and criminal trials is adequately 
regulated by the ECT Act, the common law and where applicable either the CPA or the CPEA.  
In my view, and the view the SALRC,131 electronic evidence is not adequately regulated in so 
far as hearsay electronic evidence is concerned – the legal position, which involves multiple 
sources of law, can be applied inconsistently, and creates confusion.   
2.5 FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENCE 
In order to contextualise the surrounding e-commerce environment, it is important to be 
cognisant of the fact that in any debate or discussion involving electronic evidence, or 
electronic commerce in general, South Africa should be striving to reach a position that 
conforms to one of the fundamental guiding principles relating to laws dealing with technology 
and electronic commerce – functional equivalence.132 
The United Nations133 state that a functional equivalent approach is: 
                                                             
130 By way of private discussion with two of the participants on the committee responsible for this legislation, I 
am informed that in the committee’s view, the evidentiary issues are adequately regulated by existing legislation, 
and there is no need to codify established principles. I agree with this position, subject to minor amendment being 
necessary in certain areas as discussed below in chapter 7 and summarised in chapter 8.   
131 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) 83 – 86 and ch5 in general for a summary of the SALRC’s recommendations for reform. 
132 T Pistorius ‘ “Nobody Knows you're a Dog”: The Attribution of Data Messages’ (2002) 14 SA Merc LJ 737–
738; see also United Nations ‘UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment’ 1996 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/electcom/05-89450_Ebook.pdf para 15-18, accessed on 25 July 2017. 
See further, M Kulehile An analysis of the regulatory principles of functional equivalence and technology 
neutrality in the context of electronic signatures in the formation of electronic transactions in Lesotho and the 
SADC region (PhD thesis, University of Cape Town, 2017) ch3. 
133 United Nations ‘UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment’ 1996 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/electcom/05-89450_Ebook.pdf para 16, accessed on 25 July 2017. 
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based on an analysis of the purposes and functions of the traditional paper-based 
requirement with a view to determining how those purposes or functions could be fulfilled 
through electronic-commerce techniques. 
At its core, a functional equivalent approach seeks to provide or facilitate an electronic 
equivalent for written, signed and original documents.134  Put differently, and according to a 
senior legal officer within the UNCITRAL organisation, functional equivalence is: 
the basic underlying principle of the Model Law. It involves an examination of the function 
fulfilled by traditional form requirements (‘writing’, ‘signature’, ‘original’, ‘dispatch’, and 
‘receipt’) and a determination as to how the same function could be transposed, 
reproduced, or imitated in a dematerialized environment. 135  
The ECT Act facilitates this modern approach in South Africa136 by recognising data messages 
as the functional equivalent of paper.137 This approach has been endorsed by South Africa’s 
judiciary.138  
It is worth noting that, in addition to UNICTRAL, there is express support for the 
principle of functional equivalence in many other common law jurisdictions; for example, in 
New Zealand,139 in R v Hayes140 the court stated that: 
Applying the principles of functional equivalence and technological neutrality, the 
approach to sentencing for computer based crime should start by reference to the penalties 
that would have been imposed had the crime been committed through paper based means. 
In R v D141 the court stated (referring to Hayes above as authority):142 
It is enough to apply settled case law, in the context of a clear policy choice that has been made in 
this country to deal with electronic data in the same way as its paper-based equivalents. The policy 
is premised on principles of functional equivalence and technological neutrality.  
                                                             
134 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) 57; Hofman op cit note 42 at 260. 
135 J Faria ‘E-commerce and International Legal Harmonization: Time to Go Beyond Functional Equivalence?’ 
(2004) 16 SA Merc LJ 531.  
136 Theophilopoulos op cit note 2 at 465. 
137 Mupangavanhu op cit note 99 at 859. 
138 S v Miller 2016 (1) SACR 251 (WCC) para 52; LA Consortium op cit note 37 at para 12 – 13; Ndlovu op cit 
note 38 at 165; Meyer op cit note 38 at para 299. See also the court’s analysis in one of the seminal cases involving 
electronic evidence Ndiki op cit note 6 at para 53 where although the term is not specifically used, the analysis 
performed by the court uses similar logic. See also the South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 
131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence (2014) 62 – 63. 
139 New Zealand uses a common law legal system, which is predominantly based on English common law, much 
like the legal system in South Africa. 
140 (2006) 23 CRNZ 547 (CA).  However, see the criticism of the court's use of the term in D Harvey Collisions 
in the Digital Paradigm: Law and Rule Making in the Internet Age (2017) 58 – 59. 
141 CA287/2010 [2011] NZCA 69 para 64. 
142 See also Jonathan Dixon v R [2015] NZSC 147 [20 October 2015] at para 40 – 41 where the basis of the 
Supreme Court of New Zealand’s entire analysis was the concept of functional equivalence. 
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The Law Commission for England and Wales, in its 2001 paper on Electronic Commerce,143  
referred with approval to the concept of functional equivalence.144 In summary, the advice by 
the Commission concluded that English law (as it was in 2001) provided for e-mails, website 
trading, and other forms of electronic commerce and consequently could be said to already 
embrace technology and the principle of functional equivalence.  
The Law Reform Commission of Ireland’s Consultation Paper on Documentary and 
Electronic Evidence refers to the principle on a number of occasions.145 After an exhaustive 
review of international law on electronic evidence, the Irish Commission suggested 
incorporating the approach espoused in the Model Law, 1996.146    
In Canada, a predominantly common-law based country147 with a federal system148 the 
promulgation of the Uniform Electronic Commerce Act (UECA) implemented the principles 
contained in the UNCITRAL Model Law – including functional equivalence.149  Much like 
South Africa, the basis of UECA is the Model Law, 1996.150  
For example, in section 7, if information must be in writing, electronic forms of 
communication will satisfy this if the information is ‘accessible for future use so as to be usable 
for subsequent reference’.151 Canada's Supreme Court, in Dell Computer Corporation v Union 
des consommateurs,152 applied a functional equivalence test to determine whether electronic 
clauses are reasonably accessible for the parties.  The court ultimately found that access to the 
arbitration clause should be no more difficult than access to its equivalent on paper and in so 
doing applied and endorsed functional equivalence.  
                                                             
143 Law Commission for England and Wales Electronic Commerce: Formal Requirements in Commercial 
Transactions 2001 http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/electronic_commerce_advice.pdf, 
accessed on 25 July 2017. 
144 Ibid para 2.15. 
145 Ireland Law Reform Commission Consultation Paper Documentary and Electronic Evidence LRC CP 57 - 
2009 http://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/consultation%20papers/cpDocumentaryandElectronicEvidence.pdf, 
accessed on 25 August 2017. 
146Ireland Law Reform Commission Consultation Paper Documentary and Electronic Evidence LRC CP 57 - 2009 
http://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/consultation%20papers/cpDocumentaryandElectronicEvidence.pdf at para 
1.34, accessed on 25 August 2017.  
147 Except in Quebec, where it is a civil law system based on the French civil code.   
148 J Gregory ‘The UETA and the UECA – Canadian Reflections’  (2001) Idaho Law Review 441 – 476. 
149 M Smith ‘Facilitating electronic commerce through the development of laws to recognize electronic documents 
and transactions’ 2000 http://publications.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/prb0012-e.htm, accessed on 25 August 
2017.  
150 Gregory op cit note 148 at 445. 
151 Section 7 of the UECA. 
152 [2007] 2 S.C.R. 801. 
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Consequently, as a matter of international best practice, functional equivalence must be 
incorporated in any law or decision relating to technology and electronic commerce. 
2.6 CONCLUSION  
As a starting point, South Africa ought to ensure consistency and clarity with the key definition 
of data message.  If promulgated as it stands, the current B6B – 2017 version of the 
Cybercrimes Bill will leave South Africa with two definitions for data message.  This anomaly 
ought to be rectified, and in addition, the newer version of the definition ought to be more 
concise and neutral (to withstand short to medium term technological development). 
 The principle of functional equivalence – the lodestar for e-commerce law-making – is 
applicable in a South African context, and has been approved judicially in a number of reported 
decisions, both locally and abroad.  Any suggested amendments to South Africa’s legislative 
environment must take account of this – and not seek to prefer one form of evidence over 
another.
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CHAPTER 3: HEARSAY ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE1 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Hearsay evidence is defined in s 3(4) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act2 as ‘evidence, 
whether oral or in writing, the probative value of which depends upon the credibility of any 
person other than the person giving evidence’.  In the context of electronic evidence, in addition 
to the Law of Evidence Amendment Act, one must also potentially consider the ECT Act, the 
CPA, and the CPEA.3  This position leads to ‘inefficiencies and potential confusions.’4 
 As a result, this chapter will consider whether the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 
applies to electronic evidence,5 and in any event, whether the ECT Act frees electronic 
evidence from the exclusionary hearsay rule.6 The chapter will then analyse how one 
consistently determines whether a data message is real evidence, or documentary evidence.7  
The chapter will conclude with a review of selected foreign jurisdictions in so far as the hearsay 
rule in the context of electronic evidence is concerned – and seek to articulate an ideal position 
when considering hearsay electronic evidence.  
 
3.2 OVERVIEW AND CONTEXT 
 
Any potential evidence that a party to civil or criminal proceedings wishes to have admitted in 
court will typically be classified under one or more of three headings: as an object (real 
                                                             
1 A version of this chapter 3 was published as a two-part article: L Swales ‘An Analysis of the Regulatory 
Environment Governing Hearsay Electronic Evidence in South Africa: Suggestions for Reform – Part One’ (2018) 
21 PELJ  2 – 24 and L Swales ‘An Analysis of the Regulatory Environment Governing Hearsay Electronic 
Evidence in South Africa: Suggestions for Reform – Part Two’ (2018) 21 PELJ 1 – 25. 
2 Act 45 of 1988.  See also P Schwikkard & S van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 4 ed (2016) ch 13; D Zeffertt 
& A Paizes The South African Law of Evidence 2 ed (2009) ch 13.   
3 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) 62 – 69. See also D Zeffertt & A Paizes The South African Law of Evidence 3 ed (2017) ch 13. 
4 Ibid at 65. 
5 These issues are based on the questions posed in South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 
Review of the Law of Evidence (2014). 
6 Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 2 at 432. 
7 Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 2 at 431 – 436; J Hofman & J de Jager ‘South Africa’ in S Mason (ed) Electronic 
Evidence 3 ed (2012) 761; C Theophilopoulos ‘The admissibility of data, data messages, and electronic documents 
at trial’ (2015) 3 TSAR 464 (in particular note 9) and 474 (in particular note 31); P Fourie Using Social Media as 
Evidence in South African Courts (LLM thesis, North-West University, 2016) 8 – 14. 
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evidence),8 as a document (documentary evidence),9 or evidence from a witness (oral 
evidence).10  
South African courts are not yet equipped to deal with a variety of computer systems 
and computer programs that produce electronic evidence – therefore, for practical reasons, a 
data message is normally presented to court as a print-out when tendering the information as 
evidence.11 Consequently, many South African cases have grappled with the issue of how to 
treat (classify) a printout of the data message – as documentary evidence, or as real evidence?12  
Increasingly, parties to criminal and civil proceedings rely on some form of data 
messages as evidence, and the rules relating to hearsay are often at issue (unless the person 
upon whose credibility the probative value of the data message depends testifies).  It is not 
always practical or reasonable to have every person testify, and the precise classification of a 
data message, together with its statutory exceptions, become increasingly important.  
 
3.3 DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGAL POSITION RELATING TO HEARSAY 
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE  
 
The promulgation of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 took place in October 
1988 – it rendered the common law definition of hearsay13 obsolete.14 The relevant portion of 
the Act is contained within s 3 (hearsay evidence) and reads as follows: 
 
3 (1) Subject to the provisions of any other law, hearsay evidence shall not be admitted 
as evidence at criminal or civil proceedings, unless-  
 
(a)  each party against whom the evidence is to be adduced agrees to the admission 
thereof as evidence at such proceedings;  
 
(b) the person upon whose credibility the probative value of such evidence depends, 
himself testifies at such proceedings; or 
 
                                                             
8 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 2 at 421 – 430; A Bellengère et al The Law of Evidence in South Africa 
(2013) 59 – 63; Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 1 at 849 – 862. 
9 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 2 at 431 – 436; Bellengère et al op cit note 8 at 59 – 63; Zeffertt & 
Paizes op cit note 1 at 827 – 843.  
10 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 2 at 387 – 420. See chapter 2 para 2.3 – 2.4 for an overview of 
electronic evidence in South Africa. 
11 For example, see S v Ndiki 2008 (2) SACR 252 (Ck); LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA Enterprises v MTN 
Service Provider (Pty) Ltd 2011 (4) SA 577 (GSJ); S v Meyer 2017 JDR 1728 (GJ) para 296 – 300.  This 
observation also accords with my own personal experience in practice.  
12 Ndiki supra note 11; LA Consortium supra note 11; Ex parte Rosch [1998] 1 All SA 319 (W); Ndlovu v Minister 
of Correctional Services [2006] 4 All SA 165 (W); S v Brown 2016 (1) SACR 206 (WCC). 
13 For a useful discussion of hearsay in general, see Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 2 at 287 – 304; 
Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 2 at 385-443. 
14 Ndiki supra note 11 at para 31; Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 2 at 269; Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 
2 at 389 – 416. 
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(c) the court, having regard to- 
 
(i) the nature of the proceedings; 
(ii) the nature of the evidence; 
(iii) the purpose for which the evidence is tendered; 
(iv) the probative value of the evidence; 
(v) the reason why the evidence is not given by the person upon whose credibility the 
probative value of such evidence depends; 
(vi) any prejudice to a party which the admission of such evidence might entail; and 
(vii) any other factor which should in the opinion of the court be taken into account, 
is of the opinion that such evidence should be admitted in the interests of justice. 
 
The definition of hearsay above in s 3(4)15 above applies to both civil and criminal matters.16 
Interestingly, as noted by Schwikkard and Van der Merwe17 (referring also to Zeffertt, Paizes 
and Skeen)18 there may be some debate in so far as the interpretation of the word depends in 
the definition above is concerned.  The nuance or issue of interpretation is this: when applying 
the above definition (to any form of evidence, electronic included), does the word depends 
mean that the probative value of the evidence depends entirely on another person? Or only 
partially? Or is it somewhere in between the two?  In my view, the answer lies somewhere in 
the middle of the two.19 As suggested by Zeffertt and Paizes,20 the preferred interpretation must 
be that the probative value of the evidence must depend substantially, primarily, or even 
sufficiently upon the credibility of any person other than the person giving evidence. 21   
In any evidentiary dispute involving hearsay, the statutory definition above will be the 
point of departure22 when determining whether a data message constitutes hearsay.  Of course, 
in order to draw any definitive conclusion on whether a data message is admissible, the 
statutory definition above requires the reading in and context of: applicable case law, the ECT 
Act, and other relevant legislation. 
 
 
  
                                                             
15 See the definition above in chapter 3 para 3.1. 
16 Hofman & de Jager op cit note 7 at 770 – 771. 
17 P Schwikkard & S van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 3 ed (2009) at 275 and particularly the discussion at 
para 13.4; Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 2 at 293 – 294.   
18 D Zeffertt, A Paizes & A Skeen The South African Law of Evidence (2003) 364 – 402; see Zeffertt & Paizes op 
cit note 2 at 389 – 391. 
19 A view endorsed in Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 2 at 390 – 391 where the authors state: ‘a case may be made 
for reading the words as meaning depends substantially or primarily upon’. 
20 Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 2 at 390 – 391; Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 2 at 293 – 294.  See also 
Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 3 ch 13. 
21 Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 2 at 390, in particular, see notes 24 – 28 thereof where an analysis of hearsay 
related cases decided before the Law of Evidence Amendment Act, going back as far as 1837 inform the view 
expressed. 
22 S v Ndiki supra note 11 para 31. 
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3.4 CAN ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE CONSTITUTE HEARSAY? 
 
It would seem at first blush that if electronic evidence were to be exempt from the rules 
regulating hearsay, the net effect of this approach would be to favour electronic evidence over 
other forms of evidence.  This could lead to forum or format shopping23 and would undoubtedly 
abolish any form of functional equivalence.24 Ideally, any form of electronic evidence must be 
treated as the functional equivalent of traditional evidence as far as possible. 
It cannot be that hearsay electronic evidence faces fewer hurdles on its admission to 
court (than traditional hearsay evidence), and similarly, South Africa cannot sustain a position 
where it is more cumbersome (with more requirements to meet) to admit electronic forms of 
hearsay evidence. 
Prior to the promulgation of the ECT Act, some early decisions25 favoured an approach 
which suggested that electronic evidence could not constitute hearsay as it was produced by a 
machine, and therefore, its probative value did not depend on a person.  This approach was 
based on the rationale of the first reported South African decision dealing with hearsay 
electronic evidence – Narlis,26 where the key finding was: ‘a computer, perhaps fortunately, is 
not a person’ (and therefore evidence produced by a computer cannot depend on the probative 
value of a person).  This decision provided the grounding for computer-based evidence to be 
inadmissible under the then applicable statutory provisions. 
In S v Harper,27 the court considered whether a computer could be classified as a 
document in terms of the CPA. It ultimately found a computer could not be a document (for 
purposes of the CPA), and held that: 
 
Computers do record and store information but they do a great deal else; inter alia, they 
sort and collate information and make adjustments… The extended definition of 
‘document’ is clearly not wide enough to cover a computer, at any rate where the 
operations carried out by it are more than the mere storage or recording of information.28 
 
However, the court did note that a print-out by a computer could be a document for purposes 
of the CPA, and held that: 
 
                                                             
23 Hofman & de Jager op cit note 7 at 766 – 767. 
24 J Hofman ‘Electronic evidence in criminal cases’ (2006) 3 SACJ 257. 
25 A Mapoma A critical study of the authentication requirements of Section 2 of the Computer Evidence Act No 
57 of 1983 (LLM thesis, University of South Africa, 1997) 20 – 26.  
26 1976 (2) SA 573 (A).   
27 1981 (1) SA 88 (D).  
28 Ibid at 259. 
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It seems to me, therefore, that it is correct to interpret the word ‘document’ in its ordinary 
grammatical sense, and that once one does so the computer print-outs themselves are 
admissible.29 
 
As noted by the court in Ndiki,30 the Harper judgment has been misunderstood to some extent. 
The ratio above, as the law was then, was authority for the proposition that evidence on a 
computer (on computer storage) would not be covered by the exception in the CPA.  However, 
if the information was reduced to a print-out, the evidence (as long as it met the statutory 
requirements in the CPA) could be regarded as a document, and therefore admissible.  
Moreover, in Ex Parte Rosch,31 the court found that the Law of Evidence Amendment 
Act was not applicable to computer printouts because, on a similar basis to the rationale in 
Narlis, the court found that a computer was not a person – it held that: 
 
The provisions of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 regarding hearsay 
evidence were also not applicable as the computer was not a ‘person’ as contemplated in 
section 3(4) of that Act.32 
 
Further, in S v Mashiyi,33 another case based on the rationale of the Narlis, the court found it 
was unable in terms of the prevailing law, to admit as evidence the disputed documents, which 
contained information that had been processed and generated by a computer.34 It reached this 
decision on the basis that the Law of Evidence Amendment Act could not apply, as a computer 
was not a person.  As suggested elsewhere, this authority, although of little consequence today 
(decided prior to the ECT Act), is ‘doubtful’.35 In Ndiki,36 the court rejected the reasoning 
above and stated as follows: 
 
Cutting away the frills, the suggested approach, based on the aforegoing decisions [Narlis, 
Ex Parte Rosch and Mashiyi], is that a computer is not a person and if it carried out active 
functions, over and above the mere storage of information, the disputed documents are 
inadmissible. For the same reason the provisions of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 
relating to hearsay evidence is also of no assistance because hearsay evidence only extends 
to oral or written statements, the probative value of which depends upon the credibility of 
a ‘person’.  As I would indicate hereinunder, such an approach to computer generated 
evidence is in my view incorrect and of very little assistance. (my emphasis). 
                                                             
29 Ibid. 
30 S v Ndiki supra note 11 paras 16 – 18 where Van Zyl J clearly and logically summarises the S v Harper judgment. 
31 [1998] 1 All SA 319 (W). 
32 Ibid at 321.   
33 2002 (2) SACR 387 (TkD). 
34 Ibid at 390 – 391. 
35 Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 2 at 432 see particularly footnote 313. See also D De Villiers ‘Old 'Documents', 
'Videotapes' and New 'Data Messages' – A Functional Approach to the Law of Evidence (part 1)’ (2010) 3 TSAR 
563 where the author notes he cannot support the finding in Mashiyi and, correctly in my view, criticizes the 
judgment on the basis that the evidence could surely have been admitted as real evidence (as an object). 
36 S v Ndiki supra note 11 para 11 – 12. 
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A misunderstanding37 of technology, and the nature of technology, most likely led to these 
early approaches. The primary position adopted by Van Zyl J in Ndiki (and his rejection of the 
logic above) should be endorsed and followed in subsequent decisions – it is a pragmatic and 
common-sense approach which aligns itself to international best practice.38   
As noted elsewhere,39 the view that a computer is not a person (and therefore its probative 
value does not depend on a person) misses the fact that at some stage in its genesis all 
computers (and data messages) rely on the credibility of some person to design,40 activate,41 
program, enable, disable, etcetera, the computer and/or technology. Moreover, this view 
arguably does not take account of South Africa's position on evidence in general – that is, the 
distinction between real and documentary evidence where an object should be admissible in 
any event (subject to it being relevant and a court assessing its evidentiary weight). 
The Law of Evidence Amendment Act notwithstanding, section 15 of the ECT Act 
provides for the admissibility of electronic evidence.42 This section has had, and will continue 
to have a ‘huge impact’43 on the law of evidence – it reads as follows: 
 
15. Admissibility and evidential weight of data messages  
 
(1) In any legal proceedings, the rules of evidence must not be applied so as to deny 
the admissibility of a data message, in evidence-  
 
(a) on the mere grounds that it is constituted by a data message; or  
 
(b) if it is the best evidence that the person adducing it could reasonably be expected 
to obtain, on the grounds that it is not in its original form.  
 
(2) Information in the form of a data message must be given due evidential 
weight.  
 
(3) In assessing the evidential weight of a data message, regard must be had 
to-  
 
(a) the reliability of the manner in which the data message was generated, stored 
or communicated;  
                                                             
37 Fourie op cit note 7 at 31. 
38 D van der Merwe et al Information and Communications Technology Law 2 ed (2016) 130 where the authors 
praise the Judgment in Ndiki. 
39 Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 2 at 433. 
40 Fourie op cit note 7 at 31 – 32. 
41 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) 68 – 69. 
42 This chapter only discusses admissibility of electronic evidence in the context of hearsay.  For a full discussion 
on admissibility of all forms of electronic evidence, see chapter 5 below. 
43 D De Villiers ‘Old 'Documents', 'Videotapes' and New 'Data Messages' – A Functional Approach to the Law of 
Evidence (part 2)’ (2010) 4 TSAR 731. 
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(b) the reliability of the manner in which the integrity of the data message was 
maintained;  
 
(c) the manner in which its originator was identified; and  
 
(d) any other relevant factor.  
 
(4) A data message made by a person in the ordinary course of business, or a 
copy or printout of or an extract from such data message certified to be correct 
by an officer in the service of such person, is on its mere production in any 
civil, criminal, administrative or disciplinary proceedings under any law, the 
rules of a self regulatory organisation or any other law or the common law, 
admissible in evidence against any person and rebuttable proof of the facts 
contained in such record, copy, printout or extract. 
 
Early academic views44 on this section favoured an interpretation45 that would exempt 
electronic evidence from the rules regulating hearsay altogether, with a court being primarily 
focused on assessing the weight46 of the electronic evidence and simply admitting all forms of 
electronic evidence.   
The argument went along the following lines: s 15(2) of the ECT Act enjoins courts to 
give due evidential weight to data messages.  Moreover, s 15(3) provides factors to assess 
evidential weight – these factors are remarkably similar to the questions a court must consider 
when performing a hearsay analysis.  Accordingly, so the argument goes, data messages would 
be exempt from the rules pertaining to hearsay on the basis that courts must give data messages 
due evidential weight, and are then given factors (similar to the hearsay factors listed in the 
Law of Evidence Amendment Act) to consider. 
Both courts and other academics have roundly rejected47 the view above – to be fair to 
one of the authors of this initial view though, she did herself state in the article where this 
controversial view was espoused that the effect of s 15 of the ECT Act on the authenticity rule 
                                                             
44 D Collier ‘Evidently not so Simple: Producing Computer Print-outs in Court’ 2005 Juta Business Law 6 – 9; 
Hofman op cit note 24 at 262. 
45 This interpretation appears to have been retracted by Collier herself in Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 
17 at 414 – 415, particularly footnote 42 – 43 thereof.  The chapter dealing with electronic evidence in the latest 
version of this text (Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 2 ch 21) is written by a different author and this 
initial view is not canvassed in any detail. 
46 Bellengère et al op cit note 8 at 76.  
47 S v Meyer supra note 11 para 299; S v Brown supra note 12 para 16; Ndlovu supra note 12 at 172; LA Consortium 
supra note 11 para 19; Theophilopoulos op cit note 7 at 474 – 775; M Watney ‘Admissibility of Electronic 
Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: An Outline of the South African Legal Position’ (2009) 1 Journal of 
Information, Law and Technology 3 – 7. 
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and the hearsay rule is not clear. Moreover, in a later publication,48 the author further stated 
that courts are unlikely to adopt this progressive view. 
Consequently, since this early debate on the import and meaning of s 15 of the ECT 
Act, there is universal acceptance49 that data messages are not exempt from the rules regulating 
hearsay. Rightly, in my view – it would clearly go against the principle of functional 
equivalence if data messages were to be exempt from hearsay.   
In so far as s 15 of the ECT Act is concerned, in Ndlovu, the court held that ‘there is no 
reason to suppose that s 15 seeks to override the normal rules applying to hearsay evidence’.50  
It further noted that the ‘the rules relating to hearsay evidence have not been excluded entirely 
by s 15(1)’.51 Finally, and logically so, the court opined that if a data message were to be 
rendered admissible in all circumstances ‘without further ado’, then that position would clearly 
‘elevate’52 data messages above traditional form of evidence. In support of Ndlovu, Bozalek J 
in S v Brown53 held: 
 
I agree with the observation of Gautschi AJ [in Ndlovu] that sec 15(1)(a) does not render 
a data message admissible without further ado. The provisions of sec 15 certainly do not 
exclude our common law of evidence. 
 
Furthermore, in Ndiki,54 the court held: 
 
The definition of hearsay quite clearly extends to documentary evidence. Whether or not 
the evidence contained in the document can be said to depend upon the credibility of a 
person, is a factual question that must in turn be determined from the facts and 
circumstances of each case. If a computer print-out contains a statement of which a person 
has personal knowledge and which is stored in the computer’s memory, its use in evidence 
depends on the credibility of an identifiable person and would therefore constitute hearsay. 
On the other hand, where the probative value of a statement in the print-out is dependent 
upon the “credibility” of the computer itself, section 3 will not apply. 
 
Moreover, in LA Consortium,55 the court held: 
 
The principle of ‘functional equivalence’ does not free data messages from the normal 
strictures of the law of evidence but only from those referred to in s 15(1). It follows that, 
                                                             
48 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 17 at 415 where Collier notes that it is ‘unlikely’ that courts will adopt 
this approach.  
49 S v Meyer supra note 11 para 299; S v Brown supra note 12 para 18; LA Consortium supra note 11 para 19; S v 
Ndiki supra note 11 para 31; Ndlovu supra note 12 at 172 – 173.  See also Hofman op cit note 24 at 262; 
Theophilopoulos op cit note 7 at 474 – 475; Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 2 at 432 – 435. 
50 Ndlovu supra note 12 at 172 – 173. 
51 Ndlovu supra note 12 at 172 – 173.  See also Hofman & de Jager op cit note 7 at 767 – 768. 
52 Ndlovu supra note 12 at 173. 
53 S v Brown supra note 12 para 18. 
54 S v Ndiki supra note 11 para 31. 
55 LA Consortium supra note 11 para 13. 
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despite the very wide words of s 15(4), any hearsay contained in a data message must pass 
the criteria set out in s 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988. 
 
More recently, in S v Meyer,56 the court joined the chorus above and held: 
 
Section 15 (1) does not, however make all data messages automatically admissible. According 
to the ECT Act data messages are the functional equivalents of documents and therefore, except 
where the Act specifically provides for exceptions, the ordinary common law requirements for 
the admissibility of documents must be adhered to. 
 
In summation then: can a data message constitute hearsay within the meaning of s 3 of the Law 
of Evidence Amendment Act?  In short, yes. Simply put, s 15 of the ECT Act does not override 
the normal rules applying to hearsay in so far as data messages are concerned.57 Moreover, the 
ECT Act ensures that data messages are functional equivalents58 of paper.  Consequently, 
except where specific exceptions are made, the normal position in so far as hearsay (in terms 
of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act) applies59 equally to documentary hearsay as it does 
to electronic hearsay. 
Finally, and the early academic debate about the import of s 15 of the ECT Act 
notwithstanding, the provisions thereof do not free data messages from the exclusionary 
hearsay rules60 – if the credibility of the data message depends upon a natural person.  
Conversely, if a data message's credibility depends substantially upon an automated process, 61 
(for example, GPS data or mobile phone call records) then that evidence should be regarded as 
real62 in nature and should not be subject to a hearsay enquiry. 63   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
56 S v Meyer supra note 11 para 299. 
57 S v Meyer supra note 11 para 299; S v Brown supra note 12 para 18; LA Consortium supra note 11 para 19; S v 
Ndiki supra note 11 para 31; Ndlovu supra note 12 at 172 – 173.  See also Theophilopoulos op cit note 7 at 474 – 
475; Watney op cit note 47 at 8 – 11; Hofman & de Jager op cit note 7 at 776 – 777; Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 
2 at 432 – 435. 
58 S Papadopoulos & S Snail (eds) Cyberlaw@SA III (2012) 322. 
59 Van der Merwe et al op cit note 38 at 130. 
60 Subject to s 15(4) of the ECT Act. 
61 Theophilopoulos op cit note 7 at 474 and in particular footnote 31. 
62 D Bainbridge Introduction to Information Technology Law 6 ed (2008) 490. 
63 Ndlovu supra note 12 at 171 – 173; S v Ndiki supra note 11 para 31; LA Consortium supra note 11 para 13.   
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3.5 HOW DOES ONE CONSISTENTLY DETERMINE WHETHER A DATA MESSAGE IS 
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE OR REAL EVIDENCE? 
 
Real evidence64 consists of objects (things) – tangible items – that are in and of themselves 
evidence, and are available for inspection by a court, for example: A gun, a bullet, or a knife.65 
As noted in S v M:66 
 
Real evidence is an object which, upon proper identification, becomes, of itself, evidence (such 
as a knife, photograph, voice recording, letter or even the appearance of a witness in the 
witness-box). 
 
Real evidence67 is not subject to exclusion68 if it is relevant (and if no other statutory exception 
excludes it).69  Importantly for present purposes, real evidence is not subject to the hearsay 
rules70 for the simple reason that it is what it purports to be.  However, real evidence 
(traditionally, in any event) is typically only meaningful when supplemented by witness 
testimony i.e.: there must be someone present in court to explain its relevance.71 
Consequently, as real evidence, a data message need not be admitted to court under one 
of the various hearsay exceptions,72 and technically, is evidence in and of itself to which a court 
must accord appropriate weight (even without oral testimony – although, without oral 
testimony the evidence is likely to have little evidentiary weight). Therefore, if evidence is real 
in nature, it is not in my view conceptually correct to subject that evidence to a hearsay enquiry.   
 
A further difficulty is that our courts have taken differing views on the meaning of the 
word document.73 This inconsistency in approach is particularly problematic in the context of 
electronic evidence where the classification of evidence as real or documentary is an important 
                                                             
64 S Mason & D Seng ‘Real Evidence’ in S Mason (ed) Electronic Evidence 3 ed (2012) 39 define real evidence 
as ‘material objects other than documents, produced for inspection of the court’ relying on H Malek (ed) Phipson 
on Evidence 17 ed (2009).  See further the newer version of this text, S Mason & D Seng ‘Real Evidence’ in S 
Mason & D Seng (eds) Electronic Evidence 4 ed (2017) 39 – 43. 
65 Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 2 at 849; Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 2 at 421. 
66 2002 (2) SACR 411 (SCA) para 31.  This definition and case is used by all major evidence text book authors in 
South Africa when referring to real evidence.  
67 See the discussion of real evidence in the context of electronic evidence in South African Law Reform 
Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence (2014) 35 – 37. 
68 Hofman op cit note 24 at 268. 
69 Hofman & de Jager op cit note 7 at 776 – 777.  
70 Hofman & de Jager op cit note 7 at 777; S v Ndiki supra note 11 para 31; Ndlovu supra note 12 at 173. 
71 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 17 at 395; Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 2 at 849; Hofman & de Jager 
op cit note 7 at 776 – 779; van der Merwe et al op cit note 38 at 124 – 130. 
72 See para 3.6 below for a discussion of exceptions to the hearsay rule.  
73 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 2 at 313 – 315. 
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consideration74 in determining the evidentiary rules applicable.   For example, in the case of 
Seccombe v Attorney-General it was held that the word document is: 
 
a very wide term and includes everything that contains the written or pictorial proof of 
something. It does not matter of what material it is made…75 
 
This early definition clearly suggests that a data message could be included in the definition of 
document.76  Conversely, however, in S v Mpumlo,77 the court found that video evidence is not 
a document, and classified the evidence as real evidence78 by finding that: 
 
I have no doubt that a video film, like a tape recording, is real evidence, as distinct from 
documentary evidence, and, provided it is relevant, it may be produced as admissible 
evidence, subject of course to any dispute that may arise either as to its authenticity or the 
interpretation thereof.79 
 
On the logic followed by the court in Mpumlo, data messages could also be treated as real 
evidence requiring the court to focus on authenticity, accuracy and interpretation once the 
evidence is received (assuming it is relevant). In other words, on this logic, the only hurdle to 
the admissibility of real data message evidence is relevance.   
In S v Baleka (1),80 the court agreed with the approach in Mpumlo above, but only in so 
far as the video aspect of the evidence is concerned (leaving the categorisation and question of 
the audio aspect open). Van Dijkhorst J held as follows: 
 
I agree with the conclusion of Mullins J (in Mpumlo) that a video tape is real evidence. It 
remains to be considered whether the aural component thereof is to be equated to a tape 
sound recording and dealt with on the same basis as documentary evidence.81 
 
However, in S v Ramgobin,82 the court took the opposite view and found that video evidence 
is documentary evidence, and found the decision in Mpumlo to be incorrect. This view guards 
against the possibility of doctored or edited evidence being admissible. There is strong support 
for this decision by Zeffertt.83 
                                                             
74 Fourie op cit note 7 at 31 at 8 – 14. 
75 1919 TPD 270 at 277.   
76 See further discussion on this point, De Villiers (1) op cit note 35 at 564 – 572. 
77 1986 4 All SA 197 (E).  See also Fourie op cit note 7 at 8 – 14; G van Tonder The admissibility and evidential 
weight of electronic evidence in South African legal proceedings: a comparative perspective (LLM thesis, 
University of the Western Cape, 2013) 16 – 18.  
78 See Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 2 at 854 where this decision is criticised. 
79 S v Mpumlo supra note 77 at 202. 
80 1986 (4) SA 192 (T). 
81 Ibid at 433. 
82 1986 (4) SA 117 (N). 
83 Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 2 at 855 – 857. 
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Further, in S v Baleka (3),84 the court had occasion to consider Ramgobin, and via Van 
Dijkhorst J, rejected the approach by Milne JP in Ramgobin and stated: 
 
I deal with tape recordings as I would deal with any other type of real evidence tendered 
where its admissibility is disputed. The test is whether it is relevant. It will be relevant if 
it has probative value. It will only have probative value if it is linked to the issues to be 
decided.85   
 
In addition, in S v Nieuwoudt,86 and in S v Fuhri,87 in two appeal matters, it was held that 
the approach in Baleka (3) was preferable.  How can these decisions be interpreted in the 
context of data messages?  On one hand, the only hurdle to admissibility is relevance (if the 
data message is classified as real evidence); but on the other hand, in addition to relevance, the 
data message must also be authentic.  
Based on the logic in Baleka (3), and those cases that support it, the classification of a 
data message as real evidence will mean that if a court determines a data message is relevant, 
the evidence is admissible.  On this logic and rationale, the enquiry about authenticity will be 
central when a court accords the evidence weight – rather than when a court considers 
admissibility.  
However, in S v Koralev,88 a child pornography matter involving data messages in the 
form of digital photographs, the court noted, ‘because of modern technology, it is essential for 
evidence in relation to such images [digital images] to be approached with extreme caution’.89 
The court again endorsed the approach in Baleka (3), but in effect what it did was introduce a 
modified version of the rationale in Ramgobin,90 by finding that in order to be admissible, real 
evidence must not only be relevant, but also authentic (with some form of corroboration as to 
the accuracy of the image), the court held: 
 
Before the images in question could be admissible in evidence against the appellants there 
had to be some proof of their accuracy in the form of corroboration that the events depicted 
therein actually occurred; and 
 
Corroboration in the sense required must be found in some independent source of evidence, 
which makes the evidence constituted by the images in the photographs and video 
recordings more acceptable in that it supports an aspect or aspects thereof.91 
                                                             
84 1986 (4) SA 1005 (T). 
85 Ibid at 1026. 
86 1990 (4) SA 217 (A). 
87 1994 (2) SACR 829 (A) 835. 
88 2006 (2) SACR 298 (N). 
89 Ibid at 307. 
90 See Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 2 at 852.   
91 S v Koralev supra note 88 at 306 – 307. 
 56 
 
Consequently, before the digital images could be admissible in evidence, the court found that 
there had to be some proof of their authenticity in the form of corroboration – for example, a 
photographer or some other witness must testify as to the veracity of the images.  
As noted by Hofman,92 it is quite possible to adopt the interpretation taken in these 
video and audio admissibility cases to data messages.  Consequently, if one prefers the 
approach in the KwaZulu-Natal cases93 illustrated by Ramgobin, then a data message that relies 
on the credibility of a computer would be admissible if it is relevant and authentic (my 
emphasis).94  Conversely, if one prefers the approaches taken in the Gauteng cases via Baleka 
(1) and Baleka (3) (and supported by Hefer JA in two appeal decisions), then authenticity is 
not a pre-requisite for admissibility and a data message that relies substantially on the 
credibility of a computer (automated process) will be admissible if relevant.95 
Consequently, there is a strong argument in the context of data messages that where the 
credibility of the data message substantially depends on the credibility of a computer, 
application, machine or mechanical process, it is real evidence and only needs to be relevant 
to be admissible. Conversely, there is an equally strong argument to suggest that the data 
message evidence must not only be relevant to be admissible, but also authentic.96  
In Motata v Nair NO,97 the court weighed up the various approaches and held it was 
unnecessary to decide whether proof of authenticity is in fact a prerequisite for the admissibility 
of audio recordings.    In these circumstances, in the context of electronic evidence, the issue 
that remains unclear relates to the admissibility of real evidence in the form of data messages.   
Given the ease of manipulation98 of data messages, the production of some evidence to 
show a court that a data message is authentic (accurate and reliable representation of the 
information) is probably desirable – but quite what that is in each case will turn on the relevant 
facts and be at the discretion of each respective judicial officer.  Authenticity as a pre-requisite 
for admissibility (in addition to relevance) is supported by: Koralev (which dealt specifically 
                                                             
92 Hofman & de Jager op cit note 7 at 778 – 779. 
93 See also S v Singh 1975 (1) SA 330 (N). 
94 N Whitear-Nel ‘Admissibility of hearsay evidence’ (2007) 20 SACJ 116 where the author notes that the 
approach of the court in Koralev ‘leads to the possibility that relevant evidence may be excluded because it is not 
original or not corroborated, where its reliability is not placed in issue by the defence, only its admissibility. This 
is not in the interests of justice.’  
95 Motata v Nair NO 2009 (1) SACR 263 (T) para 21 where the court summarises the various approaches. 
96 See chapter 5, paragraph 5.3 and 5.4 below for a further discussion on real and documentary electronic 
evidence. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Theophilopoulos op cit note 7 at 461; Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 2 at 852 – 854. 
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with data messages); widely quoted academics;99 Ramgobin; and is consistent with the most 
recent High Court judgment of LA Consortium100 (the Supreme Court of Appeal has not yet 
had occasion to consider this issue).   
Conversely, there appears to be equal justification for a court to accept data messages 
as evidence (when the evidence is real in nature) on the basis that it is relevant – and then to 
consider accuracy when determining weight.101  
As a result, in the context of electronic evidence, it is critical to determine the nature of 
the data message, and then to analyse the common law and/or statutory requirements for 
admission of that type of evidence.  Questions that might be asked include: Does the data 
message rely substantially on the credibility of a machine, computer or mechanical process?  
Does the data message contain statements or conclusions that rely on a person?  Is the data 
message substantially automated without human intervention?  
There is an argument that video, audio and graphics more closely resemble documentary, 
rather than real evidence, and in this regard Hofman states: 
 
video, audio and graphics now resemble documents more than the knife and bullet that are 
the traditional examples of real evidence. In data message form, graphics, audio and video 
are susceptible to error and falsification in the same way as data messages that embody 
documentary content. They cannot prove themselves to be anything other than data 
messages and their evidential value depends on witnesses who can both interpret them and 
establish their relevance.102  
  
Accordingly, some authors are of the view that graphics, audio and video in data message form 
constitute documentary evidence. 103   This view was accepted by the Western Cape High Court 
in Brown by Bozalek J. Here,104 where the court had occasion to discuss how best to classify 
electronic evidence as real or documentary, the decision in Ndiki105 was endorsed – the court 
found that the best approach is to consider the nature106 of the evidence, together with the 
reason for its admission.  Furthermore, the court in Brown found, that much like in Ndiki, the 
                                                             
99 Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 2 at 852. 
100 LA Consortium supra note 11 para 12 – 13 where the court found that the evidence was both real and 
documentary – in so doing, it applied a hearsay enquiry to admit the evidence and considered the authenticity and 
reliability of the evidence as key factors to be considered before admitting the evidence.  
101 S v Baleka (3) supra note 84; Motata v Nair NO supra note 95 para 21.  See also South African Law Reform 
Commission  Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence (2014) 35 – 37. 
102 Hofman op cit note 24 at 268.  This argument is endorsed by Bozalek J in S v Brown supra note 12 para 19. 
103 Hofman op cit note 24 at 268; Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 2 at 852.  
104 S v Brown supra note 12 para 18. 
105 S v Ndiki supra note 11 para 53. 
106 S v Brown supra note 12 para 20. 
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transient and fluid nature of electronic communications meant that its admission into evidence 
was better suited as a document, rather than an object (real evidence).107   
With that being the case, an electronic communication in the form of a document, in 
circumstances where it is not considered real in nature, in order to be admissible,108 must be: 
produced, original, and authentic (subject to concessions provided in the ECT Act regarding 
originality and production).109 As noted by Gautschi AJ:110 
 
For documentary evidence to be admissible, the statements contained in the document 
must be relevant and otherwise admissible; the authenticity of the document must be 
proved; and the original document must normally be produced. 
 
More recently, in S v Meyer,111 in the context of documentary evidence, the court found: 
 
According to the ECT Act data messages are the functional equivalents of documents and 
therefore, except where the Act specifically provides for exceptions, the ordinary common law 
requirements for the admissibility of documents must be adhered to. 
 
Therefore, the question of whether a data message is a document (documentary evidence) or 
an object (real evidence) can be pivotal in determining whether evidence is admissible or 
inadmissible (due to hearsay), and will further dictate the hurdles to be overcome in its 
admission in evidence. 
In Ndlovu, Gautschi AJ found that data messages could be either real evidence or 
documentary evidence, depending on the nature of the evidence by holding as follows: 
 
Where the probative value of the information in a data message depends upon the 
credibility of a (natural) person other than the person giving the evidence, there is no reason 
to suppose that section 15 seeks to override the normal rules applying to hearsay evidence. 
On the other hand, where the probative value of the evidence depends upon the ‘credibility’ 
of the computer (because information was processed by the computer), section 3 of the 
Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 will not apply, and there is every reason to 
suppose that section 15(1), read with sections 15(2) and (3), intend for such ‘hearsay’ 
evidence to be admitted, and due evidential weight to be given thereto according to an 
assessment having regard to certain factors. 
  
                                                             
107 Ibid. 
108 Theophilopoulos op cit note 7 at 461 – 480.  
109 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 2 at 431 – 435. 
110 Ndlovu supra note 12 at 165 – 166. 
111 S v Meyer supra note 11 para 299.  
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In Ndiki112(via Van Zyl J), the court followed similar logic used in Ndlovu by finding that a 
data message will be considered real evidence if its credibility depends on the reliability of the 
technology, by holding that: 
 
Evidence on the other hand that depends solely upon the reliability and accuracy of the 
computer itself and its operating systems or programs, constitutes real evidence. What 
section 15 of the ECT Act does, is to treat a data message in the same way as real evidence 
at common law. It is admissible as evidence in terms of subsection (2) and the Court’s 
discretion simply relates to an assessment of the evidential weight to be given thereto. 
 
However, the court in Ndiki did express reservations about the reliability of computer-based 
evidence and obiter expressed the view113 that all electronic evidence should be hearsay.114  
The court did not deem it necessary to finally determine this issue and left the question open.  
As will be seen below in discussing the position in England, Canada, and the United States, 
this position should be avoided.  
In LA Consortium, Malan J supported the distinction created in both Ndlovu and Ndiki 
by finding that evidence in the form of computer printouts were real evidence by stating that: 
‘this is real evidence the probative value of which depends on the reliability and accuracy of 
the computer and its operating systems’.115 The court went further, unfortunately as noted 
elsewhere,116 to state: ‘the data messages relied upon in this case are not only real evidence but 
includes hearsay.’  Perhaps the court meant to say the data message evidence was both real 
evidence and documentary hearsay evidence (as was the case in Ndiki).  This is not clear from 
the judgment and it appears the court was referring to the printouts as being both real and 
documentary in nature – this classification is problematic as conceptually, real evidence cannot 
be subjected to a hearsay analysis – if the evidence is real in nature, it is therefore what it 
purports to be.  It cannot be subject to the credibility of a person, it is in theory subject to the 
credibility of a computer or the relevant technology.  
In Brown, Bozalek J took a conservative approach (although the court did endorse the 
decision in Ndiki), and found that even though the admissibility of photographs (stored via 
                                                             
112 S v Ndiki supra note 11 para 7. 
113 S v Ndiki supra note 11 para 33. See also Hofman & de Jager op cit note 7 at 777 where the reservations 
expressed in Ndiki are based on the misgivings noted in the evidentiary portion of the annual survey of South 
African law by Bilchitz in 1998 where the view espoused is that all computer based evidence is subject to 
credibility of a natural person and should therefore always be regarded as hearsay.  This view should be rejected 
as it is inconsistent with recent case law, the international position, and with South Africa's common law on real 
evidence.  
114 This view is only obiter, and Van Zyl J did not feel it necessary to decide this point. 
115 LA Consortium supra note 11 para 16. 
116 De Villiers (2) op cit note 43 at 733. 
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electronic means) were more akin to being real evidence, they were ultimately classified as 
documentary evidence.  The court found that:  
  
Given the potential mutability and transient nature of images such as the images in this 
matter which are generated, stored and transmitted by an electronic device I consider that 
they are more appropriately dealt with as documentary evidence rather than ‘real 
evidence’. I associate myself, furthermore, with the approach followed in S v Ndiki and 
others [2007] 2 All SA 185 (CK) where Van Zyl J expressed the view that the first step in 
considering the admissibility of documentary evidence is to examine the nature of the 
evidence in issue in order to determine what kind of evidence one was dealing with and 
what the requirements for its admissibility are.  
 
Herein lies some of the controversy (or room for law reform) – when should data messages be 
considered documentary evidence and when should they be considered real evidence? Or do 
data messages constitute a hybrid of the two forms of evidence?  
 
With the law as it currently stands, the solution is to:117 consider the nature118 of the data 
message, and the requirements of the relevant legislation (or common law requirements).119 As 
noted in Ndiki: 
 
It is an issue that must be determined on the facts of each case having regard to what it is 
that the party concerned wishes to prove with the document, the contents thereof, the 
function performed by the computer and the requirements of the relevant section relied 
upon for the admission of the document in question.120 
 
It may be that a data message exhibits characteristics of both real and documentary 
evidence, as was the case in both Ndiki and LA Consortium, making the distinction between 
real or documentary difficult to draw. As many have noted (sometimes with more concern than 
necessary in an advancing digital age), it is certainly possible to amend or surreptitiously edit 
data messages.  These concerns and apparent difficulties notwithstanding, it should not mean 
all data messages are treated as documentary evidence. If a data message relies substantially 
                                                             
117 De Villiers (1) op cit note 35 at 568 – 569 where the author suggests a five step approach.  In my view, this is 
overly complicated – a court must concern itself, primarily, with the nature of the evidence and then apply the 
normal common law rules applicable to that type of evidence.  See also Fourie op cit note 9 para 2.1.2 at 13 – 14 
where the author suggests a purpose test.  While I can agree that the purpose of the evidence is important, I cannot 
agree with the following statement: ‘if the purpose is for the court to read or listen to and interpret the contents of 
a piece of evidence, such evidence should be considered documentary evidence’.  The nature of the evidence must 
dictate its classification, not its purpose.  In this regard, see S v Brown supra note 12 para 20; S v Ndiki supra note 
11 para 53; Theophilopoulos op cit note 7 at 461 – 479. 
118 S v Brown supra note 12 para 20; S v Ndiki supra note 11 paras 20 – 21. 
119 S v Ndiki supra note 11 paras 20 – 21; De Villiers (1) op cit note 35 at 566 – 567; Fourie op cit note 7 at 8 – 
11. 
120 S v Ndiki supra note 11 paras 20 – 21. 
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on technology (without human intervention) then that evidence should be real in nature.  To 
guard against manipulation, a court must satisfy itself that the evidence is authentic (reliable, 
accurate) – i.e. it is what it purports to be.  Furthermore, a court has a discretion when deciding 
what weight to give the evidence. 
Much of the debate above arises in contexts where data message are produced as 
documents in the form of a print out.  Would it make any difference if the data messages were 
produced via a different medium, for example, projection in court or transmission in some other 
electronic format?   There does not appear to be any reason why the principles set out above 
should not apply: namely, the nature of the data message must be considered together with 
empowering legislation (or common law). If by its nature a data message relies predominantly 
or substantially on a computer or mechanical process, its manner of presentation to court is 
irrelevant, it should still be regarded as real evidence. Similarly, if a data message contains 
conclusions, statements or assumptions that rely on the credibility of a natural person, 
regardless of the manner of presentation, it should be subject to the hearsay rules.  
 
3.6 EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE 
 
If a data message is classified as documentary evidence, and not real evidence, the hearsay trap 
may still mean the evidence is excluded.121  The hearsay rule will apply if the probative value 
of the data message depends upon the credibility of any person other than the person giving 
evidence.122  However,  there are a number of statutory exceptions where hearsay evidence will 
be admitted.123  
 
3.6.1 The Law of Evidence Amendment Act  
 
The Law of Evidence Amendment Act changed the law of evidence by introducing a statutory 
definition for hearsay, and including several exceptions to the exclusionary hearsay rule.124 The 
three exceptions created by s 3(1) are as follows: 
 
• 3(1)(a) where the party against whom the hearsay evidence is to be adduced 
agrees to its admission; 
                                                             
121 Hofman & de Jager op cit note 7 at 770 – 771. 
122 Hearsay as defined by s 3 (4) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988. 
123Hofman op cit note 24 at 265 – 268; Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 2 at 305 – 323; Zeffertt & Paizes 
op cit note 2 at 418 – 441. 
124 Ibid. 
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• 3(1)(b) where the person upon whose credibility the probative value of the 
hearsay evidence depends testifies; and 
 
•  3(1)(c) where a court is provided with a list of factors,125 and ultimately 
has a wide discretion to admit hearsay evidence if the court deems it to be 
in the interests of justice to admit such evidence. 
 
Consequently, even if a court takes a conservative approach and classifies a data message as 
documentary hearsay evidence, then it will still have the discretion to admit the hearsay data 
message if it is of the view that the interests of justice demand its admission into evidence. 
Therefore, where a court is in doubt as to the classification of a data message, it may classify 
it as documentary hearsay and still have the ability to receive it into evidence via the broad 
discretion vested in a court via the Law of Evidence Amendment Act.126 
 
3.6.2 The Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 
 
The three primary exceptions created by the CPEA (in the context of data messages) relate to 
bankers' books, business records, and a general exception where the author of a data message 
is not available.127  The promulgation of the CPEA took place when data messages were not 
fully contemplated or developed, but as noted by Hofman,128 there is no reason these exceptions 
should not apply to electronic evidence.   
Section 34(1)(a)(i) creates an exception for situations where the author of the data 
message had personal knowledge of the statements made therein, but is not available to testify.   
Section 34(1)(a)(ii), the wording of which is certainly not a model of clarity, creates a 
further exception in relation to the recording of another in the ordinary course of duty. 
The details pertaining to these exceptions are largely nullified129 by the Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act (and are therefore less applicable than they once were).130  Even though 
                                                             
125 See a reproduction of this section of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act above at para 3.2. 
126 LA Consortium supra note 11 para 16. 
127 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 2 at 310 – 316.  
128 Hofman & de Jager op cit note 7 at 771. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 2 at 311 – 316; Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 2 at 418 – 429; Bellengère 
et al op cit note 8 at 295 – 305. 
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controversial, the creation of a business records exception in s 15 of the ECT Act, discussed 
below, has further nullified the use of the older, more traditional hearsay exceptions.  
 
3.6.3 The Criminal Procedure Act 
 
As is the case with the CPEA, and the ECT Act discussed directly below, the CPA creates an 
exception for business records in terms of s 221.131  
If the conditions of s 221(1) are satisfied, any statement contained in the document that 
establishes a fact will be admissible on the mere production thereof.  
The conditions for admissibility are: the compilation of the document must have taken 
place in the ordinary course of business; and someone who can be reasonably presumed to have 
knowledge of the matters dealt with therein must supply it. Finally, the person who supplied 
the information must be dead, outside the Republic, or unable to testify due to mental or 
physical ailments.  
Moreover, s 222 of the CPA incorporates s 33 – 38 of the CPEA making them 
applicable to all forms of criminal proceedings.  In the present context, that means that the 
exception created by s 34 of the CPEA (for the admissibility of a data message where the author 
is not available), is also applicable to criminal proceedings. 
Finally, s 236 and s 236A of the CPA create an exception for banking records (both 
local and international banks) where an employee of the bank certifies the accuracy of the 
record and confirms that the capture thereof took place in the ordinary course of business.    
 
3.6.4 The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act  
 
Section 15(4)132of the ECT Act creates a business records exception to the hearsay rule for any 
data message created in the ordinary course of business. 
The section, which is controversial,133 has been criticised because of the ‘difficulties’134 
it creates. It reads as follows:  
 
A data message made by a person in the ordinary course of business, or a copy or printout 
of or an extract from such data message certified to be correct by an officer in the service 
of such person, is on its mere production in any civil, criminal, administrative or 
                                                             
131 Hofman & de Jager op cit note 7 at 773 – 776; Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 17 at 290 – 301; 
Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 2 at 418 – 441. 
132 A Duvenhage An evidential analysis of section 15 (4) of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 
25 of 2002 (LLM thesis, University of Pretoria, 2016) 9 – 34.  
133 LA Consortium supra note 11 at para 12. 
134 Hofman & de Jager op cit note 7 at 771 – 772; De Villiers (2) op cit note 43 at 734. 
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disciplinary proceedings under any law, the rules of a self regulatory organisation or any 
other law or the common law, admissible in evidence against any person and rebuttable 
proof of the facts contained in such record, copy, printout or extract. 
 
Hofman lists six difficulties with the section.135 The two primary difficulties are: 1) the ECT 
Act exception is much wider than previous business records exceptions; and 2) the ECT Act 
exception creates a situation where there is an ‘unjustified shifting of the onus of proof’ in 
criminal cases (a so-called reverse onus provision). These difficulties appear to remain and 
although the section has been at issue in several cases, it has often received superficial judicial 
treatment.136  In LA Consortium137 the court found that:  
 
despite the very wide words of s 15(4), any hearsay contained in a data message must pass 
the criteria set out in s 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988. 
 
In Absa Bank Ltd v Le Roux,138 the court noted that: 
 
Section 15(4) has a twofold effect. It creates a statutory exception to the hearsay rule and 
it gives rise to a rebuttable presumption in favour of the correctness of electronic data 
falling within the definition of the term ‘data message'.139  
 
In the Supreme Court of Appeal, in Firstrand Bank Limited v Venter,140 in the context of 
s 15(4), the court noted that it: 
 
lays down the minimum requirements for admissibility…; and 
 
once produced was admissible against [a person] and [serves] as ‘rebuttable proof’ of the 
facts contained in the printouts…   
 
Earlier, in what appears to be the first case141 dealing with s 15(4), in Golden Fried Chicken 
(Proprietary) Limited v Yum Restaurants International (Proprietary) Limited,142 Du Plessis J 
held: 
 
                                                             
135 Hofman op cit note 24 at 267 – 268; Theophilopoulos op cit note 7 at 476; De Villiers (2) op cit note 43 at 733 
– 734; South African Law Reform Commission  Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of 
Evidence (2014) 75. 
136 For example, in S v Van der Linde [2016] 3 All SA 898 (GJ) where the section was referred to, but only briefly, 
after the parties agreed on admitting the evidence concerned. In Sublime Technologies (Pty) Ltd v Jonker 2010 
(2) SA 522 (SCA), although it appeared central to the dispute, it was only mentioned in passing. 
137 LA Consortium supra note 11 para 13. 
138 2014 (1) SA 475 (WCC). 
139 Ibid para 19. 
140 [2012] JOL 29436 (SCA) para 16. 
141 Hofman & de Jager op cit note 7 at 772 – 773. 
142 [2005] ZAGPHC 311. 
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In terms of s 15(4) of [the ECT Act] a printout of a data message can constitute prima facie 
proof [of the facts contained therein] if the data message was made by a person in the 
ordinary course of business and if the printout is certified to be correct by ‘an officer in the 
service of such person’.143 
 
Further, in Ndlovu, despite the court noting that s 15 does not override the normal rules relating 
to hearsay,144 it went on to describe s 15(4) as follows: 
 
Section 15(4) provides for two situations in which a data message may on its mere 
production be admissible in evidence. The first is “a data message made by a person in the 
ordinary course of business”, which, juxtaposed with the words that follow, clearly refers 
to an original data message, and is required to have been made “in the ordinary course of 
business”. The second is a copy or printout of or an extract from such data message which 
is certified to be correct by an officer in the service of such person (being a person who 
made the data message in the ordinary course of business). Once either of these two 
situations is present, the data message is on its mere production admissible in evidence and 
rebuttable proof of the facts contained therein.145 
 
The dictum directly above appears to suggest that s 15(4) does override the hearsay trap via a 
statutory exception – created if a data message is made during the ordinary course of business, 
and certified to be correct.  If these conditions are satisfied, a printout of a data message will 
be rebuttable proof of the facts contained therein.   
In Trend Finance (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for SARS,146 the court pointed out that a 
party seeking to rely on s 15(4) must show that the document ‘sought to be admitted is a 
printout of information existing in electronic form.’  Consequently, it appears from this case, 
that in order to rely on this statutory exception one must satisfy a court that the printout has a 
data message format somewhere on a computer or mechanical system.  This requirement (that 
the data must still exist in electronic form) does not appear to have received any other judicial 
approval. 
In addition, in Director of Public Prosecution v Modise,147 the court catergorised                  
s 15(4)148 as follows: 
 
[It is] designed to … allow evidence in the form of the facts and opinions contained in a 
document which complies with [section 15(4)] to be admitted in evidence at a trial 
notwithstanding that the person who listed the facts and formed the opinions in the 
document is not called as a witness.149 
                                                             
143 [2005] ZAGPHC 311 6.  
144 Ndlovu supra note 12 at 173. 
145 Ndlovu supra note 12 at 172 – 173.  
146 [2005] 4 All SA 657 (C) 678-679. 
147 2012 (1) SACR 553 (GSJ). 
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 66 
 
In Modise, in an application to review a Magistrate’s decision, Lamont J seemed to 
indicate that notwithstanding some of the academic concerns pointed out above s 15(4) 
is an intentional step by South Africa's legislature to subjugate the hearsay rule:150 
 
[Section 15(4) is] specifically designed to enable [persons] to avoid the need to lead the 
evidence of a witness by way of producing him and then leading viva voce evidence. The 
facts and matters in a document are the evidence. The evidence is admissible if the 
provisions of this section are complied with. Nothing more is required. The section enables 
[persons] to easily produce evidence which will generally be of a formal and uncontested 
nature and to place same in documentary form before a court without the need to call the 
witness… [A person] does not have to send its experts to a variety of courts countrywide 
to give evidence which generally is uncontested with the concomitant waste of money and 
time. In addition the expert becomes free to perform other work. These sections allow 
limited resources to be properly and adequately used.151 
 
This exception appears to go further than previous statutory exceptions, and may favour 
evidence in the form of a data message if in a business context.  If a person in a business is able 
to comply with the statutory provisions of s 15(4) – which simply require certification from an 
employee that the printout of a data message is correct – then those facts are rebuttably 
presumed true. 152  
However, the wording of s 15(4), as noted by Lamont J in Modise is an intentional step 
by the legislature to subjugate the hearsay rule.  This type of ‘shop-book’ or business records 
exception, as will be seen in the discussion on foreign law in paragraph 3.6 below, is common 
around the world. 
Be that as it may, some argue153 this creates a reverse onus154 that may be 
constitutionally suspect in criminal cases155 – even though it is a presumption which can be 
challenged. However, it may be argued that the wording of s 15(4) creates an evidentiary 
burden – and not a full reverse onus.156  If this is the case, in a criminal context, this may 
                                                             
150 Duvenhage op cit note 132 at 34 – 38. 
151 Modise supra note 147s at 557. 
152 Hofman op cit note 24 at 268; De Villiers (2) op cit note 43 at 731; Fourie op cit note 7 at 79.  
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156 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 2 at 540; Zeffertt, Paizes & Skeen op cit note 18 at 212 – 214.  See 
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infringe on the right to remain silent in that an accused is placed in a position where she will 
have to show that the evidence that is rebuttably presumed true is not accurate or contains some 
falsehood. Accordingly, as this argument goes, it is not an infringement of the presumption of 
innocence, but rather a potential infringement on the right to remain silent.  However, whether 
classified as an evidentiary burden, or as a full reverse onus, in a criminal context this section 
appears to be susceptible to criticism in that it either infringes on the right to remain silent, or 
worse, infringes on the presumption of innocence, and possibly on the right to a fair trial.157 
Further, in a civil context, the fact that someone operates a business does not necessarily 
mean the data message is accurate, reliable or honest, even if certified correct. Conversely, 
however, as pointed out above in Modise, there is merit in the argument that this type of section 
is imperative in a modern society, and an intentional departure from the Model Law, 1996.  
As suggested by the SALRC, the interplay between the statutory hearsay exceptions 
and s 15(4) is ‘complex’, creates ‘unnecessary confusion’ and requires ‘greater alignment’. 158 
These proposals will be discussed in chapter 7 below. 
 
3.7 SELECTED INTERNATIONAL POSITIONS ON HEARSAY ELECTRONIC 
EVIDENCE 
 
What follows below in paragraphs 3.7.1 to 3.7.4 is a consideration of several foreign 
jurisdictions.  This does not purport to be a comprehensive comparative study of law in these 
jurisdictions.  It is intended as a tool for identifying suitable approaches to hearsay electronic 
evidence in South Africa.  
 
3.7.1 England and Wales 
 
In England, the primary default rule governing evidence is that all evidence sufficiently 
relevant to an issue before court will be admissible, and that all irrelevant evidence should be 
excluded.159 This default position is subject to a number of exceptions,160 which include 
                                                             
burden in para 6.2 below.  See further the discussion on the constitutional consequences of a shifting evidentiary 
burden in para 7.3.9 below when the SALRC proposals are discussed.   
157 Section 35(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
158 South African Law Reform Commission  Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) 31 – 32  and 69 – 71. 
159 C Tapper Cross & Tapper on Evidence 12 ed (2010) 64 – 65. 
160 S Mason, C Freedman & S Patel ‘England & Wales’ in S Mason (ed) Electronic Evidence 3 ed (2012) 347. 
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hearsay, opinion, character, and conduct on other occasions.161  As a result, the English law of 
evidence (which the South African law of evidence is based on), has been referred to as being 
founded on exclusionary rules, which contain two fundamental guiding principles – the best 
evidence rule, and the hearsay rule.162   
Tapper notes that in so far as hearsay is concerned, it is: ‘one of the most complex and 
most confusing of the exclusionary rules of evidence.’163 However, more recently, England has 
implemented fundamental statutory reform in relation to hearsay in the form of the Civil 
Evidence Act 1995 (CEA) in civil proceedings, and the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (CJA) in 
criminal proceedings.164 
In civil proceedings,165 evidence is not excluded on the basis that it is hearsay.  Section 
1 of the CEA states as follows:  
1 Admissibility of hearsay evidence  
(1) In civil proceedings evidence shall not be excluded on the ground that it is hearsay. 
 
(2) In this Act— 
 
(a) ‘hearsay’ means a statement made otherwise than by a person while giving 
oral evidence in the proceedings which is tendered as evidence of the matters 
stated; and 
(b) references to hearsay include hearsay of whatever degree. 
 
As a result, hearsay evidence is freely admitted in civil matters.  However, s 2 of the CEA 
provides that notice of the hearsay evidence must be given to the opposing party, and provides 
in s 4 factors a court should consider when deciding on the weight the hearsay evidence should 
receive.  In addition, s 3 of the CEA allows a party to call as a witness for cross-examination, 
any person who has made a statement containing hearsay. 
 Conversely, in criminal proceedings, the CJA excludes hearsay evidence – but subject 
to several exceptions where hearsay evidence will be admissible.166  As with South Africa’s 
Law of Evidence Amendment Act, a court in England will always retain an overarching 
discretion as to whether hearsay evidence should be admitted in criminal proceedings167 in 
                                                             
161 Tapper op cit note 159 at 66 – 67.  
162 O Leroux ‘Legal Admissibility of Electronic Evidence’ International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 
(2004) 18(2) at 202. 
163 Tapper op cit note 159 at 551. 
164 Ibid. 
165 Tapper op cit note 159 ch 13. 
166 Tapper op cit note 159 at 602 – 603.  
167 For further details on the other exceptions to hearsay applicable in criminal law, see Tapper op cit note 159 ch 
13. 
 69 
terms of s114 1(1) (d) of the CJA,168 which sets out an interests of justice considerations. 
Simply, if a court feels it is in the interests of justice for hearsay evidence to be admissible, it 
has the discretion to accept the evidence – whether electronic or otherwise.  
Much like South Africa, one of the core concerns in so far as computer evidence is 
concerned has been in relation to the hearsay rule.169 In England,170 the position is the same as 
South Africa’s – that is, if the production of data occurs without human intervention, it is real 
evidence (no hearsay enquiry).171 Conversely, if the data is a record of human assertions, then 
it is hearsay.172 The key, as with many jurisdictions around the world, is to determine whether 
the credibility of the data relies on a person, or an automated process – and this distinction 
often leads to ‘confusion’ and has acted as a ‘brake’ on the introduction of new technology.173  
In terms of hearsay electronic evidence, in O'Shea v City of Coventry Magistrates' 
Court,174 the accused was charged with offences relating to accessing child pornography – 
automated transactions (involving the accused’s credit card and the pornography website) were 
regarded as real evidence, and admissible.  On review, the High Court of Justice found that a 
‘computer printout produced exclusively by a computer without the intervention of the human 
mind’ is real evidence.  More recently, in McDonald v R,175 in a criminal appeal largely dealing 
with character evidence, the court found that a printout from a mobile phone service provider 
(Vodafone) was real evidence (rather than documentary hearsay). 
Earlier, in R v Minors and Harper176 the following statement was accepted as an 
explanation of real evidence:  
 
Where information is recorded by mechanical means without the intervention of a human mind 
the record made by the machine is admissible in evidence provided, of course, it is accepted that 
the machine is reliable. 
 
                                                             
168 For a detailed analysis of this legislation, see Tapper op cit note 159 at 586 – 621, see also 551 – 581 for a 
discussion on hearsay in general. 
169 Mason, Freedman & Patel op cit note 160 at 363. 
170 For a review of the English position, see Tapper op cit note 159 ch 12; see also C Gallavin & S Mason ‘Hearsay’ 
in S Mason (ed) Electronic Evidence 3 ed (2012) paras 4.1 – 4.4.5; C Gallavin & S Mason ‘Hearsay’ in S Mason 
& D Seng (eds) Electronic Evidence 4 ed (2017) 72 – 86.  
171 Mason, Freedman & Patel op cit note 160 at 329; Hofman & de Jager op cit note 7 at 776 – 777. 
172 Mason, Freedman & Patel op cit note 160 at 329. 
173 C Reed ‘The Admissibility and Authentication of Computer Evidence – A Confusion of issues’ in 5th Annual 
British and Irish Legal Education Technology Association Conference (1990) 3 – 5. 
174 [2004] EWHC 905. 
175 [2011] EWCA Crim 2933 para 42. 
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In R v Spiby,177 an automated computer process monitored telephone calls, and a print-out of 
certain call details was accepted as real evidence because there was no human intervention in 
the production of the data – accordingly, it was not hearsay evidence.178 However, it should be 
noted that Spiby was overturned in R v Shephard179 where the court found that the empowering 
legislation (section 69 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984) requires a party to 
produce evidence that will establish that the electronic evidence is reliable in the circumstances.  
The evidence required will vary from case-to-case.180   
As with many other jurisdictions that rely on technology and computerised records, 
England has a variety of business records exceptions.  Typically, these exceptions require the 
data to be created during the ordinary course and scope of business, and the creator of the data 
to have had personal knowledge thereof.181 In England, s 117 of the CJA contains the exception 
in criminal proceedings, and s 9 of the CEA contains a similar exception in a civil context.   
 In summary, in English law, electronic evidence can be classified as either real evidence (not 
subject to the hearsay rules), or it can be classified as documentary evidence (subject to the 
hearsay rules), depending on whether the evidence was created with human input.  If data is 
subject to human intervention in its production, then it will be classified as hearsay 
documentary evidence.  Conversely, if the data is not subject to any substantial human 
intervention, then the evidence will be real evidence.   
 
3.7.2 Canada 
 
The Canadian law of evidence is predominantly based on English common law (except in 
Quebec),182 and as is the case in England and South Africa, electronic evidence is subject to 
the same evidentiary regime as traditional (paper) based evidence.183 This is consistent with 
the United Nations ‘international standard’ (the Model Law, 1996), and with the principle of 
functional equivalence.184 
                                                             
177 [1990] 91 Cr App R 186.  
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As a federal state, Canada has a somewhat segmented185 jurisdictional structure. In 
criminal matters and federal litigation,186 where the federal state has jurisdiction, the Canada 
Evidence Act 1985 finds application.187  Conversely, in civil and property matters, jurisdiction 
rests with the provinces and territories, where the applicable provincial evidence statute will 
apply.188   
Consequently, jurisdiction will determine whether federal or provincial law applies – 
however, in so far as electronic evidence is concerned, both federal and provincial evidence 
statutes are based on the Model Law, 1996.189 
As is the case with most provincial statutes regulating electronic evidence, section 31.1 
– 31.8 of the Canada Evidence Act 1985 contains statutory provisions regulating the 
authenticity of electronic documents, and contains directives on the best evidence rule in 
relation to data and electronic evidence.190  These provisions deal with the admissibility of the 
electronic document, not the admissibility of its contents (this is regulated by some other 
statutory provision, or the common law).191 
In R v Mondor,192 the Ontario Court of Justice193 confirmed that electronic evidence 
(much like the position in South Africa and England above) can take the form of real evidence 
or documentary evidence. The court found: 
 
Where the electronically stored data is recorded electronically by an automated process, 
then the evidence is real evidence.  Where, however, the electronically stored information 
is created by humans, then the evidence is not real evidence, and is not admissible for its 
truth absent some other rule of admissibility. 
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As with many other jurisdictions, Canada also has a business records hearsay exception, and 
the court in Mondor was tasked with determining whether hearsay electronic evidence 
(documentary evidence that is subject to human intervention) would be admissible in terms of 
the Canadian hearsay exception.194 Using similar logic to the South African decisions in Ndlovu 
and Ndiki, the Canadian court in Mondor found that: 
 
[The Canada Evidence Act] does not allow for the admission of hearsay evidence 
contained within an electronic document just because it is in electronic form.  The 
applicant must first establish that the hearsay is admissible either under section 30 or some 
other mechanism. 
 
Ultimately, after analysing previous cases dealing with hearsay electronic evidence,195 the 
court found the evidence to be ‘inadmissible for the truth of their contents.’196  
In Saturley v CIBC World Markets Inc.,197 the Nova Scotia Supreme Court set out the 
position as follows (similar to what in my view is the correct position in South Africa): 
 
Electronic information may be considered either real or documentary evidence.  If it is real 
evidence, it simply needs to be authenticated and the trier of fact will then draw their own 
inferences from it.  Examples of real evidence include photographs and physical objects.198 
 
If electronic information is determined to be real evidence, the evidentiary rules relating 
to documents, such as the best evidence and hearsay rules, will not be applicable.199 
 
The court went further to note that the real issue lies in deciding, ‘when electronic information 
should be treated as real evidence, rather than documentary.’200  Ultimately, and as with the 
position in England and South Africa, electronic evidence will be real evidence when its 
production is ‘without human intervention.’201 This position has received judicial support 
including in the matter of R v McCulloch,202 where the admission of telephone records were 
introduced to court as real evidence because of the automated nature of the data. 
Moreover, in R v Hall,203 the court found that automated billing records were real 
evidence (although they also fell under the hearsay business records exception).   The court 
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referred with approval to the English case of R v Spiby204 where the English court found that 
an automated process monitoring phone calls was also real evidence (not subject to hearsay 
rules). 
As with South Africa and England, in Canada the classification of electronic evidence 
(as real or documentary) will be important. It guides the admissibility enquiry, and 
consequently, a critical determination is to find out whether the data produced (and which a 
litigant seeks to rely on to prove or disprove an issue) was created with or without human 
intervention.  Thereafter, it will be necessary to consider the empowering legislation (or 
common law) for the applicable admissibility requirements.  
 
3.7.3 The United States of America  
 
It is almost impossible to concisely summarise the legal position on any issue in the United 
States – primarily, because of the federal system.  Each state has its own independent judiciary, 
and applies its own nuanced procedural and evidentiary rules.205 
That said, holistically, the legal system of the United States is similar to South Africa 
and the jurisdictions discussed above in that it is a predominantly common law system based 
on English common law (at a federal level).206  As a general position, the United States adopts 
a similar stance in relation to hearsay electronic evidence:  it recognises a business records 
hearsay exception,207 and distinguishes between computer-generated records (no human 
intervention – real evidence), and computer-stored records (human intervention – documentary 
hearsay).208 
In terms of the Federal Rules of Evidence, hearsay is not admissible as evidence,209 but 
this is subject to several exceptions.210   
The basis for considering the admissibility of electronic evidence in the United States 
is similar to South Africa – the evidence must be relevant, authentic, must not be hearsay, must 
be the best evidence available, and its probative value must outweigh any prejudicial effect.211 
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The distinction between real and documentary evidence drawn in South Africa, 
England and Canada is similarly made in the United States, in that if the data relies on a human 
mind (or a human statement) it is subject to hearsay rules.  If the data relies on or its production 
is solely automated or mechanical, then it is not subject to the hearsay rules.212 
For example, in U-Haul Intern Inc. v Lumbermens,213 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dealt with computer generated summaries of payments made on 
insurance claims, and found that, in the context of the business records hearsay exception: 
‘Rule 803(6) provides that records of regularly conducted business activity meeting [certain] 
criteria constitute an exception to the prohibition against hearsay evidence.’214   
In Telewizja Polska USA Inc. v Echostar Satellite Corp,215 the court found that images 
and text (that purported to show what a website looked like at a point in time) were not 
statements for purposes of the federal hearsay rules (akin to real evidence in South Africa). In 
addition, in United States v Rollins,216 the court found that computer generated evidence 
(without human intervention) was admissible without requiring admissibility in terms of the 
hearsay rules.   
In the seminal matter of Lorraine v Markel American Insurance Company,217 the court 
delivered a comprehensive 101 page opinion outlining the admissibility of electronically stored 
information. The thorough opinion canvasses all relevant United States law (in so far as 
electronic evidence is concerned) and may well be a point of departure if United States 
electronic evidence is at issue.218 In summary, the court comprehensively reviewed the 
applicable statutory regime for admissibility of electronic evidence (at a federal level) – and 
found that if evidence is primarily generated by a computer, it cannot be subject to hearsay as 
it is not produced by a person.219 In the context of hearsay electronic evidence, the court found 
that:220 
  
                                                             
– 21; J Frieden & L Murray ‘The Admissibility of Electronic Evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence’ 
(2011) 17 Richmond Journal for Law and Technology 2 – 6. 
212 G Joseph ‘A Simplified Approach to Computer-Generated Evidence and Animations’ available at 
http://www.jha.com/us/articles/viewarticle.php?8, accessed 5 June 2017.  
213 576 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2009). 
214 Ibid at 1043. 
215 2004 WL 2367740. 
216 2004 WL 26780. 
217 241 F.R.D. 534. 
218 B Esler ‘Lorraine v Markel: Unnecessarily Raising the Standard for Admissibility of Electronic Evidence’ 
2007 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 80 – 82.  
219 Similar logic was used in the South African cases of Ex Parte Rosch and Narlis. 
220 Kemp op cit note 211 at 2 – 7. 
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When an electronically generated record is entirely the product of the functioning of a 
computerized system or process, such as the ‘report’ generated when a fax is sent showing 
the number to which the fax was sent and the time it was received, there is no ‘person’ 
involved in the creation of the record, and no ‘assertion’ being made. For that reason, the 
record is not a statement and cannot be hearsay. 
 
In a similar vein, in United States v Lizarraga-Tirado,221 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
found that machine-generated evidence (without any substantial human intervention) is not 
hearsay.  In this case, the court found that a ‘pin’ from Google Earth (satellite image software) 
was not an assertion by a person, and was therefore not hearsay.  The court stated as follows: 
‘we join other circuits that have held that machine statements aren’t hearsay.’222 
Consequently, the key issue in the United States in so far as computer generated 
evidence and hearsay is concerned, is to determine whether the evidence is subject to input, 
assertions or conclusions by a person.  If so, it is hearsay.  If not, and the evidence is 
automatically generated, then subject to the other evidential conditions being satisfied 
(relevance, authenticity, and the best evidence rule), the evidence will be admissible. Of course, 
as with South Africa and other jurisdictions, even if the evidence is hearsay in nature, then it 
may still be admissible under one of the statutory exceptions (contained in the Federal Rules 
of Evidence or in an applicable State statute).  
  
3.7.4 Comment 
 
 In all the foreign jurisdictions considered the accepted position appears to favour electronic 
evidence being admissible without hearsay considerations if produced by machine or computer 
without substantial human intervention. However, in South African, this issue can be 
controversial,223 and arguably requires law reform, or clear judicial guidance. The South 
African Law Reform Commission noted as follows:224 
 
                                                             
221 2015 WL 3772772 (9th Cir. 2015). 
222 Ibid at 7 – 8.  The appeal court quotes the following cases in support of this conclusion: United States v Lamons 
532 F.3d 1251, 1263 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v 
Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 2007); United States v Hamilton, 413 F.3d 1138, 1142 (10th Cir. 2005); 
United States v Khorozian, 333 F.3d 498, 506 (3d Cir. 2003). 
223 Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 2 at 432 – 433 where the authors disagree with the proposition that a computer 
can produce real evidence and rely on Bilchitz’s contribution to the Annual Survey of South Africa Law in 1998 
to support their position.  In my view, although understandable, this position is not consistent with modern 
international practice and does not accord with the South African common law in relation to real evidence – as a 
result, the proposition that computers cannot produce real evidence should be rejected as appears the case with 
most recent case law in South Africa dealing with the issue – for example, S v Ndiki supra note 11; Ndlovu supra 
note 12; LA Consortium supra note 11. 
224 South African Law Reform Commission  Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) 70. 
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The SALRC supports the maintenance of a distinction between automated data messages 
and data messages ‘made by a person’ and proposes statutory reform to guide the 
production and proof of both types of evidence in court. In addition, the SALRC supports 
the development of a handbook on obtaining and producing electronic evidence that will 
provide clarity, to practitioners and judicial officers, on the legal position and advice on 
technical aspects of producing electronic evidence in court to avoid unnecessary 
confusion. 
 
The law reform proposals, and law reform recommendations, will be discussed in chapter 7 
below. 
 
3.8 CONCLUSION 
 
South African courts and academics have been almost entirely ad idem in their 
determination that electronic evidence can constitute hearsay within the meaning of the Law 
of Evidence Amendment Act.  Notwithstanding the imminent promulgation of new 
Cybercrimes legislation, the evidentiary position will remain unchanged by that legislation 
(which barring one minor procedural section, leaves the law of evidence untouched). 
Consequently, the categorisation of a data message as either real evidence or documentary 
evidence will play a pivotal role in determining the admissibility requirements the evidence 
must face. Most recent South African cases dealing with the admissibility of electronic 
evidence appear to accept that a distinction must be drawn between evidence generated by a 
computer without substantial human involvement (real evidence and no hearsay enquiry), and 
evidence where there is human involvement or assertions (documentary hearsay and subject to 
the exclusionary hearsay rules).  However, the distinction is not always clearly articulated 
and/or justified, and the statutory exception created in s 15(4) of the ECT Act remains a cause 
for disagreement.  
In the foreign jurisdictions considered above it appears settled law that electronic 
evidence that relies on a computer or automated system (such as phone records or GPS data) 
should be introduced into evidence without the need for a hearsay enquiry (of course, subject 
to any other exclusionary rule of evidence applicable in that jurisdiction, such as relevance, 
authenticity or the best evidence rule). 
The current position in South Africa, with a multitude of sources of law, differing 
definitions, some conflicting case law, some questionable obiter statements, and importantly 
no real clarity on the distinction between different types of electronic evidence, will benefit 
from law reform, or clear judicial guidance.   
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CHAPTER 4:1 ELECTRONIC DEVICES – A PRESUMPTION OF RELIABILITY, A 
PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY, JUDICIAL NOTICE, OR NONE OF THE ABOVE?   
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Electronic devices have become part of the fabric of every-day life – their omnipresent nature 
ensures that in a post information-revolution society, it is likely that a person will use, rely on, 
or interact with technology every day. Consequently, technological developments have ushered 
in a ‘revolution’ that requires some adaption from the law of evidence.2   
In the context of data messages and electronic communication, a presumption of 
reliability is a presumption that electronic equipment was working and reliable at the relevant 
time, unless there is evidence to the contrary.3 The primary rationale being expediency – to 
save time and money; and to avoid proving the obvious.4  
In Trustees for the time Being of the Delsheray Trust v ABSA Bank Limited (‘Delsheray 
Trust’),5 the Western Cape High Court invoked what it referred to as a common law 
presumption of reliability in order to ensure seemingly valid computer-based evidence was 
admitted to court. 
Consequently, the purpose of this chapter is to examine a presumption of reliability in 
relation to electronic evidence, paying particular attention to recent case law in South Africa 
in order to critically analyse whether the law reform proposed by the SALRC in the context of 
presumptions is necessary and/or desirable.  
 
                                                             
1 A version of this chapter was published as L Swales ‘Electronic instruments – a presumption of reliability, a 
presumption of regularity, judicial notice, or none of the above?’ SACJ 2018 (2) 189 – 211. 
2 Trustees for the time Being of the Delsheray Trust v ABSA Bank Limited [2014] 4 All SA 748 (WCC) para 18; 
S v Meyer 2017 JDR 1728 (GJ) where the court applied the ECT Act in the context of fraudulent VAT refunds 
totalling over 200 million Rand; S v Brown 2016 (1) SACR 206 (WCC) where electronic evidence from a mobile 
phone and the application of the ECT Act were central issues in the context of a murder trial; S v Miller 2016 (1) 
SACR 251 (WCC) where electronic evidence was required in the context of organised crime involving abalone. 
See also Uramin Incorporated v Perie 2017 (1) SA 236 (GJ) where technology was ‘simply another tool for 
securing effective access to justice’ in the context of evidence being led via video link.  
3 Delsheray Trust supra note 2 at para 40 – 41. See also D De Villiers ‘Old 'Documents', 'Videotapes' and New 
'Data Messages' – A Functional Approach to the Law of Evidence (part 2)’ (2010) 4 TSAR 722 – 734 where a 
presumption is discussed in the broader context of electronic evidence; C Theophilopoulos ‘The admissibility of 
data, data messages, and electronic documents at trial’ (2015) 3 TSAR 477 where the author discusses courts 
taking judicial notice of the ‘integrity and reliability of the operation of electronic hard drive systems and software 
programs’. 
4 S Mason ‘Mechanical Instruments: the presumption of being in order’ in S Mason (ed) Electronic Evidence 3 
ed (2012) at 149.  See also D van der Merwe ‘Evidence’ in Law of South Africa (2015) 18(3) para 230 and para 
235; C Tapper Cross and Tapper on Evidence 12 ed (2010) 131. 
5 Delsheray Trust supra note 2 at para 41. 
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4.2 PRESUMPTIONS: AN OVERVIEW 
 
A presumption is a legal device or method of reasoning.6  It is a form of logic where conclusions 
may or must be drawn in the absence of contrary evidence.7 Presumptions ultimately augment 
and aid reasoning in legal enquiries8 – the primary aim being to alleviate the need to prove 
every item of evidence adduced in court, or to reduce the need for evidence to prove the 
obvious.9  
In South Africa, presumptions are traditionally classified in three categories:10 
irrebuttable presumptions of law, rebuttable presumptions of law, and rebuttable presumptions 
of fact.11  
An irrebuttable presumption of law, as the name suggests, is conclusive proof of the 
fact presumed and cannot be rebutted by evidence to the contrary. For example, a child under 
10 years old is irrebuttably presumed to lack criminal capacity.12 The term presumption in this 
context is a misnomer: an irrebuttable presumption of law applies as a rule of substantive law 
and not as a presumption.13 In Scagell v Attorney-General, Western Cape, in the context of the 
constitutionality of certain statutory presumptions, the court found: ‘the legal character of an 
irrebuttable presumption is not that it is a rule of evidence, but that it is a rule of substantive 
law.’14  
Conversely, a rebuttable presumption of law provisionally accepts a fact as true; the 
fact will be presumed true unless there is evidence to the contrary. For example, the ownership 
of a thing is rebuttably presumed to be unencumbered, and free from servitudes – consequently, 
this ‘fact’ or position will operate until countervailing evidence proves the opposite.15 In R v 
Fourie, the Appellate Division held that a rebuttable presumption ‘must be accepted as proof 
of the fact presumed until rebutted’.16 
                                                             
6 D Zeffertt & A Paizes The South African Law of Evidence 2 ed (2009) 181 – 182.   
7 P Schwikkard & S van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 4 ed (2016) 536. 
8 Thayer Preliminary Treatsie of Evidence at Common Law (1898) in Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 7 
at 537.  See also D Zeffertt & A Paizes The South African Law of Evidence 3 ed (2017) 191 – 197. 
9 S Mason ‘The Presumption that Computers are reliable’ in S Mason & D Seng (eds) Electronic Evidence 4 ed 
(2017) 101. 
10 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 7 at 536; Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 6 at 181.  
11 Tregea v Godart 1939 AD 16 at 28 where the court notes: ‘…presumptions in all the text books are commonly 
said to be of three kinds, viz., (1) Presumptiones juris et de jure, (2) Presumptiones juris and (3) Presumptiones 
hominis’ in D Zeffertt & A Paizes Essential Evidence (2010) at 55 – 57. 
12 This legal position is comprehensively regulated by statute – see section 7 of Child Justice Act 75 of 2008.   
13 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 7 at 538.  
14 Scagell v Attorney-General, Western Cape 1997 (2) SA 368 para 30. 
15 C van der Merwe ‘Servitudes’ in Law of South Africa (2010) 24 para 543. 
16 1937 AD 31 at 44 in Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 7 at 538.  See also Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 
6 at 183 where the authors in addition refer to S v Steyn 1963 (1) SA 797 (W). 
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Finally, a rebuttable presumption of fact is a provisional inference that must be drawn based 
on probabilities, ordinary use, and common-sense; ultimately, it is a presumption based on 
what one would usually expect to happen in similar situations.17 For example, if an automated 
computer process that produces telephone records is usually reliable, and its results are 
normally credible, then a rebuttable presumption of fact may well presume the mechanical 
process that produces telephone records to be working at the relevant time until contrary 
evidence is produced. 
 
4.3 PRESUMPTIONS OF FACT 
 
A presumption of fact is often likened to circumstantial evidence18 and inferential reasoning,19 
and has been described as:  
merely frequently recurring examples of circumstantial evidence;20  
 
an inference of probability which a court may draw if on all the evidence it appears to be 
appropriate;21  
 
really only another way of indicating that the specific circumstances of the case are such that 
inferential reasoning is permissible.22 
 
In R v Fourie23 the Appellate Division described a rebuttable presumption of fact as follows: 
‘[It] is the Judge's own; an inference which he draws from the established premises’. As a 
result, some writers have noted that it is misleading to refer to ordinary reasoning and common 
sense as presumptions.24 In the context of electronic evidence, others have noted that a 
presumption of fact that all computers were working at the material time is too crude to be 
applied to modern technology, and too vague.25   
As Mason points out,26 by way of analogy, the presumption that all computers (or 
technology) is working would be similar to suggesting all motor vehicles, regardless of quality 
                                                             
17 Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 6 at 182; Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 7 at 538; van der Merwe op cit 
note 4 para 230 and 235. 
18 A Paizes ‘The law of evidence: Seven wishes for the next twenty years’ (2014) 3 SACJ 280 – 282; Zeffertt & 
Paizes op cit note 6 at 23 – 24. 
19 R v Blom 1939 AD 188 at 202–203 and the two cardinal rules of logic espoused by Watermeyer JA. Zeffertt & 
Paizes op cit note 6 at 99 – 100; Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 7 at 538 – 539.  In so far as the cardinal 
rules of logic are concerned, see Piazes op cit note 18 at 280 – 282. 
20 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 7 at 579. 
21 Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 6 at 182 – 184. 
22 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 7 at 579. 
23 1937 AD 31 at 44. 
24 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 7 at 539.   
25 Mason op cit note 9 at 176; Mason op cit note 4 at 177 – 181. 
26 Mason op cit note 9 at 175 – 176. 
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and/or age and/or other surrounding factors are reliable – this type of presumption would be 
absurd.  Accordingly, as argued by Mason, a presumption that all computers are presumed to 
be working at the relevant time requires a re-think, or at the very least a court should be satisfied 
that the surrounding factors suggest the presumption ought to be applied in the circumstances.  
In Arthur v Bezuidenhout and Mieny,27 a South African court referred with approval to 
the seminal United States academic text on evidence by Wigmore28 where it was stated: the 
term ‘presumption of fact’ should be discarded as useless and confusing. Earlier, in R v 
Fourie,29 in a South African context the Appellate Division noted:   
 
Presumptions of fact are as numerous as the facts on which they are founded, they cannot be 
catalogued and ought not, in my view, to find a place in a legal treatise, for the simple reason 
that being so individual and varied no generalisation can be made in respect of them. 
 
Consequently, in the context of electronic evidence, given that presumptions of fact are 
little more than ‘ordinary inferences drawn by the courts from the facts presented to them’,30 a 
party to criminal or civil proceedings would need to satisfy a court that the appropriate 
inference, in the particular circumstances, would be to infer that the electronic process was 
reliable at the relevant time – or, as the case may be, not reliable at the relevant time. For 
example, if bank records were required to prove some unlawful transaction, and in the event a 
common law presumption was relevant: a commercial bank, particularly those with many 
different branches and international locations should easily be able to satisfy a court that 
computer systems it used at a point in time relevant to an evidentiary dispute were of the 
appropriate industry standards, and usually reliable.  If this is found to be the case, it is likely 
a court will by relying on this circumstantial evidence (and adopt inferential reasoning) to 
conclude that the relevant computer process was reliable at the applicable time, unless there is 
evidence to the contrary.31   
                                                             
27 1962 (2) SA 566 (A) 574 in Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 7 at 539.  See also Zeffertt & Paizes op 
cit note 6 at 183. 
28 J Wigmore A treatise on the system of evidence in trials at common law 3 ed (1940). 
29 1937 AD 31 at 44. 
30 van der Merwe op cit note 4 para 236. 
31 Delsheray Trust supra supra note 2 at para 43 where the court invoked what it called a presumption of reliability 
(akin to a presumption of fact) and found that as ABSA was a ‘large commercial bank with branches all over the 
country. It can safely be assumed that its computer system is as sophisticated, efficient and reliable as those of 
financial institutions competing with it’, and that ‘it can also be assumed that respondent would employ the 
personnel (or outside contractors) with the experience, expertise and responsibility which the proper operation of 
such a computer system would require.’ The court therefore, via inferential reasoning and circumstantial evidence 
drew this presumption of fact which it referred to as a presumption of reliability.  It further found, at para 37, that 
‘this presumption is not generally applied in the South African case law under that name but the underlying 
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4.4 DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL NOTICE 
 
The doctrine of judicial notice allows a judicial officer to accept a fact as true (take notice of a 
fact) if the court, in the circumstances, regards that fact as established32 and true33 without the 
need for any evidence.   The rationale for judicial notice is based on expediency and consistency 
– much like the presumptions discussed above. Once a court has taken judicial notice of a fact, 
it will then be accepted into evidence without any evidence necessary to prove the point.34  
These facts are ‘well known to all reasonable persons or to a reasonable court in a specific 
location.’35   
Judicial notice is said to be taken of four types of facts.36  First, facts that are so 
notorious as to be known by all reasonable persons37 – for example, that Durban is in KwaZulu-
Natal, or that Cape Town in early 2018 was in severe drought. Second, facts which are 
objectively speaking, capable of being verified by an outside source38 – for example, the prime 
lending rate in South Africa on 25 February 2010.  Third, facts relating to published law and 
related legal matters, for example, judicial notice will be taken of any South African statute, as 
well as the common law.  Fourth, legal commentators39 have created a further category of facts 
a court will take notice of when dealing with constitutional matters – for example, a court can 
take judicial notice of apartheid in South Africa and the socio-economic conditions that 
followed such a system.40 
In the Appellate Division case of S v Mthimkulu,41 (later endorsed in S v Fuhri),42 in 
the context of taking judicial notice of the trustworthiness of a scale measurement, the court 
held that expert evidence as to the trustworthiness of a process may not always be required and 
stated:  ‘expert evidence as to the trustworthiness of the process may be obviated by the 
doctrine of judicial notice.’43  The court further noted: ‘judicial notice is similarly taken of 
                                                             
principles, we suggest, are indeed established…’  Although this case is civil in nature, the court’s rationale is 
based on an Appellate Division criminal matter discussed below – S v Mthimkulu 1975 (4) SA 759 (A). 
32 Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 6 at 865 – 866; Zeffertt and Paizes op cit note 11 at 278. 
33 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 6 at 515 – 516. 
34 Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 6 at 865 – 866; Zeffertt and Paizes op cit note 11 at 278. 
35 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 7 at 518. 
36 Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 11 at 277 – 281 where the authors suggest there are four categories.  See also 
Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 6 at  865 – 881 and Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 7 at 515 – 530. 
37 Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 6 at 865 – 866; Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 7 at 515 – 518. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 11 at 277 – 281; Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 6 at 865 – 866; Schwikkard & van 
der Merwe op cit note 7 at 515 – 530. 
40 Ibid. 
41 S v Mthimkulu 1975 (4) SA 759 (A) (Mthimkulu). 
42 1994 (2) SACR 829 (A).  
43 Mthimkulu supra note 41 at 764. 
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other scientific instruments or processes, such as tape-recording, telephony and ordinary 
photography.’44 Corbett JA relied on John Henry Wigmore45 to justify this finding, and found 
as follows: 
in order to justify testimony based on [electronic] instruments…: Preliminary professional 
testimony (1) to the  trustworthiness of the process or instrument in general (when not otherwise 
settled by judicial notice); (2) to the correctness of the particular instrument, such testimony 
being usually available from one and the same qualified person. Any process or instrument, 
furnishing abnormal aid to the senses, may thus be employed as a source of testimonial 
knowledge.46 
 
As recently noted in the Western Cape High Court in S v Helm:47 
Corbett JA referred to the third edition of Wigmore on Evidence and held that, in order to justify 
testimony based on scientific instruments or processes, professional testimony is required as to 
the trustworthiness of the process, or to the instrument, and, in addition, to the correctness of 
the particular instrument. Recognising that the doctrine of judicial notice may suffice in certain 
cases as to the trustworthiness of the process, the learned Judge of Appeal considered the 
circumstances in which a court will insist upon, or relax, the standards of proof which apply 
when assessing evidence involving the use of scientific instruments. These will include the 
nature of the process and instrument involved in the particular case, the extent, if any, to which 
the evidence is challenged, the nature of the inquiry and the facta probanda in the case. But at 
the end of the day the learned judge of appeal reminds us that there is no hard and fast rule and 
that much  I will depend on the facts of each case. 
 
Moreover, in S v Fuhri,48 the court held that where a relevant science advances to a 
level of general acceptance, it is not necessary for further evidence and human verification, and 
a court can take judicial notice thereof.  Consequently, much will depend on the facts of the 
matter, and the scientific or electronic process involved as to whether judicial notice is 
appropriate in the circumstances. 
 
4.5 TRUSTEES FOR THE TIME BEING OF THE DELSHERAY TRUST V ABSA BANK 
LIMITED: ADMISSIBILITY AND ADEQUACY OF VERIFYING AFFIDAVITS, 
COMPUTER GENERATED EVIDENCE, AND PRESUMPTIONS OF 
RELIABILITY  
 
In Delsheray Trust,49 the Western Cape High Court relied on a common law presumption of 
reliability (based on the rationale in Mthimkulu) to accept electronic evidence. Curiously, 
instead of relying on the provisions of s 15 of the ECT Act, which provides expressly for data 
message evidence, ABSA chose to rely on the common law in arguing that its electronic 
                                                             
44 Ibid. 
45 Wigmore op cit note 28 at 189 – 190. 
46 Mthimkulu supra note 41 at 764. 
47 2015 (1) SACR 550 (WCC) para 104. 
48 S v Fuhri supra note 42. 
49 Delsheray Trust supra note 2. 
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evidence was admissible.50 As a result of ABSA’s approach, the court sat on the horns of a 
dilemma as it was forced to use South African common law to ensure apparently valid 
electronic evidence was admissible.51   
 
4.5.1 Delsheray Trust v ABSA 
 
ABSA, a large commercial bank, instituted action against the trustees of the Delsheray Trust 
for payment of R1 588 208,85 plus interest as a result of the trust’s breach of a loan agreement 
in which the bank lent and advanced three separate amounts totalling R1 700 000.00.  To secure 
this debt, ABSA held three mortgage bonds over an immoveable property owned by the trust. 
Consequently, in addition to the claim for payment of R1 588 208,85, ABSA sought an order 
declaring the mortgaged property specially executable.52  
In response to ABSA’s summons, the trust filed a notice of intention to defend – almost 
predictably in modern litigation of this nature, the response to the notice of intention to defend 
was an application for summary judgment.  In terms of Rule 32(2) of the Uniform Rules of 
Court,53 in summary judgment proceedings, the applicant must file an affidavit verifying the 
cause of action, amount claimed, and further stating that in the deponent’s opinion there is no 
bona fide defence to the action.  Although not directly stated in the rule itself, these allegations 
must also be made by a person with personal knowledge.54 
An ABSA employee deposed to an affidavit as required in terms of Rule 32(2), and 
duly confirmed the cause of action and appropriate details.  In response the Delsheray Trust 
claimed that the affidavit did not comply with Rule 32(2) in that the deponent did not have 
personal knowledge of the facts therein.  Essentially, the Delsheray Trust claimed that an 
ABSA employee relied on computer data and records of ABSA, and not on his own direct 
personal knowledge.55  This procedural interpretation notwithstanding, the court a quo (a single 
                                                             
50 Para 17 where the court noted this, and confirmed that section 3 of the ECT Act does not exclude the operation 
of common law. 
51 Various recent cases (reported in the last 2 years) discuss s 15 of the ECT Act and the admissibility of data 
messages – see for example, S v Meyer supra note 2; S v Miller supra note 2; S v Brown supra note 2. 
52 Delsheray Trust supra note 2 para 2 – 8.  For more on declaring immoveable property specially executable, see 
Nedbank v Fraser  2011 (4) SA 363 GSJ and Jaftha v Schoeman and Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC).  
53 Rules regulating the conduct of the proceedings of the several provincial and local divisions of the Supreme 
Court of South Africa in terms of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959, hereafter referred to as the ‘Uniform Rules 
of Court’. 
54 Maharaj v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1976 (1) SA 418 (A) as the locus classicus, and the more recent Rees v 
Investec Bank Limited 2014 (4) SA 220 (SCA).  Summary judgment is said to be extraordinary and drastic: the 
affidavit in support thereof must be made by someone with personal knowledge of the facts. 
55 Para 10. 
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judge in the Western Cape High Court) nevertheless granted summary judgment against the 
appellants.56 
 
4.5.2 Central issue in Delsheray Trust  
 
The appeal, heard before three judges in the Western Cape Division of the High Court, was 
concerned with the admissibility and adequacy of ABSA’s verifying affidavit which was based 
exclusively on its computerised records.57  Specifically, the central issue was: whether an 
affidavit, in terms of Rule 32(2) of the Uniform Rules of Court, can be validly executed where 
the deponent’s knowledge is based exclusively on computerised data.58  For the reasons to be 
discussed below, the appeal court sensibly decided in the affirmative, namely, that a deponent 
can rely exclusively on electronic data and validly declare that the information is within his or 
her personal knowledge.  
 
4.5.3 Decision of the court in Delsheray Trust  
 
The court noted that electronic evidence is regulated by the ECT Act,59 but that s 3 
(interpretation) of the ECT Act expressly provides that its application should not exclude the 
common law.  Given that ABSA presented and argued its case on common law principles, the 
court considered the admissibility and adequacy of the verifying affidavit in terms thereof.60 
If it had elected to do so, the court could have also validly applied the ECT Act by 
relying on s 4 of the ECT Act (sphere of application) read together with s 15 (admissibility and 
evidential weight of data messages).  Section 4 states that, subject to its internal limitations,61 
the Act applies ‘in respect of any electronic transaction or data message.’62 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
56 Para 11. 
57 Para 1. 
58 Para 16. 
59 Para 17. 
60 Para 17. 
61 Primarily aimed at ensuring certain acts cannot be performed via data message, such as the execution of a will 
or the sale of immovable property.  See sch 1 and sch 2 read together with s 4 (1) of the ECT Act. 
62 Spring Forest Trading 599 CC v Wilberry (Pty) Ltd t/a Ecowash 2015 (2) SA 118 (SCA) para 16. 
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4.5.4 Admissibility and adequacy of a verifying affidavit in terms of Rule 32(2) of the Uniform 
Rules of Court 
   
The court faced a dilemma in that there are a string of high court judgments which suggest that 
a deponent to a verifying affidavit cannot rely exclusively on a perusal of records and 
documents.  For example, in Shackleton Credit Management (Pty) Ltd v Microzone Trading 
88 CC,63 Wallis J noted that: 
 
I do not understand any of the cases as going so far as to say that the deponent to an affidavit 
in support of an application for summary judgment can have no personal knowledge whatsoever 
of the facts giving rise to the claim and rely exclusively on the perusal of records and documents 
in order to verify the cause of action and the facts giving rise to it. 
 
This position, which requires a deponent to have personal knowledge beyond a perusal of 
electronic records and documents was endorsed in, inter alia, the Western Cape High Court in 
ABSA Bank Limited v Le Roux,64 and Standard Bank of South Africa v Han-Rit Boerdery CC65 
in the North Gauteng High Court.  In the latter case,  the court was constrained by the generic 
affidavits presented to it – standard-form precedent which is often ill-suited to the facts and 
applicable law.66  The court pointed out that ‘difficulties arise only where plaintiffs attempt to 
bend the rules and take short cuts’ – the court further noted that the summary judgment rules 
are ‘straightforward and can easily be complied with’.67 
Further, in ABSA Bank Limited v Smith68 the court found that a verifying affidavit did 
not comply with Rule 32(2) and labelled the affidavit deficient and unreliable.69  In ABSA Bank 
Limited v Le Roux70 the court found that the affidavit in support of summary judgment fell 
                                                             
63 2010 (5) SA 112 (KZP). 
64 2014 (1) SA 475 (WCC). 
65 [2011] ZAGPPHC 120. 
66 From a reading of the cases discussed in this paragraph 4.5.4, and from my own personal experience as an 
attorney of the High Court of South Africa (practicing in Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal), typically, many 
colleagues who litigate for credit providers and similar clients collecting debt do so on large volume, and will 
usually rely on standard-form, generic precedent; and snappy, apparently clever automated systems.  Usually, this 
results in an end-product which is not entirely suitable.  These colleagues are typically pitted against one another, 
and under significant pressure – financially and from the credit provider client – and will consequently rely on 
standard pleadings, notices and strategies when colleting debts on seemingly similar matters, all in the name of 
cost-savings and efficiencies.  In addition, at times, there appears to be a lack of appreciation for certain provisions 
in the ECT Act.  The end-result in matters of this ilk is that one often finds that the documents are unreliable 
and/or vague. 
67 See also ABSA Bank Limited v Le Roux 2014 (1) SA 475 (WCC) para 20 where in my view the court correctly 
points out that a plaintiff can rely on the provisions of s 15(4) of the ECT Act in the affidavit supporting summary 
judgment.   
68 [2016] ZAWCHC 147. 
69 Ibid para 15. 
70 ABSA Bank Limited v Le Roux supra note 67. 
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‘materially short’ of Rule 32(2).  In ABSA Bank Limited v Future Indefinite lnvestments 201 
(Pty) Ltd,71 the court noted several ‘generic references’, which required ‘educated guesswork’, 
and found the affidavit was entirely ‘unsatisfactory’.72  Finally, in Delsheray Trust,  the court 
found that the verifying affidavit of ABSA’s representative was ‘not a model of clarity’.73  
  Be that as it may, it is worth pointing out that in the cases above where summary 
judgment was refused, the courts noted the age-old summary judgment rationale set out by 
Corbett JA in the Appellate Division in Maharaj v Barclays National Bank Limited:  summary 
judgment proceedings are inherently extraordinary – and should only succeed where the claim 
is valid, and where the defendant has no defence thereto, particularly because summary 
judgment deprives a defendant of the opportunity to raise his or her defence in trial 
proceedings. 
  The judgments in Shackleton, Le Roux, Han-Rit Boerdery CC and others 
notwithstanding, the three judges in Delsheray Trust v ABSA found that a deponent to a 
verifying affidavit can rely exclusively on records and data; the court noted: ‘We do not, with 
respect, agree with the approach adopted in these high court judgments’ (referring to 
Shackleton and the line of cases which support that approach). The court further held that on a 
proper interpretation of Corbett JA’s seminal decision in Maharaj, a bank manager or person 
in a similar position is not expected to have personal knowledge of every fact, and is expected 
to rely on records – the court held: 
 
We believe that our approach herein is not inconsistent with the principles applied in [Maharaj]. 
Corbett JA accepted, for pragmatic reasons, that the manager of the branch of the respondent 
bank who deposed to the verifying affidavit could not have been expected to have personal 
knowledge of every entry in the client’s statement of account. He ‘must rely upon the bank 
records which show the amounts paid into his account and the amounts withdrawn by the 
client’.74 
 
In Delsheray Trust v ABSA it was ultimately held that an exclusive review of computer 
generated information was perfectly acceptable – and found it was: ‘sufficient to allow [the 
ABSA employee] to depose to a valid and adequate verifying affidavit’.  
In addition, two recent Supreme Court of Appeal decisions also deal the with the 
adequacy of verifying affidavits in terms of Rule 32(2), namely: Rees v Investec Bank 
                                                             
71 [2016] ZAWCHC 118.  See also ABSA Bank Ltd v Expectra 423 (Pty) Ltd 2017 (1) SA 81 (WCC) para 19 – 
28. 
72 ABSA Bank Limited v Future Indefinite lnvestments 201 (Pty) Ltd supra note 71 para 18. 
73 Delsheray Trust supra note 2 para 14. 
74 Ibid para 52.  
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Ltd,75  and Stamford Sales & Distribution (Pty) Limited v Metraclark (Pty) Limited.76 In both 
instances, the affidavits supporting summary judgment were found to be valid. However, as 
pointed out in Delsheray Trust v ABSA, neither of these cases dealt with deponents exclusively 
relying on knowledge of computerised records.   
However, the Supreme Court of Appeal in Rees noted with approval the following logic 
from Maharaj: ‘undue formalism in procedural matters is always to be eschewed’, and 
confirmed that personal knowledge of every fact is not required (particularly for a corporate 
plaintiff), and finally, confirmed that a deponent averring facts obtained in the ordinary course 
of his or her duties as an employee of a bank is valid, and in compliance with Rule 32(2).77   
Consequently, reading the Supreme Court of Appeal decisions together with Delsheray 
Trust v ABSA, as some practicing attorneys have pointed out,78 the requirements of Rule 32 
(and the rationale laid out by Corbett JA in Maharaj) can be easily met if an employee of a 
bank (or similar corporate entity) properly pleads its case by:  a) setting out the data and 
information relied upon by the plaintiff’s employee obtained while in the ordinary course of 
duty; and b) swearing positively to the facts contained therein.  
In order to properly swear positively to the facts contained in the affidavit, generic 
precedent must be avoided, and each case should be properly drafted according to its facts – 
this will allow the court to deduce whether the deponent is able to validly hold the opinion that 
the defendant has no bona fide defence to the action, and that the notice of intention to defend 
was solely filed for purposes of delay.  This type of verifying affidavit must hold enough detail 
and fact for a court to validly preclude a defendant from raising his or her defence in trial 
proceedings – and enable the court to do this without having to presume or guess.   
Moreover, and crucially when acting on behalf of a corporate entity, as pointed out by 
Binns-Ward J in ABSA Bank Limited v Le Roux,79 a deponent should also comply with the 
requirements of s 15(4) of the ECT Act.80  Section 15(4) provides an exception to the hearsay 
rule for data messages created in the ordinary course and scope of business, and creates a 
rebuttable presumption that the information contained in a data message is accurate.  The 
                                                             
75 2014 (4) SA 220 (SCA). 
76 [2014] ZASCA 79. 
77 Rees v Investec Bank Ltd supra note 75 para 10. 
78 N Van Vuuren ‘Summary Judgment Proceedings’ Without Prejudice July 2014 at 24 – 25. 
79 2014 (1) SA 475 (WCC) para 19.  
80 Trend Finance (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for SARS [2005] 4 All SA 657 (C); LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a 
LA Enterprises v MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd 2011 4 SA 577 (GSJ); S v Van der Linde [2016] 3 All SA 898 
(GJ).  See also, J Hofman ‘Electronic evidence in criminal cases’ (2006) 3 SACJ 267 – 268; J Hofman & J de 
Jager ‘South Africa’ in Mason (ed) Electronic Evidence 3 ed (2012) 766 - 767; Theophilopoulos op cit note 3 at 
476 – 477. 
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section has been described as ‘controversial’,81 and is discussed in detail in chapter 3 above.82 
Consequently, according to Binns-Ward J in ABSA Bank Limited v Le Roux:  
 
the deponent to a supporting affidavit in summary judgment proceedings [should] aver that he 
is (i) an officer in the service of the plaintiff, (ii) that the salient facts - which should be 
particularised - are electronically captured and stored in the plaintiff’s records (iii) that he had 
regard thereto (iv) that he is authorised to certify and has executed a certificate certifying the 
facts contained in such record to be correct and (v) on the basis thereof is able to swear 
positively that the plaintiff will - having regard to the provisions of s 15(4) of Act 25 of 2002 - 
be able to prove the relevant facts at the trial of the action by producing the electronic record 
or an extract thereof, the requirements of rule 32(2) would be satisfied.  
 
Ultimately, a plaintiff in summary judgment proceedings must avoid generic, standard-form 
precedent – and legal practitioners should ensure that the facts are carefully considered, and 
the appropriate averments made in order to comply with Rule 32(2) of the Uniform Rules of 
Court, read together with s 15(4) of the ECT Act.83 
 
4.5.5 Computer generated evidence according to Delsheray Trust v ABSA 
 
In coming to its decision in Delsheray Trust v ABSA, the court provided the judgment with 
context by confirming that:  
 
[i]t is well known that modern technological developments have brought about a revolution in 
the way that information, including legal information, is captured and disseminated. These 
developments brought about substantial changes in the law of computer generated evidence, 
internationally and in South Africa. 
 
Further, the court quoted with approval the celebrated English case of R v Minors, R v 
Harper:84    
 
The Law of Evidence must be adapted to the realities of contemporary business practise. Main 
frame computers, mini computers play a pervasive role. Often the only record of a transaction 
which nobody can be expected to remember, will be in the memory of a computer. In versatility, 
power and frequency of use of computers will increase. If computer output cannot relatively 
readily be used as evidence in criminal cases, much crime and notably offences of dishonesty 
will in practice be immune from prosecution. 
 
                                                             
81 LA Consortium supra note 80 para 12. 
82 See chapter 3.5.4 above. 
83 Section 15 (4) is beyond the scope of this chapter, for a more in-depth analysis, see chapter 3 above.    
84 [1989] 2 All ER 208. 
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In addition, the court quoted with approval English barrister and author Mason,85 who sets out 
three categories of electronic evidence: 1) data written by one or more people – will be 
necessary to demonstrate that content is reliable and can be trusted; 2) data generated 
automatically by a computer (data logs, GPS, ATM transactions) – will be necessary to 
demonstrate that the computer program that generated the record was reliable and can be 
trusted; and 3) data comprising a mix of 1) and 2) above.   
Essentially, this analysis distinguishes real evidence from documentary evidence and 
assists a court with the classification of evidence.  The court found that the relevant evidence 
fell into Mason’s third category – a combination of human input and mechanical automation. 
Further, the court identified that in the first phase of the evidence’s generation – where a human 
inputs data and/or captures transactions – the evidence would be classified as hearsay, but that 
these problems can be overcome by statutory exceptions.86 In the second phase – automated 
generation of data by a computer process – the evidence, the court found, can be admitted on 
the basis of a common law presumption of reliability to the effect that: in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, the courts will presume that mechanical instruments were in order at 
the material time.87 
 
4.5.6 Presumption of reliability  
 
The court held that ‘a presumption [of reliability] is not generally applied in the South African 
case law … but the underlying principles … are indeed established’.  In supporting this view, 
the court referred to another judgment by Corbett JA – S v Mthimkulu,88 where it was held that 
expert evidence may in certain circumstances be obviated by the doctrine of judicial notice.  
Further, the court referred to the pre-ECT Act matter of Ex parte Rosch89 where it was held 
that: 
 
Many gadgets have been invented which are capable of automatically recording material facts 
without human agency. Courts in this country as well as England have recognised that evidence 
produced by such gadgets is prima facie accurate. This accords with reality and common 
experience… 
                                                             
85 S Mason ‘Electronic Evidence, The Presumption of Reliability and Hearsay – a Proposal’ Criminal Law & 
Justice Weekly 28 September 2013.  See also Mason op cit note 9 for a more comprehensive overview of this legal 
position by the same author at 101 – 120.  In general, for a South African perspective on electronic evidence see 
Hofman & de Jager op cit note 80 at 761 – 797. 
86 Section 15 (4) of the ECT Act; s 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988; s 221 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act and s 34 of the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965. 
87 Delsheray Trust supra note 2 para 37 – 43; para 49 – 51. 
88 1975 (4) SA 759 (A). 
89 [1998] 1 All SA 319 (W).  
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In addition, the court referred to the Supreme Court of Appeal’s decision in S v Fuhri90 where 
the SCA, approving the Appellate Division matter of Mthimkulu, accepted as admissible 
photographs produced by a machine and the information contained in such photographs 
(including the digital time report).  Importantly however, the court found its primary 
justification in S v Mthimkulu, where  Corbett JA listed factors which may influence a court to 
relax the strict standards of proof as follows: 
 
(a) the nature of the process and instrument involved in the particular case; 
 
(b) the extent, if any, to which the evidence is challenged; and  
 
(c) the nature of the enquiry and the facta probanda in the case.  
 
No hard and fast rule can, or should, be laid down. Much will depend upon the facts and 
circumstances of each individual matter. 
 
After applying the applicable factors, the full bench of the Western Cape High Court in 
Delsheray Trust v ABSA ultimately concluded that in the particular circumstances, the 
application of a presumption of reliability could be supported – primarily, because of ABSA’s 
stature as a large commercial bank (i.e.: sophisticated systems and experienced, qualified staff). 
The court further noted that this type of common law presumption overlaps with a presumption 
of regularity – and can be relied upon as an alternative solution when admitting electronic 
evidence.91  The court quoted with approval a passage from Zeffertt and Paizes:92  
 
The scope of the presumption of regularity, usually expressed in the maxim omnia 
praesumuntur rite esse acta, is very ill-defined . . . In some cases it appears to be no more than 
an ordinary inference, based upon the assumption that what regularly happens is likely to have 
happened again. In other cases it is treated as a presumption of law, sometimes placing an onus 
upon the opposing party and sometimes creating only a duty to adduce contrary evidence. It 
has been applied in a wide variety of cases which are impossible to catalogue exhaustively. 
 
Ultimately, the court concluded as follows: ‘There is clearly a significant degree of overlap 
between this presumption and the presumption of reliability… [I]t seems to us therefore that 
the arguments in favour of the application of the presumption of reliability in this case… 
applies mutatis mutandis to the application of the presumption of regularity.’  
                                                             
90 S v Fuhri supra note 42.  See also Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services [2006] 4 All SA 165 (W); S v 
Ndiki 2008 (2) SACR 252 (CK); LA Consortium supra note 80. 
91 Where the court refers to Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 6 at 212. 
92 Ibid. 
 91 
Consequently, it appears that in the context of electronic evidence, whether this type of 
common law presumption is referred to as a presumption of reliability or a presumption of 
regularity is important only for academic debate and conceptual clarity – ultimately, both 
incarnations of the presumption create a method for the same outcome: to receive evidence 
when applying the common law.   However, in my view, should a court elect to do so, it can 
receive any data message evidence directly in terms of s 15 of the ECT Act without having to 
consider presumptions and/or judicial notice.93 
 
4.6 DISCUSSION  
 
4.6.1 Concerns about a presumption of reliability and South African Law Reform  
 
Is this presumption too crude to apply to modern technology?  Mason, widely quoted by the 
court in Delsheray Trust v ABSA in reaching its decision, is of the view that this type of 
presumption is too vague to be implemented as a default position with electronic evidence, and 
that it should be reconsidered.94 His reasons are as follows: 
 
There is no authoritative guidance in relation to the meaning of the words ‘reliable’, ‘in order’, 
‘accurate’, ‘properly set or calibrated’ or ‘working properly’ as variously used by judicial 
authorities, and the language used in legislation in the context of digital data. 
 
The Presumption of Reliability is difficult to rebut.  The party contesting the presumption will 
rarely be in a position to offer substantial evidence to substantiate any challenge, because the 
party facing the challenge will generally be in full control of the computer or computer systems 
that are the subject of the challenge, although that is not always the case, given the promotion 
of cloud computing and recourse to sub-contracting on a significant scale. 
 
A fundamental problem is caused by the fact the software errors can be present (in large 
numbers), but not observable in use until a specific situation is encountered. 
 
The term ‘computers’ is used solely to reinforce the point that a computer or computer-like 
device is far more sophisticated than any pure mechanical machine, and such devices only work 
because a human being has written code to allow it to function. 
 
In the most recent law reform commission paper dealing with electronic evidence,95 which is 
pending before the responsible Minister, issue 10 deals directly with a presumption of 
regularity.   The key issue is phrased as follows: 
 
                                                             
93 Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services supra note 90 at 172 – 173; S v Ndiki supra note 90 at para 20 – 21; 
S v Brown supra note 2 at para 18; S v Meyer supra note 2 at para 298. 
94 Mason op cit note 5 at 179 – 183; Mason op cit note 9 at 173.   
95 South African Law Reform Commission  Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) Issue 10: A Presumption of Regularity 78 – 80. 
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Should the law of evidence prescribe a presumption of regularity in relation to mechanical 
devices (involving automated operations such as speedometers and breath-testing devices)? 
 
The LSSA favours a presumption of regularity, provided it does not affect the onus of proof, 
by stating: 
such a presumption should be included in the law of evidence [and] … such a presumption 
would be a factual presumption and will not affect the onus of proof 
 
To expect the prosecution to prove the workings or functioning of a computer, especially in 
circumstances where such function is not challenged by the accused, would place an 
unnecessary and time consuming burden on the prosecution 
 
Conversely, Legal Aid South Africa96 suggests the presumption should not find application.  It 
alludes to the fact that this presumption may place an unconstitutional evidential burden on the 
accused by stating: 
 
It would have the effect of placing at the very least an evidential burden on an accused person 
who would normally not have the resources to meaningfully rebut as it would involve the 
leading of expert evidence. 
 
The NPA adopts a more pragmatic approach by stating: 
 
It would be prudent to lay a sufficient factual basis for reliability and then to apply this ... 
presumption ... to prove that the evidence in the instant case is reliable. 
 
Further, Mason wrote to the SALRC to note his published concerns97 – ultimately, he argued 
that this type of presumption fails to take into account the complex nature of electronic 
evidence. However, the SALRC proposes to introduce a presumption in civil proceedings only, 
by stating:98 
 
the SALRC proposes rather to introduce (in clause 6.4) a presumption in civil proceedings only, 
if and when, upon receiving notice of an intention to produce documentary evidence, no 
objection is raised by the party against whom such evidence is intended to be produced. The 
presumption is that “the nature, origin, and contents of the document are as shown on its face” 
and places an evidential burden on the other party to show evidence to the contrary.  
 
The proposed law reform reads as follows: 
 
                                                             
96 Legal Aid South Africa is a non-profit organisation established by the Legal Aid South Africa Act 39 of 2014 
with its primary aim being to ‘give legal aid or to make legal aid available to indigent persons within its financial 
means.’ 
97 South African Law Reform Commission  Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) 78. 
98 South African Law Reform Commission  Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) 79. 
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6.4 In any civil proceedings, where the notice in terms of subsection (1) relates to 
documentary evidence, and no party objects to the notice in terms of subsection (1), or 
if the court dismisses an objection on the ground that no useful purpose would be served 
by requiring the party concerned to call a witness to produce the documents, – 
 
(a) the document, if otherwise admissible, may be admitted in evidence; and 
 
(b) it will be presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the nature, 
origin, and contents of the document are as shown on its face. 
 
Arguably, this type of statutory presumption may not fully take into account the complex nature 
of electronic evidence.99 These concerns notwithstanding, the SALRC noted that a presumption 
of integrity is present in Canadian law,100 as well as in Australian law101 – as well as in Article 
7 of the draft United Nations Electronic Evidence Model Law.102    
 Typically, a party seeking to rely on a presumption of integrity must establish that the 
computer system was operating properly, or that the electronic document was recorded or 
stored in the usual and ordinary course of business.103 
It appears that integrity and reliability substantially deal with the same concept.  In the 
context of data messages, the SALRC use the terms reliability and integrity interchangeably.104 
Reliable appears to be synonymous with integrity of data.105 Furthermore, the SALRC refer to 
this presumption as a presumption of regularity (as opposed to the court in Delsheray Trust, 
where the presumption was referred to as a presumption of reliability).  There is no substantial 
difference between the two presumptions, both presumptions are vehicles to achieve the same 
result in the context of data messages.106 
Ultimately, the SALRC recommends the introduction of a statutory presumption only 
in civil proceedings – referred to as a limited presumption, placing an evidential burden on a 
                                                             
99 Mason op cit note 5 at 101 – 185. 
100 South African Law Reform Commission  Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) 44 where reference is made to s 31 (3) of the Canada Evidence Act 1985.   
101 South African Law Reform Commission  Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) 44 where reference is made to the provisions facilitating proof of documents in the Australian Evidence 
Act 1995.  See also A Stanfield The Authentication of Electronic Evidence (PhD thesis, Queensland University 
of Technology, 2016) 95 – 120. 
102Commonwealth Secretariat ‘Model Law on Electronic Evidence’ available at  
http://thecommonwealth.org/sites/default/files/key_reform_pdfs/P15370_7_ROL_Model_Bill_Electronic_Evide
nce_0.pdf, accessed on 30 April 2018.   
103 Section 31.3 of the Canada Evidence Act which deals with a presumption of integrity.  See also R v Oland 
2018 NBQB 259 para 12 – 23 for a discussion of a presumption of integrity. 
104 South African Law Reform Commission  Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014)  24. 
105 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) ‘Review of the Law of Evidence’ 
(2014) 41 – 45. 
106 Delsheray Trust supra note 2 at para 51 where a full bench of the Western Cape high court reached this 
conclusion. 
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party to civil proceedings who does not object.107  Additionally, the SALRC recommends the 
creation of a standing committee (working group) to review the question of presumptions (in 
addition to other issues identified in the discussion paper).108 
Currently, in the absence of this type of statutory presumption, a court in South Africa 
has several mechanisms by which it can properly receive electronic evidence, including relying 
on the common law and/or statute. Introducing a presumption of this nature to only civil 
proceedings and leaving a lacuna in the regulation of criminal law will likely cause confusion 
and potentially inconsistent application.  A review of recent case law109 indicates there is no 
urgent need to adopt such a presumption in its suggested form, and for the short to medium 
term, the current legislative and common law framework is better off as it stands.  
 
4.6.2 Application of a presumption of reliability moving forward 
 
It is necessary to facilitate the admission of data messages in an expedient and cost-effective 
manner, while taking account of the inherent difficulties one may face with electronic data.110  
The common law currently achieves this effectively without the need for further statutory 
confusion. Although it dealt with the doctrine of judicial notice111 – the Appellate Division’s 
Mthimkulu judgment could inform how future courts receive and deal with electronic evidence 
when applying the common law.    
The key principle: no hard and fast rule should be set out.  The facts of each case, the 
type of hardware and software at issue, the nature and size of the business and its employees, 
whether the evidence is disputed, the form and characteristics of the data message itself, 
amongst many others, must be considered to form a view as to whether a court can draw an 
inference of probability based on frequently recurring examples of circumstantial evidence.112  
                                                             
107 South African Law Reform Commission  Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) 79. 
108 South African Law Reform Commission  Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) 84 – 87. 
109 S v Meyer supra note 2, S v Miller supra note 2, S v Brown supra note 2,  S v Helm supra note 47 for four recent 
criminal law examples. See also Delsheray Trust supra note 2, and LA Consortium supra note 80 for two recent 
civil law examples. 
110 South African Law Reform Commission Issue Paper 27 (Project 126) Electronic Evidence in Criminal and 
Civil Proceedings: Admissibility and Related Issues (2010) 7 – 13 where several concerns with electronic 
evidence are discussed.   See also, South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131, Project 126 - 
Review of the Law of Evidence (2014) Issue 10: A Presumption of Regularity 78 – 80.  
111 Delsheray Trust supra note 2 para 53, where the court noted: ‘Had computers, as we know them today, been 
used in the ordinary course of banking business, Corbett JA might well have applied the approach which he 
himself articulated in the Mthimkulu judgment.’ 
112 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 7 at 579; Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 6 at 182 – 184. 
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If the circumstances so dictate, as they did in Delsheray Trust v ABSA, then a court should 
consider:113 
 
1. the nature of the process and instrument involved in the particular case 
 
This would require a court to consider the nature and characteristics of the data message. It 
could ask: What type of electronic instrument was used to generate the data message? What 
software was being used?  Objectively, how reliable is the hardware and software? What 
circumstances surrounded the creation of the data message?  For example, what experience and 
expertise did the relevant employee have?  Was the message generated by a business or in a 
personal capacity? This type of enquiry is dynamic and should not be restricted to a closed list 
of  factors as  it will naturally require the consideration of any relevant fact. 
 
2. the extent, if any, to which the evidence is challenged 
 
The extent to which the evidence is challenged has a ‘bearing on the cogency of the evidence 
rather than its admissibility.’114  Clearly, the absence of a challenge does not relieve the 
opposite party of any evidential burden it may have.115    
 
3. the nature of the enquiry and the facta probanda in the case 
 
Regardless of whether the matter is civil or criminal in nature a court must consider the facts 
that need to be proved holistically – for example, in Delsheray Trust v ABSA it was found that 
a verifying affidavit in contested legal proceedings will only have a minor effect; the court 
found it did not create any onus or evidential burden and played no role in the enquiry as to 
whether a defendant raised a valid defence to the claim.    
In summary:  much will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each individual 
matter.  The application of a presumption as set out in Delsheray Trust v ABSA (applying the 
Appellate Division Mthimkulu judgment) is preferable to the proposed SALRC reform which 
will leave a large lacuna in relation to criminal law.  As it stands, the intention is to only 
introduce a statutory presumption into civil proceedings.  Any solution created must be 
                                                             
113 Delsheray Trust supra note 2 para 41. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid.  See also Mthimkulu supra note 41 at 764 – 765. 
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implemented universally – across both civil and criminal law in South Africa.  The now 
repealed Computer Evidence Act 57 of 1983 received wide-spread criticism116 for only 
regulating civil law, and ignoring criminal law – this mistake should not be made twice.  
As pointed out by Mason, in the absence of evidence, the presumption that mechanical 
instruments were working at the relevant time is a little crude and probably too simplistic  in 
2018, the advanced nature of technology means we cannot simply accept ‘the machine was 
working’.   A person must show the relevant court, whether on affidavit or via viva voce 
evidence, that the evidence is reliable and can be trusted – there must be some basis for a court 
to confirm its reliability and veracity.   It would not be overly onerous for a business owner or 
a relevant employee of a corporate entity to depose to an affidavit setting out a factual basis for 
a court to conclude that a presumption is appropriate.   
 
4.7 CONCLUSION  
 
Although there are many instances where a presumption of reliability can and should apply 
there are equally as many where this type of presumption should not apply given the nature of 
modern technology. Consequently, evidence must be adduced, or circumstantial evidence 
together with inferential reasoning must demonstrate that a presumption of reliability is 
appropriate in the circumstances.   
Currently, the ECT Act adequately facilitates the admission of data message evidence 
into court.  A court can directly rely on the provisions of the ECT Act; or if it so wishes, rely 
on the common law.117   
The SALRC suggests a statutory presumption of reliability applicable to only civil law 
in their latest investigation into electronic evidence, together with a standing committee on 
electronic evidence.  My view is that the working group should be created with a mandate to 
further consider this issue, but that for short term, South Africa is better off with the ECT Act 
and common law interpretation as it stands; and South African should only implement law 
reform in the context of electronic evidence that applies to both civil and criminal proceedings.  
Accordingly, the law reform proposed by the SALRC in the context of presumptions may well 
be desirable, but it is not necessary.  
 
                                                             
116 D van der Merwe et al Information and Communications Technology Law 2 ed (2016) 112. 
117 As was the case in Delsheray Trust supra note 2. 
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CHAPTER 5:*ADMISSIBILITY AND EVIDENTIAL WEIGHT OF ELECTRONIC 
EVIDENCE 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Technology is more accessible and affordable than ever before.  More than half of the South 
African population can access the internet.1 The natural inference one must draw is that data 
and data messages2 will play a significant role in most, if not all forms of legal and 
administrative proceedings – now and in the future.3 
As a result, to accommodate the development and change in societal norms, the 
legislative environment governing data and electronic evidence, both in South Africa4 and 
worldwide, has seen significant change – and it is likely we will continue to see more change 
as we progress further into the 21st century.5   
Currently, the primary legislative instrument regulating electronic forms of evidence is 
the ECT Act.6  However, the SALRC, in its most recent publication on evidence,7 suggest a 
                                                             
* A version of this chapter has been published by Oxford University Press, L Swales ‘Electronic and Cyber 
Evidence’ in A Bellengère et al (eds) The Law of Evidence in South Africa 2 ed (2019) 120 – 156. 
1 Internet World Stats ‘South Africa’ available at http://www.internetworldstats.com/africa.htm#za, accessed on 
7 July 2018. Approximately 53.7% of South Africa's population has internet access as at December 2017. In 2008, 
the South African penetration rate was approximately 9%. 
2 Although the umbrella term electronic evidence is sometimes used, the technically correct term in South African 
law is data messages and/or data. However, for ease of reference, this chapter will use the terms data messages 
and electronic evidence interchangeably. See South African Law Reform Commission  Discussion Paper 131 
(Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence (2014) at 27 where the SALRC states: ‘[the] definition of data 
message in any event appears largely consistent with the term electronic evidence.’ See also section 1 of the ECT 
Act where data is defined as ‘electronic representations of information in any form’, and where data message is 
defined as ‘data generated, sent, received or stored by electronic means.’  See also the discussion in para 2.1 
above.  
3 P Schwikkard & S van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 4 ed (2016) at 437 where the authors note that 
electronic communications have become pervasive in legal interactions; R Davey & L Dahms-Jansen Social 
Media in the Workplace (2017) 287. 
4 For an overview of the South African position in relation to electronic evidence, see J Hofman & J de Jager 
‘South Africa’ in S Mason (ed) Electronic Evidence 3 ed (2012).  See also C Theophilopoulos ‘The admissibility 
of data, data messages, and electronic documents at trial’ (2015) 3 TSAR 461 – 477; Davey & Dahms-Jansen op 
cit note 3 at 287 – 299; D Van der Merwe et al Information and Communications Technology Law 2 ed (2016) 
107 – 147; S Papadopoulos & S Snail (eds) Cyberlaw@SA III (2012) 322 – 323; D De Villiers ‘Old 'Documents', 
'Videotapes' and New 'Data Messages' – A Functional Approach to the Law of Evidence (part 1)’ (2010) 3 TSAR 
558 – 575.  
5 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) at 22 – 23 where the SALRC propose three options to reform the current regulatory landscape. See also R 
Susskind Tomorrow’s Lawyers An Introduction to the Future 2 ed (2017) 1 – 10. 
6 Read together with the common law, the relevant rules of court, and other applicable legislation such as the Law 
of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 in so far as hearsay is concerned, and the Civil Proceedings Evidence 
Act 25 of 1965, together with the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 in the context of civil and criminal 
proceedings respectively.   
7 South African Law Reform Commission  Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014). 
 98 
partial repeal thereof, together with a comprehensive Law of Evidence Bill to codify the law of 
evidence in South Africa.8  The original closing date for comment was October 2014.  This 
was extended to March 2015, with an intended completion date of March 2016.9 The final 
report was presented to the Minister of Justice in November 2016, the process is yet to be 
completed.  Consequently, in light of the proposals put forward by the SALRC, this chapter 
aims to critically evaluate the admissibility, authentication, and weight of electronic evidence. 
 
5.2. HISTORY OF ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
5.2.1 Background10 
 
Our courts have been cautious11 and ‘conservative’12 in relation to electronic transactions in 
general – however, it appears that this approach is changing as electronic transactions and a 
plethora of electronic means of communication become common-place.13 However, South 
African courts are not yet equipped to deal with a variety of types of data messages that would 
                                                             
8 See Annexure A, which is the Law of Evidence Bill proposed by the SALRC in South African Law Reform 
Commission  Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence (2014) 90 – 95.  
9 Information gleaned from e-mail correspondence with Advocate van Vuuren (Principal State Law Adviser) in 
August 2015, and again in April 2018. 
10 As noted above in paragraph 3.1, there is no sui generis category for electronic evidence in South African law. 
Depending on the nature of the evidence, and the purpose it will serve, it will be admitted to court as documentary 
evidence in the form of a document, or real evidence in the form of a tangible thing – typically supplemented by 
expert oral evidence to explain relevance or some related issue.  See Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 3 
at 438; van der Merwe et al op cit note 4 at 107 – 147; M Watney ‘Admissibility of Electronic Evidence in 
Criminal Proceedings: An Outline of the South African Legal Position’ (2009) 1 Journal of Information, Law and 
Technology 11; P Fourie Using Social Media as Evidence in South African Courts (LLM thesis, North-West 
University, 2016) 6 – 16. 
11 Maseti v S [2014] 1 All SA 420 (SCA) para 33. 
12 Hofman & de Jager op cit note 4 at 762.  
13 For example, ABSA Bank Ltd v Le Roux 2014 (1) SA 475 (WCC) para 19 where the court found what must be 
close to trite in 2018, that any electronically stored data (within the meaning of data message in section 1 of the 
ECT Act) is admissible in evidence in terms of s 15 of the ECT Act (unless a ground of exclusion operates – for 
example hearsay or similar fact evidence). See also, CMC Woodworking Machinery (Pty) Ltd v Pieter Odendaal 
Kitchens 2012 (5) SA 604 (KZD) where substituted service was authorised via Facebook; Delsheray Trust v ABSA 
Bank Limited [2014] 4 All SA 748 (WCC) where the court accepted that a deponent to a verifying affidavit in 
summary judgment proceedings may validly rely exclusively on electronic data; Dutch Reformed Church v 
Sooknunan 2012 (6) SA 201 (GSJ) and Isparta v Richter 2013 6 SA 529 (GP) where the courts ordered monetary 
damages after the publication of defamatory material on social media networks.  Moreover, the promulgation of 
legislation such as the Protection from Harassment Act 17 of 2011 and the Protection of Personal Information Act 
4 of 2013, together with the soon to be published Hate Speech Bill and Cybercrimes Bill indicate a clear shift in 
priority in so far as electronic communication is concerned.  
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ordinarily be required as evidence.  Consequently, for the short to medium term at least, 
electronic evidence will for practical reasons be admitted to court in the form of a print-out.14   
 
5.2.2 Development and history of electronic evidence in South Africa 
 
The first computer is reported to have landed in South Africa in the 1950’s,15 but the statutory 
evolution of electronic evidence is often traced to the decision of Narlis.16  
Following the decision in Narlis,17 the South African Law Commission (as it was then 
called)18 investigated the need for law reform in relation to electronic evidence.  Ultimately, 
the Law Commission found that legislative reform was required, and suggested the 
promulgation of a separate statute.19 
Before the separate statute was promulgated, and in the interim, in S v Harper20 the 
court was concerned with the meaning of the word document in the context of a criminal trial 
where the admissibility of a computer-print out was at issue.  It was held that in the absence of 
specific governing legislation (in terms of s 221 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977) the 
word document in s 221(5), in its ordinary grammatical sense, was wide enough to include 
print-outs from a computer.  However, the court held that the computer itself, and the 
information thereon, could not fall under the wider definition of the word document.  
Following the Law Commission's recommendation, the Computer Evidence Act 57 of 
198321 commenced operation on 1 October 1983.  As discussed above in chapter 2, the 
                                                             
14 S v Brown 2016 (1) SACR 206 (WCC) 28 para 18.  See also South African Law Reform Commission Discussion 
Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence (2014) 29.  This also accords with my own personal 
experience as a practicing attorney from 2007 to date. 
15 Y Lulat United States Relations with South Africa: A Critical Overview from the Colonial Period to the Present 
(2008) 73 where date is stated as 1952 and the computer was imported by IBM; Hofman & de Jager op cit note 4 
at 761 where the date is stated 1959, and Mybroadband ‘South Africa’s First Computers’ (2015) 
https://mybroadband.co.za/news/hardware/132408-south-africas-first-computers.html where the date is also 
stated as 1959. The actual date is of little consequence to this research, but it appears the first computer arrived in 
South Africa at the end of the 1950s.  
161976 (2) SA 573 (A).  See also van der Merwe et al op cit note 4 at 111 and the discussion in para 2.3.1 above 
in chapter 2. 
17 See also the discussion in paragraph 2.3.1. 
18 South African Law Reform Commission Issue Paper 27 (Project 126) Electronic Evidence in Criminal and 
Civil Proceedings: Admissibility and Related Issues (2010) 19. The South African Law Commission changed its 
name to the South African Law Reform Commission in 2002. See South African Law Reform Commission (2013) 
http://salawreform.justice.gov.za/anr/2012-2013-anr-salrc.pdf at 7, accessed on 5 April 2017. 
19 South African Law Commission Project 6 Report on the Admissibility in Civil Proceedings of Evidence 
Generated by Computer, Review of the Law of Evidence 1982. 
20 1981 (1) SA 88 (D). 
21 For a perspective on the now repealed Computer Evidence Act No 57 of 1983, see S Mapoma A critical study 
of the authentication requirements of Section 2 of the Computer Evidence Act No 57 of 1983 (LLM thesis, 
University of South Africa, 1997) 3 – 32.  See further the discussion in paragraph 2.3.2 above. 
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Computer Evidence Act was South Africa’s first attempt at legislating rules and norms for 
computer and electronic based evidence – it only applied to civil proceedings, 22 and while in 
effect, was criticised23 for being overly technical and for ignoring the regulation of electronic 
evidence in criminal matters.24  This cautious approach was based on the general belief that 
alterations of electronic data are far harder to detect than alterations to paper documents,25 
which have certain attributes which assist with verification – such as signature, ink and 
handwriting.26 In my view, technology has developed to a point where these attributes are 
easily mirrored.  Moreover, forensic science has progressed and an expert should be able to 
provide a court with a considered opinion regarding the authenticity of an electronic 
communication should that be in dispute. 
 
5.2.3 Background to the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 
 
In response to modern trends involving technology, and various new forms of communication, 
in 1996, UNCITRAL published the Model Law, 1996.27  The broader goal of the UNCITRAL 
is to facilitate and encourage international trade. Consequently, the Model Law, 1996 is 
intended to serve as a guide for member states regarding e-commerce and related issues (such 
as electronic evidence).  But for two sections,28 dealing with certification and electronic 
signatures,29 the ECT Act is based entirely on the United Nations guidance, and is South 
Africa’s primary legislative tool regulating electronic commerce. 
                                                             
22 D Zeffertt & A Paizes The South African Law of Evidence 2 ed (2009) at 843; South African Law Reform 
Commission Issue Paper 27 (Project 126) Electronic Evidence in Criminal and Civil Proceedings: Admissibility 
and Related Issues (2010) 19.  
23 Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services [2006] 4 All SA 165 (W) at 171 where the court noted that the 
Computer Evidence Act had two major shortcomings: first, that is was ‘cumbersome’ to comply with its 
provisions, and secondly, that it only applied to civil proceedings.  See also S v Brown supra note 14 para 16 
where it was stated that the Computer Evidence Act was ‘generally considered to have failed to achieve its 
purpose’.  See also Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 3 at 440; van der Merwe op cit note 4 at 112;  
Hofman & de Jager op cit note 4 at 761 – 763; Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 22 at 431 – 432.  See also D Zeffertt 
& A Paizes The South African Law of Evidence 3 ed (2017) at 455 – 456. 
24 Hofman & de Jager op cit note 4 at 761 – 763.  
25 Theophilopoulos op cit note 4 at 467 – 468; J Hofman ‘Electronic evidence in criminal cases’ (2006) 3 SACJ 
258. 
26 Davey & Dahms-Jansen op cit note 3 at 291. 
27 United Nations ‘Model Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment’ (1996) 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/electcom/05-89450_Ebook.pdf, accessed 25 April 2017.  
28United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ‘Status’ (2018) 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/electronic_commerce/1996Model_status.html, accessed on 25 
April 2017 where the Secretariat lists member states that comply with the UN 1996 Model Law, there are 71 
States in a total of 150 jurisdictions that have adopted it. South Africa is largely compliant: ‘…except for the 
provisions on certification and electronic signatures.’ 
29 On electronic signatures generally, see Spring Forest Trading 599 CC v Wilberry (Pty) Ltd t/a 2015 (2) SA 118 
(SCA) para 27 – 29. See  also S Eiselen ‘Fiddling with the ECT Act – Electronic Signatures’ (2014) 17 PELJ 
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In Ketler Investments CC t/a Ketler Presentations v Internet Service Providers’ 
Association,30 the court noted that the ECT Act: ‘Recognises both the economic and social 
importance of electronic communications as well as the need to promote technology neutrality 
in the application of legislation.’ The ECT Act facilitates this modern methodology in South 
Africa by recognising data messages as the functional equivalent of paper  – this  approach has 
been endorsed by various decisions,31 and technological neutrality is codified as one of the 
objects of the ECT Act.32    
In MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd v LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA 
Enterprises,33 the court confirmed what is surely now trite law: the ECT Act facilitates proof 
of facts by way of data messages. 
 
5.3 OVERVIEW OF THE COMMON LAW POSITION IN RELATION TO DATA 
MESSAGES 
 
Section 3 of the ECT Act, interpretation, reads as follows: 
This Act must not be interpreted so as to exclude any statutory law or the common law from 
being applied to, recognising or accommodating electronic transactions, data messages or any 
other matter provided for in this Act. 
 
This provision was at issue in Trustees for the time Being of the Delsheray Trust v ABSA Bank 
Limited,34 where the admissibility of electronic evidence was central. In this context, the court 
found as follows: 
 
The subject of computer evidence in South Africa, it should be noted, is regulated by the ECT 
Act but respondent did not present or argue its case on the basis of the provisions of ECT Act. 
In terms of the express wording of s 3, however, it does not exclude the application of the 
common law. 
 
                                                             
2805 – 2820; Y Mupangavanhu ‘Electronic signatures and nonvariation clauses in the modern digital world: The 
case of South Africa’ (2016) 133 SALJ 853 – 873; L Swales ‘The regulation of electronic signatures: Time for 
review and amendment’ (2015) 132 SALJ 257 – 270. 
30 2014 (2) SA 569 (GJ) para 30. 
31 S v Miller 2016 (1) SACR 251 (WCC) para 52; LA Consortium & Vending CC v MTN Service Provider 2011 
(4) SA 577 (GSJ) para 12 – 13; Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services supra note 23 at 165. See also the 
court’s analysis in one of the seminal cases involving electronic evidence, S v Ndiki 2008 (2) SACR 252 (CK), 
where although the term functional equivalence is not specifically used, the analysis performed by the court (para 
53) uses similar logic; see also the South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) 
Review of the Law of Evidence (2014) 62 – 63. 
32 Section 2 (f) of the ECT Act.  See also LA Consortium supra note 31 para 15. 
33 2011 (4) SA 562 (WLD).  Confirmed on appeal in the South Gauteng High Court in Johannesburg in LA 
Consortium supra note 31. 
34 [2014] 4 All SA 748 (WCC) para 17.  This case is discussed in detail in chapter 4 above. 
 102 
In S v Ndiki,35 in the context of data messages, the court confirmed the common law position 
by noting: 
 
As a point of departure it may be appropriate to restate the common law position with regard 
to evidence generally, namely, that evidence tending to prove or disprove an allegation which 
is in issue is admissible unless a specific ground for exclusion operates.   
 
Therefore, even if probative material is relevant, it will only be admissible as evidence if it is 
not excluded by a common law or statutory rule precluding the admissibility of a certain type 
of evidence,36 or precluding the admissibility of evidence obtained in a certain manner.37 The 
fact that evidence is in data message format should not shield it from normal evidentiary rules 
applicable.  For example, with similar fact evidence,38 the Constitutional Court recently 
confirmed that, when looked at in totality, similar fact evidence will only be admissible if has 
sufficient probative value to outweigh its prejudicial effects.39  The fact that similar fact 
evidence may be contained in data message format will not preclude it from being considered 
in the same light as if the evidence was in traditional form. 
In so far as data messages are concerned, as pointed by out by Bozalek J in S v Brown:40 
 
 … the admissibility of an electronic communication will depend, to no small extent, on 
whether it is treated as an object (real evidence) or as a document. 
 
In the context of determining whether electronic communications are admissible, in S v Ndiki:41 
 
A preferable point of departure in my view is to rather closely examine the evidence in issue 
and to determine what kind of evidence it is that one is dealing with and what the requirements 
for its admissibility are. 
 
                                                             
35 S v Ndiki supra note 31 paras 20 – 21. 
36 For example, hearsay evidence as a default position is not admissible unless an exception applies. For more on 
hearsay evidence see Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 3 at 287 – 304; Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 22 at 
385 – 441. 
37Evidence obtained in an unconstitutional manner is generally inadmissible, but subject to the overriding factor 
of the administration of justice balanced against the right of an accused to have a fair trial – consequently, even 
evidence obtained in an unconstitutional manner may (in certain instances) be admissible. For example, see 
Harvey v Niland 2016 (2) SA 436 (ECG). For more on unconstitutionally obtained evidence see Schwikkard & 
van der Merwe op cit note 3 at 198 – 283; Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 22 at 721 – 736; S v Brown supra note 14 
para 14.  See also Davey & Dahms-Jansen op cit note 3 at 287 – 299 and Zeffert & Paizes op cit note 23 at 798 – 
805.  
38 Savoi v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2014 (5) SA 317 (CC). 
39 Ibid para 55.   
40 S v Brown supra note 14 para 18. 
41 S v Ndiki supra note 31 para 53. 
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As discussed above in chapter 3,42 in order to be received into evidence, a court will classify a 
data message as either documentary evidence, or real evidence (or a combination of both).   The 
classification of the data message will dictate the admissibility rules it will have to overcome.43  
Depending on the circumstances, some of these admissibility hurdles (for example the 
requirement of a document being an original) will be qualified44 by the ECT Act. 
In Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services, the court summarised the admissibility 
requirements for documentary evidence:45  
 
Documentary evidence, in order to be admissible in evidence, generally has to comply with 
three rules (a) the statements contained in the document must be relevant and otherwise 
admissible; (b) the authenticity of the document must be proved; and (c) the original document 
must normally be produced. 
 
Conversely, for real evidence to be admissible, it must only be relevant.46 Alternatively, if in 
data message form, there is some debate47 as to whether the evidence must be relevant and in 
addition, authentic.48  In Motata v Nair NO,49 the court weighed up the various approaches and 
held it was unnecessary to decide whether proof of authenticity is in fact a prerequisite for the 
admissibility of data messages. My view is that data messages must be authentic before being 
accepted into evidence – particularly given the nature of electronic evidence.50 
 
5.4. ADMISSIBILITY OF DATA MESSAGES  
 
5.4.1 Overview 
 
Section 15 of the ECT Act regulates the admissibility and evidential weight of data messages.51  
Section 15 (1) deals with admissibility, while s 15 (2) and s 15 (3) provide guidance in so far 
                                                             
42 See paragraph 3.5 above. 
43 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 3 at 445 – 446; Hofman & de Jager op cit note 4 at 776 – 779. 
44 S v Brown supra note 14 para 20.   
45 Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services supra note 23 at 172. 
46 S v Baleka (3) 1986 (4) SA 1005 (T), and S v Fuhri 1994 (2) SACR 829 (A). Hofman op cit note 25 at 268; 
Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 3 at 445.  
47 See paragraph 3.5 above. 
48 N Whitear-Nel ‘Admissibility of hearsay evidence’ (2007) 20 SACJ 116.   
49 2009 (1) SACR 263 (T) para 21. 
50 S v Brown supra note 14 para 20; South African Law Reform Commission Issue Paper 27 (Project 126) 
Electronic Evidence in Criminal and Civil Proceedings: Admissibility and Related Issues (2010) 7 – 13 for a 
discussion on some of the difficulties with electronic evidence, including: ease of manipulation, difficulty of 
detecting manipulation, changing technology, and evolving software and hardware.  See also South African Law 
Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence (2014) 27 – 46. 
51 Papadopoulos & Snail op cit note 4 at 322; Hofman & de Jager op cit note 4 at 261 – 264; Theophilopoulos op 
cit note 4 at 464 – 474. 
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as assessing evidential weight is concerned; finally, s 15 (4) creates a further statutory 
exception52 to the hearsay rule by introducing an exception for business records.53  
In S v Meyer,54 the court confirmed that admissibility and weight are distinct concepts.  
A court will first determine admissibility – either evidence is admissible, or not. Only once a 
court finds that evidence is admissible will it turn to consider evidential weight.55 Clearly, if a 
court finds evidence is inadmissible, there is no need to consider its weight.  
 
5.4.2 Section 15(1) of the ECT Act 
 
Section 15(1) reads as follows: 
15.   Admissibility and evidential weight of data messages  
(1)  In any legal proceedings, the rules of evidence must not be applied so as to deny the 
admissibility of a data message, in evidence 
(a)  on the mere grounds that it is constituted by a data message; or 
(b)  if it is the best evidence that the person adducing it could reasonably be 
expected to obtain, on the grounds that it is not in its original form. 
 
Section 15(1) of the ECT Act seeks to facilitate56 the admissibility of data messages, and 
follows an inclusionary rather than an exclusionary approach.57 The section follows global 
trends illustrated by the Model Law, 1996 and prohibits the exclusion of evidence on the mere 
grounds that it is generated by a computer and not by a natural person.58 Moreover, evidence 
cannot be excluded on the grounds that it is not original – if the evidence is the best evidence 
reasonably available.59  
As noted by the Supreme Court of Appeal in First Rand Bank Ltd v Venter,60 s 15 of 
the ECT Act can be summarised as facilitating the use of data messages. Importantly, in Ndlovu 
v Minister of Correctional Services,61 the court held: 
                                                             
52 In addition to the exceptions created in s 34 of the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965, s 221 – 222 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, and s 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988. 
53 See the discussion in chapter 3 above. 
54 2017 JDR 1728 (GJ) para 310. 
55 S v Meyer supra note 54 para 310; Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 3 at 20. 
56Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services supra note 23 at 165 – 166; LA Consortium supra note 31 para 7. 
57 S v Brown supra note 14 at para 17. 
58 Section 15 (1)(a).  Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services supra note 23 at 172. 
59 Section 15 (1)(b). Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services supra note 23 at 172; LA Consortium supra note 
31 para 18 – 19; Maseti v S supra note 11 para 33. 
60 [2012] JOL 29436 (SCA) para 16. 
61 Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services supra note 23 at 172. 
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Section 15(1) does not… do away with these three requirements [referring to common law 
requirements in so far as documentary evidence is concerned]. The data message must be 
relevant and otherwise admissible, be proved to be authentic and the original be produced, 
unless (in regard to the latter aspect) section 15(1)(b) applies. 
 
The only exemption created by section 15(1)(a) is that it is admissible, all other requirements 
being in place, despite the fact that it was generated by a computer and not by a natural person. 
 
In S v Ndiki,62 the court held that a court should consider the nature63 of the data message, and 
determine whether it relies on the credibility of a person, or a machine.64  
 
It is an issue that must be determined on the facts of each case having regard to what it is that the 
party concerned wishes to prove … the contents thereof, …the function performed by the 
computer and the requirements of the relevant section relied upon for the admission of the 
document in question.65 
In S v Brown,66 the decision in Ndiki was endorsed, and the court held:   
 
the first step in considering the admissibility of documentary evidence is to examine the nature 
of the evidence in issue in order to determine what kind of evidence one was dealing with and 
what the requirements for its admissibility are. 
   
In S v Meyer,67 the court confirmed the importance of functional equivalence, and reiterated 
the position that s 15 does not do away with the common law; Klein AJ held: 
 
According to the ECT Act data messages are the functional equivalents of documents and 
therefore, except where the Act specifically provides for exceptions, the ordinary common law 
requirements for the admissibility of documents must be adhered to. 
  
Consequently, the provisions of s 15 must be considered in light of the common law of 
evidence, and s 15 certainly does not render all data messages admissible ‘without further 
ado’.68  Moreover, as noted in S v Brown:69  ‘the provisions of s 15 [of the ECT Act] certainly 
do not exclude our common law of evidence’.  
                                                             
62S v Ndiki supra note 31 para 20 – 21. 
63S v Brown supra note 14 para 20; S v Ndiki supra note 11 para 20 – 21. 
64S v Ndiki supra note 31 para 20 – 21; De Villiers supra note 4 at 566 – 567. 
65S v Ndiki supra note 31 para 20 – 21. 
66S v Brown supra note 14 para 20.   
67 S v Meyer supra note 54 para 298; Liberty Group Limited v K & D Telemarketing CC 2015 JDR 1846 (GP) para 
33.  See also S v Panayiotou [2018] 1 All SA 224 (ECP) para 85 where the court relies on s 15 of the ECT Act. 
68 Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services supra note 23 at 172; La Consortium supra note 31 para 12 – 14. 
See also Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 3 at 446; Theophilopoulos op cit note 4 at 474 – 475; Hofman 
& de Jager op cit note 4 at 766 – 767; De Villiers op cit note 4 at 572. 
69 S v Brown supra note 11 at para 18.   
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As noted by Hofman,70 data messages are subject to the ordinary laws of evidence. In 
this regard, the purpose of the ECT Act is to facilitate electronic forms of communications and 
transactions, and to provide for functional equivalence and technological neutrality.71  The 
purpose of the ECT Act is ‘not to reform the law of evidence’, nor is its purpose to elevate data 
messages above other forms of evidence which would undoubtedly lead to format shopping.72 
Cassim notes there is a dearth of case law in a civil context, and submits that the ECT 
Act creates a ‘rebuttable presumption that data messages or printouts are admissible in 
evidence.’73  To support this view, reference is made to Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional 
Services,74 and a 2005 academic article.75 The view that data messages are automatically 
admissible – which would destroy functional equivalence and encourage format shopping – is 
incorrect, and has been universally rejected by South African courts in, inter alia: Ndlovu v 
Minister of Correctional Services,76 La Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA Enterprises v MTN 
Service Provider (Pty),77 S v Brown,78 and S v Meyer.79 General consensus amongst academic 
opinion also rejects this approach.80 
Does the ECT Act – or any other law – make provision for mandatory notice when a 
party relies on electronic evidence?  No.  In Liberty Group Limited v K & D Telemarketing 
                                                             
70 Hofman & de Jager op cit note 4 at 766. 
71 Section 2 of the ECT Act. 
72 Hofman & de Jager op cit note 4 at 766. 
73 J Cassim ‘The use of electronic discovery and cloud computing technology by lawyers in practice: lessons from 
abroad’ (2017) 42 Journal for Juridical Science 27.   To be entirely accurate, this statement should refer to s 15(4) 
of the ECT Act and its requirements.  Section 15(4) creates a business records exception where data messages are 
rebuttable proof of the contents contained therein only if: a) created during the ordinary course and scope of 
business; and b) certified correct by an officer of the business concerned.   
74 Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services supra note 23 at 172.  However, in my view, Ndlovu v Minister of 
Correctional Services is not authority for the proposition that all data messages are automatically admissible in 
evidence.  The court clearly notes that data messages are not admissible without further ado, and that doing so 
would ‘elevate a data message evidentially above an ordinary document’, and that s 15 does not do away with the 
ordinary common law requirements in relation to documentary evidence.  See further S v Brown supra note 14 
para 18; S v Meyer supra note 54 para 299. 
75 D Collier ‘Evidently not so simple: Producing computer print-outs in court’ (2005) Juta Business Law 6 – 9.  
This interpretation appears to have been retracted by Collier herself in Schwikkard & van der Merwe Principles 
of Evidence 3 ed (2009) 414 – 415, particularly footnote 42 – 43 thereof.  The chapter dealing with electronic 
evidence in the latest version of this seminal text, Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 3 ch 21 is written by 
a different author and this early view is not canvassed in any detail.   
76 Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services supra note 23 at 171 – 174. 
77 La Consortium supra note 31 para 11 – 15. 
78 S v Brown supra note 14 para 18. 
79 S v Meyer supra note 54 para 299 where it is noted: ‘Section 15 (1) does not, however make all data messages 
automatically admissible. According to the ECT Act data messages are the functional equivalents of documents 
and therefore, except where the Act specifically provides for exceptions, the ordinary common law requirements 
for the admissibility of documents must be adhered to.’ 
80 Hofman & de Jager op cit note 4 at 765 – 766; Theophilopoulos op cit note 4 at 461 – 481. 
 107 
CC,81 the court confirmed that it is not mandatory to produce a certificate in terms of s 15(4) 
in order to rely on electronic evidence, and correctly it is submitted held as follows: 
 
However, with reference to the matter of Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services and 
Another I am of the respectful opinion that firstly it is not necessary for the Plaintiff to produce 
a certificate in terms of Section 15(4) of the ECT Act. The production of such a certificate 
makes the particular computer printout prima facie evidence without more. However there is 
no such certificate available and accordingly the admissibility and weight of the computer 
printouts must be established with reference to the provisions of Section 15(1), (2) and (3) of 
the Act read together with the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 that makes 
provision for the acceptance of hearsay evidence. 
 
It would be nonsensical to suggest that electronic evidence can only be relied upon with notice 
in terms of the ECT Act (or notice in terms of some other law) – this interpretation, to the 
extent it exists, would clearly impose further restrictions on electronic evidence than currently 
exist with ordinary evidence and would conflict with functional equivalence.82  
 
5.4.3 Admissibility of data messages as documentary evidence  
 
In Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services,83 it was held that for documentary evidence to 
be admissible, it has to comply with three rules: 
 
(a) the statements contained in the document must be relevant and otherwise admissible;  
 (b) the authenticity of the document must be proved; and  
 (c) the original document must normally be produced. 84 
 
This view is endorsed by text book authors and academics.85 Similarly, in S v Brown,86 the 
court echoed this sentiment and held: 
 
the ordinary requirements of our law for the admissibility of such evidence [data messages in 
documentary form] is that the document itself must be produced, which document, ordinarily 
speaking, must be the original and the authenticity of the document must be proved. These 
requirements are, of course, qualified by those specific provisions of the ECTA having a 
bearing on electronic communications. 
 
                                                             
81 2015 JDR 1846 (GP) para 33. 
82 Director of Public Prosecution v Modise 2012 (1) SACR 553 (GSJ) where it was found that the provisions of s 
15 of the ECT Act do not require a party to provide another with notice when relying on data message (or print-
outs thereof) evidence.   
83 Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services supra note 23 at 172. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 3 at 431 – 436; Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 22 at 827 – 843; 
Theophilopoulos op cit note 4 at 465; Watney op cit note 10 at 3; De Villiers op cit note 4 at 572. 
86 S v Brown supra note 14 para 20.   
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Moreover, in the recent matter of S v Meyer,87 the court held: 
 
Section 15 places electronic information on the same footing as traditional paper-based 
transactions, and thus does not do away with the requirements governing the admissibility of 
documentary evidence which are relevance, authenticity and originality. 
 
Consequently, for a data message classified as documentary evidence to be admissible, it must 
be relevant, otherwise admissible, authentic and original (subject to concessions in the ECT 
Act).88  
 
5.4.3.1 Relevance 
 
Relevance is always critical in an evidentiary dispute. What does this term mean? As noted by 
Zeffertt:89 
 
There have been many attempts to define relevance; but it is important to grasp that for the 
purposes of the law of evidence we are not required to act like philosophers or logicians. 
Relevance, in this context, is largely a matter of common sense and practicality… [R]elevance 
is not determined in a vacuum but on the facts of each case. 
 
Comparatively, Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence of the United States of America 
provides a test for relevance:90 
 Evidence is relevant if: 
 
(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without 
the evidence; and 
 
(b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action. 
 
Some academic authors define relevance as a matter of ‘reason and common sense’.91  In R v 
Matthews, it was held that relevance is ‘based upon a blend of logic and experience lying 
outside the law.’92 When will a fact be relevant?  According to the Appellate Division more 
than one hundred years ago in R v Mpanza: A fact is relevant if from its existence ‘inferences 
                                                             
87 S v Meyer supra note 54 para 298. 
88 S v Brown supra note 14 para 20; Hofman & de Jager op cit note 4 at 765 – 770. 
89 D Zeffert & A Paizes ‘Essential Evidence’ (2010) 75 – 77.  See also Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 
3 at 49 – 63. 
90 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 3 at 50. 
91 Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 23 at 237 – 242. 
92 1960 (1) SA 572 (A) at 758 in Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 22 at 237.  See also S v Meyer supra note 54 para 
291 – 294. 
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may properly be drawn as to the existence of the fact in issue’.93   Stated in the positive,94 
according to R v Trupedo: ‘all facts relevant to the issue in legal proceedings may be proved’.95  
In DPP v Kilbourne,96 it was held that facts are relevant if ‘logically probative or disprobative 
of some matter which requires proof’. The question of relevance can ‘never be divorced from 
the facts of a particular case before court’.97 
 
5.4.3.2 Otherwise admissible 
 
In addition to being relevant, the data message must otherwise be admissible – it must comply 
with South Africa’s common law of evidence.  A data message must be treated the same as all 
other forms of evidence, subject of course to the concessions in the ECT Act.98 If a data 
message contains hearsay, it should be admissible in terms of one of the statutory hearsay 
exceptions before it is accepted by a court.99  
 
Further, if data message evidence is obtained in an unlawful manner, a court will have a general 
discretion to admit or exclude this evidence.100 In S v Brown,101 in the context of data messages, 
the court noted: 
As a starting point, sec 35(5) of the Constitution provides that evidence obtained in a 
manner that violates any right in the Bill of Rights must be excluded if the admission 
of that evidence would render a trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the 
administration of justice.  
 
In S v Coetzee102 Sachs J explained: 
There is a paradox at the heart of all criminal procedure, in that the more serious the 
crime and the greater the public interest in securing convictions of the guilty, the more 
important do constitutional protections of the accused become. The starting point of 
any balancing enquiry where constitutional rights are concerned must be that the public 
interest in ensuring that innocent people are not convicted and subjected to ignominy 
and heavy sentences, massively outweighs the public interest in ensuring that a 
particular criminal is brought to book. 
                                                             
93 1915 AD 348 at 352 – 352 in Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 22 at 237. 
94 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 3 at 49. 
95 1920 AD 58 62 in Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 3 at 49. 
96 1973 AC 729 756 in Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 3 at 51. 
97 S v Zuma 2006 (2) SACR 191 (W) 199 in Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 3 at 51 
98 S v Brown supra note 14 para 20; Hofman & de Jager op cit note 4 at 765 – 770. 
99 See discussion above in paragraph 3.5 above. 
100 For more on unconstitutionally obtained evidence see Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 3 at 198 – 283; 
Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 23 at 721 – 736; A Bellengère et al The Law of Evidence in South Africa (2013) 292 
– 305; see also S v Brown supra note 14 para 12 – 14 for a discussion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence in 
the context of a case dealing with electronic evidence.   
101 S v Brown supra note 14 para 14. 
102 1997 (1) SACR 379 (CC) at para 220. 
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Further, in In Gumede v S,103 the court found that ‘s 35(5) requires the court to exclude 
evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right in the Bill of Rights if either the admission 
of that evidence will render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the administration of 
justice.’104  The application of s 35(5) is a value judgment that a trial judge is best placed to 
make on a case-by-case basis, depending on the relevant circumstances and facts. 
However, in civil matters, section 35(5) of the Constitution naturally does not apply 
given that it regulates rights pertaining to arrested, detained and accused persons.  At common 
law, as pointed out in Harvey v Niland:105  
 
all relevant evidence [is] admissible in a civil court irrespective of how it was obtained. 
That rule is not absolute: it is subject to a discretion to exclude unlawfully obtained 
evidence. 
 
In exercising its discretion to exclude unlawfully obtained evidence, ‘all relevant factors must 
be considered’106 by a court.  In Harvey,  Niland’s right to privacy had been infringed, and the 
court was tasked with determining whether to exclude the unlawfully obtained evidence.  This 
matter arose in the context of an application to the Eastern Cape Division of the High Court to 
interdict Niland from breaching fiduciary duties imposed by s  42 of the Close Corporation 
Act.107   
Harvey was a former business partner with the Niland, where they operated a hunting 
and safari guide business.  Although the parties ended their business relationship 
acrimoniously, and they no longer worked together, Niland remained an owner of members 
interest in the Close Corporation (Huntershill) that was operated by Harvey.   
One of Harvey’s employees knew Niland’s Facebook password – Harvey instructed his 
employee to access Niland’s account unlawfully (this was accepted as a fact by the court) and 
review his private messages – this conduct was in contravention of section 14 of the 
Constitution, and section 86 of the ECT Act.  However, the evidence revealed that Harvey had 
no other lawful means to obtain the evidence, and it resulted in him being able to prove that 
Niland was ‘conducting himself in a duplicitous manner contrary to the fiduciary duties he 
                                                             
103 2017 (1) SACR 253 (SCA). 
104 See also Key v Attorney-General, Cape Provincial Division 1996 (4) SA 187 (CC) para 13. 
105 Harvey v Niland supra note 37 para 47 – 53. 
106 Ibid para 47. 
107 Act 69 of 1984. 
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owed to Huntershill.’108The evidence was found to be admissible; the court reasoned as 
follows: 
[R]ight-thinking members of society would believe that Niland’s conduct, particularly in the 
light of his denials and the undertakings that he gave, ought to be exposed and that he ought 
not to be allowed to hide behind his expectation of privacy: it has only been invoked, it seems 
to me, because he had something to hide. 
 
As a result, it is likely that illegally obtained electronic evidence will be more readily admitted 
in civil matters, as opposed to in criminal matters.  However, the final determination must 
depend on the unique facts of every matter, and be decided on a case-by-case basis.  
 
5.4.3.3 Authentic 
 
Despite providing guidance on how to attribute evidential weight to data messages in s 15(3) 
of the ECT Act, and on how to assess whether a data message is an original in s 14. The ECT 
Act is silent on how to authenticate a data message.109 In Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional 
Services,110 the court interpreted the requirement of authenticity – in the context of data 
messages – to mean ‘proof that a document was written or executed by the person who purports 
to have done so’. The court noted: 
 
I consider the authenticity of the printout to have been proved. Proof that a document 
was written or executed by the person who purports to have done so could be presented 
in various ways, such as to call as a witness the author to identify the document, or 
someone who saw the author sign or write it, or who can identify his handwriting. 
 
In S v Brown,111 in so far as authenticity is concerned, the court adopted a similar approach to 
Ndlovu in that it required expert oral evidence to confirm the authenticity of digital images.   
The court accepted oral evidence from a Lieutenant Colonel in a technical division of the South 
African Police Service and noted: 
 
Applying these requirements [for documentary evidence] to the present matter, the 
images in question were downloaded from the phone, reproduced in hard copy (paper) 
form and enlarged. There was no suggestion that either the devices or the software 
which Linnen [Lieutenant Colonel in a technical division of the South African Police 
Service] used to produce or enlarge the images was unreliable or that he manipulated 
the data or electronic communication in any way. 
  
                                                             
108 Harvey v Niland supra note 37 para 49. 
109 S v Meyer supra note 54 para 306.  See also Papadopoulos & Snail op cit note 4 at 322 – 323. 
110 Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services supra note 23 at 174. 
111 S v Brown supra note 14 para 19 – 22. 
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In the context of documentary evidence generally, academic authorities appear ad idem in that 
authenticity relates to tendering evidence relating to authorship.112 The document must be what 
it purports to be, as De Villiers notes, authentication deals with:  
 
[T]he nature or character of the document… for example, whether it is actually a will, 
a contract, a death certificate or cash slip. The question about the truth of the contents 
of the specific document is not an issue at this stage.”113 
 
In S v Meyer,114 the court quoted with approval guidelines set out by the Irish Law 
Commission,115 who noted that authenticity must be established by expert evidence relating to: 
 
how the document was generated or otherwise brought into existence; on the reliability 
of the processes and on the accuracy of the electronic systems or devices which were 
used to store, transmit or generate the document, may be necessary to establish 
authenticity.  
 
Further, according to the Irish Law Commission, in order to establish authenticity, one should 
consider: 
 
whether the secondary media (CD, USB) upon which the information was stored have 
been damaged or interfered with in any way; 
whether proper record management procedures were in operation;  
whether proper security procedures were in place to prevent the alteration of the 
information of the information contained in the drive file or secondary storage device 
prior to the information being reproduced in permanent legible through a printout.
  
Theophilopoulos points out that the ECT Act does not contain a set of defined criteria for 
determining authenticity, and notes that this has created confusion.  Moreover, that an 
increasing amount of e-documents are routinely admitted for trial purposes with only ‘lip 
service being paid to the threshold rules of … authenticity’.116 In S v Meyer,117 the court defined 
the authenticity requirement as follows: 
Looking at the authenticity requirement we note that it is defined as the capacity to 
prove the digital object is what it purports to be. It authenticity is preserved by the use 
of techniques to prevent the data from being manipulated, altered or falsified 
deliberately or inadvertently 
 
                                                             
112 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 3 at 434 – 435; Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 22 at 837 – 838; 
Bellengère op cit note 100 at 62; Davey & Dahms-Jansen op cit note 3 at 290. 
113 De Villiers op cit note 4 at 572. 
114 S v Meyer supra note 54 para 307. 
115 Irish Law Reform Commission Consultation Paper ‘Documentary and Electronic Evidence’ (LRC CP 57) 
December 2009 available at: 
http://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/consultation%20papers/cpdocumentaryandelectronicevidence.pdf, 
accessed on 25 May 2017.  
116 Theophilopoulos op cit note 4 at 466. 
117 S v Meyer supra note 54 para 305. 
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Further, the court provided guidance in so far as authenticating a data message: 
The most common way of proving the authenticity of private documents would be to 
call the author(s) to identify the documents: The ECT Act does not attempt to 
enumerate any specific criteria that should be applied, this is due to the fact that there 
are different types of data messages so it would be difficult to formulate prerequisites 
for authentication which would apply to all types. 
 
In terms of the threshold requirement for admissibility in so far as authenticity is concerned, 
what must be established? The common law read together with the case law above answers 
this: A party must adduce evidence as to the authorship of the data message; together with 
evidence that speaks to the use of software (and/or manual techniques) that prevent data from 
being deliberately or mistakenly altered.118   
Typically, this would entail describing how the data message was created, and giving 
detail as to who created the data message.  This information would usually be supplemented, 
in order to give a court the full factual matrix, with information as to the reliability of the data 
message, and how it was stored and/or transmitted, and it how it came to being in paper format 
in the particular court in question.   There is a certain degree of overlap with this enquiry and 
when one considers whether a data message is original; moreover, there is further overlap with 
this authenticity requirement and when a court considers what weight to accord evidence.  
However, the similarity in the two distinct stages of admissibility and weight notwithstanding, 
each phase must be viewed individually – they should not be conflated into one test.  Whether 
a data message is original or authentic are two separate enquiries.  Moreover, whether a data 
message is authentic on the one hand and what weight to accord the evidence once admitted 
on the other hand are clearly distinct enquiries as well.  As noted in S v Meyer: ‘evidence is 
either admitted or not admitted. It should conceptually not be confused with what degree of 
weight is given to evidence’.119 
It would be unwise to fetter a judge’s discretion with a list of rigid factors to apply when 
authenticating a data message.   South Africa does not operate with a jury system. Cases are 
presided over by  judicial officers who are trained and experienced.  These judicial offices are 
well placed to  determine on a case by case basis whether a document is authentic.  
Although the factors in s 15(3), read together with the factors set out for establishing 
originality in s 14 do appear to contain overlap with authenticity, the issues should not be 
conflated.  Authenticity aims to establish whether the document is what it purports to be – in 
                                                             
118 S v Meyer supra note 54 para 305 – 306; Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 3 at 434 – 435; Zeffertt & 
Paizes op cit note 22 at 837 – 838; Bellengère op cit note 100 at 62; Papadopoulos & Snail op cit note 4 at 322 – 
323. 
119 Where the court quotes Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 3 at 20.   
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order for a court to decide whether a print out of a data message is authentic, it must establish 
how the data message was created, and who created it.  As correctly noted in S v Meyer, there 
are a plethora of possible types of data message that may be at issue – therefore, it is unwise to 
compile a closed list of factors in attempting to authenticate.120    
 
5.4.3.4 Original produced 
 
With traditional paper-based evidence, the production of an original document would often 
allay fears about manipulation and prove integrity and reliability.  Consequently, even in the 
digital realm – and in order to stay true to functional equivalence principles – the concepts of 
‘original’ and ‘produced’ are retained in the context of electronic evidence.121 
In Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services,122 the court found that an original must 
be produced unless s 15(1)(b) applies.123  Section 15(1)(b) provides that a data message should 
not be denied admissibility on that basis that it is not in original form – if the evidence is the 
best evidence124 reasonably available. This section is essentially a codification of the best 
evidence rule in the context of data messages.125  
In S v Brown126 the court explained the section’s operation as follows: 
s 15(1)(b) of ECTA gives data messages a further exemption from the requirement of 
original form 'if it is the best evidence that the person adducing it could reasonably be 
expected to obtain. 
 
Consequently, the test to determine if s 15(1)(b) applies is an objective one: A court must 
decide whether the evidence a party seeks to adduce is – reasonably measured – the best a party 
can obtain in the particular circumstances.   These considerations are fluid and will depend on 
the facts and the practice in the relevant court at the time. 
Section 14 of the ECT Act provides direct guidance in so far as originality is concerned, 
it reads as follows: 
 
  14  Original  
                                                             
120 S v Meyer supra note 54 para 306.  See also discussion of foreign law below in para 5.6. 
121 De Villiers op cit note 4 at 573 – 575. 
122 Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services supra note 23 at 172. 
123 Van der Merwe et al op cit note 4 at 119 – 120; Davey & Dahms-Jansen op cit note 3 at 291; Papadopoulos & 
Snail op cit note 4 at 322. 
124 A Kruger Hiemstra's Criminal Procedure (2018) 24 – 79 where the author notes that the best evidence rule 
only applies to traditional documents in practical terms. 
125 Van der Merwe et al op cit note 4 at 119 – 120; 127. For a history of the best evidence rule, see Zeffertt & 
Paizes op cit note 22 at 381 – 383.  See also Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 3 at 432 – 433. 
126 S v Brown supra note 14 para 24. 
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(1) Where a law requires information to be presented or retained in its original 
form, that requirement is met by a data message if- 
 
(a) the integrity of the information from the time when it was first 
generated in its final form as a data message or otherwise has passed 
assessment in terms of subsection (2); and 
 
(b) that information is capable of being displayed or produced to the 
person to whom it is to be presented. 
 
(2) For the purposes of subsection 1 (a), the integrity must be assessed- 
 
(a) by considering whether the information has remained complete and 
unaltered, except for the addition of any endorsement and any change 
which arises in the normal course of communication, storage and 
display; 
 
(b) in the light of the purpose for which the information was generated; 
and 
 
       (c)    having regard to all other relevant circumstances.   
 
Consequently, in order for a data message to be considered original, its integrity must be 
assessed, and it must be capable of being displayed or produced.127  In Maseti v S,128 the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in the context of a text message from a mobile phone, took a 
conservative view in the context of data message admissibility and stated: 
 
Whilst the best evidence rule seems everywhere to be in retreat that does not mean that a court 
must accept as accurate secondary evidence of a document or other form of writing, such as a 
text message. The fact that it has been thought necessary to make elaborate provision in a statute 
for the admissibility in evidence of such messages demonstrates the need for caution in this 
regard. 
 
Section 14 has been  dealt with in a superficial fashion by South Africa’s judiciary so far,129 
primarily because it seems that the guidance provided in the section is sufficiently clear as it 
stands.  
In so far as production is concerned,130 s 17131 facilitates the use of data messages as a 
document: As pointed out above, for the most part data messages are reduced to paper form for 
presentation purposes in court, and s 17 has not, in my experience, and based on the case law 
                                                             
127 Papadopoulos & Snail op cit note 4 at 322 – 323. 
128 Maseti v S supra note 11. 
129 Maseti v S supra note 11 para 33; Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2014 (1) SA 191 (GSJ) para 38; S v Meyer 
supra note 54 para 302. 
130 Papadopoulos & Snail op cit note 4 at 322. 
131 Van der Merwe et al op cit note 4 at 121 – 122. 
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above, been relied upon in any instances thus far – with the exception of S v Meyer,132 where a 
court dealt with s 17 for this first time and noted: 
 
The use of data messages as documents is permitted by Section 17(1) provided that certain 
conditions are met namely: that the method of generating the electronic form of that document 
provided a reliable means of assuring the maintenance of the integrity of the information 
contained in that document S17(1)(a); and that it was reasonable to expect that the information 
contained in the data message would be readily accessible so as to be usable for subsequent 
reference S17(1)(b). 
 
Consequently, s 17 allows the use of a data message as a document if two conditions are met: 
the first condition has two parts – a) the data message must be reliable, and b) the integrity of 
information in the document must have been maintained.  In addition, the second requirement 
provides that when a data message was sent, it must have been reasonable to expect that 
information contained therein would be accessible and useable – this is to ensure that that data 
is actually readable and can be relied upon for future use. In the circumstances, where the law 
requires the production of a document, s 17 facilitates the use of data messages should that be 
required.   
 
5.4.4 Law Reform Commission proposals on printouts and the Best Evidence Rule 
 
The SALRC133 suggest law reform is required and state as follows:  
 
Given that in most cases (at least in the short to medium term) so-called electronic evidence 
will be produced in court in the form of a printout, it may be prudent to clarify the position on 
printouts, and on the best evidence rule more generally. 
 
In order to address the perceived shortcomings with the current legal position, the SALRC 
proposes a comprehensive Law of Evidence Bill;134 in this context, the proposed definitions 
read as follows: 
 
‘Copy’ in relation to a document, means anything onto which information recorded in the 
document has been copied, by whatever means and whether directly or indirectly, and 
regardless of how many removes from the original; 
 
                                                             
132 S v Meyer supra note 54. 
133 South African Law Reform Commission  Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) 29. 
134 South African Law Reform Commission  Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) 29 – 30 and Annexure A. 
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‘Document’ means anything in which information of any description is recorded, and includes 
a copy; 
 
‘Electronic document’ means data that is recorded or stored on any medium in or by a computer 
system or other similar device that can be read or perceived by a person and includes a display, 
printout or other output of that data; 
  
Although comprehensive law reform would certainly clarify certain aspects in relation to 
electronic evidence, my view is that s 15 – read together with the common law and the data 
message admissibility cases discussed above – adequately regulates the legal position in the 
short to medium term.135  Moreover, as pointed out by Mason:136 
 
rather than question whether a document in digital form is an original or a copy, it might be 
more useful and relevant to refer to the proof of authenticity, or provenance, or reliability of a 
digital file…  
 
This in turn encapsulates proof of the integrity of the content of the data. Because of the ease 
in which a digital document may be migrated from one storage device to another, and undergo 
format and other changes, including content and metadata changes, it is vital to require any 
such changes to be documented in such a way as to preserve the integrity and authenticity of 
the copy.  
 
Thus it might be more relevant, when referring to digital data, to concentrate on establishing 
which version of the data is required, particularly whether the making of copies of the digital 
document is properly documented. 
 
 
5.4.5 Admissibility of data messages as real evidence 
 
As discussed above in chapter 3, real evidence consists of material objects that are in and of 
themselves evidence.137  Can data messages be classified as real evidence?138  
In Ex Parte Rosch,139 an appeal matter heard prior to the promulgation of the ECT Act, 
the court found that computer generated evidence should be regarded as real evidence if 
produced automatically, and with no human input.  In deciding that evidence relating to 
                                                             
135 However, law reform is desirable in the following areas: definition of data message; definition of document in 
the statutes applicable to hearsay exceptions; a distinction between types of electronic evidence created with 
human intervention, and without human intervention; more cohesion and alignment with the statutory exceptions 
dealing with documents and hearsay; and amendment of procedural court rules relating to discovery to take 
account of data messages and their characteristics (metadata). 
136 S Mason & D Seng ‘Foundations of evidence in electronic form’ in S Mason & D Seng (eds) Electronic 
Evidence 4 ed (2017) 57. 
137S v Gumede 2017 (1) SACR 253 (SCA) para 32 where the court refers to a firearm as real evidence.  See also 
what appears to be the locus classicus when describing real evidence: S v M 2002 (2) SACR 411 (SCA) para 31. 
138 As real evidence data messages are not subject to hearsay considerations.  See, however, D Bilchitz ‘Law of 
Evidence’ in C Lewis et al (eds) Annual Survey of South African Law (1998) 735 – 821.  See also the views of 
American jurist Teppler in S Mason ‘Software code as the witness’ in S Mason & D Seng (eds) Electronic 
Evidence 4 ed (2017) 88. 
139Ex Parte Rosch [1998] 1 All SA 319 (W). 
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software that automatically registers the numbers, time, date, length of phone call, was 
admissible as evidence, the court found as follows: 
The printout is real evidence in the sense that it came about automatically and not as result of 
any input of information by a human being. There is therefore no room for dishonesty or human 
error… Chronologically the world is approaching the 21st century. Many gadgets have been 
invented which are capable of automatically recording material facts without human agency. 
Courts in this country as well as England have recognised that evidence produced by such 
gadgets is prima facie accurate. This accords with reality and common experience. [my 
emphasis] 
 
Following Ex Parte Rosch, some criticism suggested that as all computer systems rely on 
natural persons to enable, disable, program, etcetera, all computer evidence is hearsay without 
evidence from the person who is responsible for the technology.140 In S v Ndiki,141 the court 
confirmed that data messages can be classified as real evidence, depending on the function 
performed by technology, and held as follows: 
it is not desirable to attempt to deal with computer print-outs as documentary evidence simply 
by having regard to the general characteristics of a computer. It is an issue that must be 
determined on the facts of each case having regard to what it is that the party concerned wishes 
to prove with the document, the contents thereof, the function performed by the computer and 
the requirements of the relevant section relied upon for the admission of the document in 
question.  
 
Further, in Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services,142 the court found that data messages 
can be either real evidence or documentary evidence, depending on the nature of the evidence, 
and its purpose, by holding as follows: 
Where the probative value of the information in a data message depends upon the credibility of a 
(natural) person other than the person giving the evidence, there is no reason to suppose that section 
15 seeks to override the normal rules applying to hearsay evidence. On the other hand, where the 
probative value of the evidence depends upon the ‘credibility’ of the computer (because information 
was processed by the computer), section 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 will 
not apply. 
 
In LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA Enterprises v MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd,143 in a 
dispute over outstanding monies in relation to mobile telephones and mobile telephone 
services, the court found that data messages can be classified as real evidence if ‘the probative 
value…depends on the reliability and accuracy’ of a computer system.144 As noted by 
Theophilopoulos:145  
                                                             
140 Bilchitz op cit note 138 at 735 – 821. 
141S v Ndiki supra note 31 para 33. 
142 Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services supra note 23 at 172. 
143 La Consortium supra note 31. 
144 Ibid para 16. 
145 Theophilopoulos op cit note 4 at 474, see footnote 31.  See also discussion on real evidence in context of data 
messages in Hofman op cit note 25 at 268 – 269.  
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a distinction should be made between ‘an information system automatically generated data 
message which does not require the input of a human mind’ – a real data message; and ‘an 
information system produced and stored data message based on the input of a human mind’ – 
a hearsay data message. 
 
In in S v Brown,146 however, the court quoted with approval a cautionary note from Hofman 
who submits that audio, video and graphics should be treated the same as documentary 
evidence, he stated: 
 
To be admitted real evidence only has to be relevant and meaningful. This view is conceptually 
simple and appeals to those who dislike excluding any evidence. But it does not take account 
of the way graphics, audio and video are, to an ever-increasing extent, recorded, stored and 
distributed in digital form and fall under the definition of a data message. This means that 
graphics, audio, and video now resemble documents more than the knife and bullet that are the 
traditional examples of real evidence. In data message form, graphics, audio and video are 
susceptible to error and falsification in the same way as data messages that embody 
documentary content. They cannot prove themselves to be anything other than data messages 
and their evidential value depends on witnesses who can both interpret them and establish their 
relevance. 
 
Zeffertt shares this view,147 citing S v Ramgobin148 in support thereof. The justification being 
that data messages should be treated as documents to guard against intentional or accidental 
changes to the data message.149 In S v Brown,150 the court supported this proposition and held 
that digital images more closely resemble documents, and found as follows: 
Given the potential mutability and transient nature of images such as the images in this matter 
which are generated, stored and transmitted by an electronic device, I consider that they are 
more appropriately dealt with as documentary evidence rather than 'real evidence'. 
 
Those views notwithstanding, the treatment of data messages as real evidence is consistent 
with similar common law based foreign jurisdictions – where electronic evidence has had more 
time to mature judicially; for example, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States.151  
For example, as discussed above in chapter 3, in England, it has been suggested that records 
generated by software without any input from a human should be treated as real evidence.152 
In R v Coventry Justices,153 automated transactions that involved pornography purchases from 
                                                             
146S v Brown supra note 14 para 18. 
147 Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 22 at 852. 
148 1986 (4) SA 117 (N). 
149 Hofman op cit note 25 at 268. 
150 S v Brown supra note 14 para 18. 
151 S Mason ‘Software code as the witness’ in S Mason & D Seng (eds) Electronic Evidence 4 ed (2017) 91 – 100.  
152 Ibid 97 – 98. 
153 [2004] All ER (D) 78. 
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a credit card were regarded as real evidence.  Further, in R v Spiby,154 where an automated 
program monitored telephone calls this evidence was real evidence because there was no 
human intervention in the production of the data (similar to the South African decision of Ex 
Parte Rosch155 discussed above). 
In the seminal American decision, in Lorraine v Markel American Insurance 
Company,156 the court held that where an ‘electronically generated record is entirely the 
product of the functioning of a computerized system or process’157 it cannot constitute hearsay.  
In what has been described as the ‘watershed opinion’158 in relation to electronic evidence, the 
court set out the basic requirements for the admissibility of electronic evidence.  In legal 
proceedings instituted to enforce an arbitrators award, it was found that: 
 
In order for electronically stored information (ESI) to be admissible, it must be (1) relevant, (2) 
authentic, (3) not hearsay or admissible under an exception to rule barring hearsay evidence, 
(4) original or duplicate, or admissible as secondary evidence to prove its contents, and (5) 
probative value must outweigh its prejudicial effect. 159 
 
Further, in United States v Lizarraga-Tirado,160 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that 
automated computer evidence – without any substantial human intervention is not hearsay. The 
court stated as follows: ‘we join other circuits that have held that machine statements aren’t 
hearsay’.161 
Data messages can be treated as real evidence if a court is satisfied that the data message 
in question is generated automatically without human input – put in the terminology used by 
recent South African cases: If the data message depends substantially upon the credibility of 
the technology concerned.162  
What are the admissibility requirements for real data messages?  At common law, the only 
requirement for real evidence to be admissible is that it is relevant.163   
                                                             
154 [1990] 91 Cr App R 186. 
155 Ex Parte Rosch supra note 139. 
156 Lorraine v Markel American Insurance Company 241 FRD 534 (2007). 
157 Ibid 564. 
158 Tienda v State 358 SW3d 633 Texas Criminal Appeal (2012) 639. 
159 Ibid 538. 
160 United States v Lizarraga-Tirado 2015 WL 3772772 9th Circuit (2015). 
161 Ibid 7 – 8. 
162 S v Ndiki supra note 31; S v Fuhri 1994 (2) SACR 829 (A) 835; Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services 
supra note 23; La Consortium supra note 31; Ex parte Rosch supra note 139. 
163 Hofman & de Jager op cit note 4 at 776 – 777; Hofman op cit note 25 at 268.  For an English perspective, see 
S Mason & D Seng ‘Real Evidence’ in S Mason and D Seng (eds) Electronic Evidence 4 ed (2017) 39. 
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However, as discussed above in chapter 3,164 in the context of graphics, audio and 
video, there is some debate as to how the evidence should be classified.  In Motata v Nair NO165 
the court cogently summarised the various approaches as follows: 
 
There has been considerable judicial debate concerning the prerequisites for admissibility in 
evidence of video and tape recordings. Ranged against the decisions in the Natal Provincial 
Division in the cases, in particular, of S v Singh & another 1975 (1) SA 330 (N), and S v 
Ramgobin & others 1986 (4) SA 117 (N) are the decisions in the Transvaal Provincial Division, 
in particular, in S v Baleka & others (1) 1986 (4) SA 192 (T) and S v Baleka & others (3) 1986 
(4) SA 1005 (T), in which latter cases the Singh and Ramgobin decisions were expressly 
disapproved of. See too S v Mpumlo & others 1986 (3) SA 485 (E). In S v Nieuwoudt 1990 (4) 
SA 217 (A) Hefer JA pointed out that the difference in approach between these cases came 
down to the question of whether proof of the authenticity of a recording tendered in evidence 
was a prerequisite for admissibility. Whereas in the Singh and Ramgobin cases it was held that 
it was indeed a prerequisite, the contrary was held in the Baleka cases on the grounds that a 
distinction must be drawn between the originality of a recording and the authenticity thereof, 
Van Dijkhorst J stating that, whereas originality affected admissibility, authenticity did not. 
 
In the context of data messages generally, the difference in approach can be summarised further 
as follows: the KwaZulu-Natal Singh and Ramgobin decisions require relevance and 
authenticity for admissibility, whereas according to the Gauteng Baleka cases authenticity is 
an issue to consider when considering the weight of evidence.  Moreover, the Baleka cases 
believe that originality affects admissibility, and should be considered as part of an 
admissibility enquiry.  
In S v Nieuwoudt,166 and in S v Fuhri,167 it was held that the approach in the Gauteng 
Baleka cases should be preferred. However, in S v Koralev,168 although the court appears to 
endorse the Baleka cases, what in effect it does is endorse the KwaZulu-Natal Singh and 
Ramgobin approach because, according to the court’s rationale, digital images must not only 
be relevant, but also corroborated; the court held as follows: 
 
Before the images in question could be admissible in evidence against the appellants there 
had to be some proof of their accuracy in the form of corroboration that the events depicted 
therein actually occurred; and 
 
Corroboration in the sense required must be found in some independent source of evidence, 
which makes the evidence constituted by the images in the photographs and video 
recordings more acceptable in that it supports an aspect or aspects thereof.169 
 
                                                             
164 See paragraph 3.4. 
165 2009 (1) SACR 263 (T) para 21. 
166 1990 (4) SA 217 (A). 
167 1994 (2) SACR 829 (A). 
168 2006 (2) SACR 298 (N). 
169 Ibid 306 – 307. 
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In the direct context of data messages and real evidence, the Supreme Court of Appeal and/or 
Constitutional Court is yet to decisively adjudicate on the matter.  The issue that remains 
unclear relates to the admissibility of real evidence in the form of data messages.  On the one 
hand, in matters that follow the logic of the Gauteng Baleka cases, and the Appeal Court in 
Fuhri, real evidence in the form of a data message need only be relevant in order for it to be 
admissible.  Conversely, on the basis of Koralev, Singh and Ramgobin’s rationale, real 
evidence in the form of a data message must be relevant and authentic.   
Given the nature170 of electronic evidence, it may well be desirable for a court to be 
sure the data message is authentic before considering that evidence admissible. It follows 
logically that to be relevant, the data message evidence must be authentic – consequently, as 
was found in Tienda v State, evidence has no relevance if it is not authentically what its 
proponent claims it to be.171  
 
5.5 EVIDENTIAL WEIGHT OF DATA MESSAGES  
 
5.5.1 Section 15(2) of the ECT Act 
 
Section 15(2) reads as follows: ‘Information in the form of a data message must be given due 
evidential weight’.172 The section speaks for itself and enjoins a court to give due evidential 
weight to a data message.173 This section ensures that evidence will never be excluded for the 
sole reason it is not created by a person, and to ensure electronic evidence is potentially 
admissible. Section 15(2) is based verbatim on a portion of art 9(2) of the Model Law, 1996 
and is consistent with the legal position globally (where information in electronic format is 
given due evidential weight).174 
 
5.5.2 Section 15(3) of the ECT Act 
 
Section 15(3) of the ECT Act175 provides direct guidance on evidential weight of data 
messages, and reads as follows: 
                                                             
170 S v Brown supra note 14 para 20; South African Law Reform Commission Issue Paper 27 (Project 126) 
Electronic Evidence in Criminal and Civil Proceedings: Admissibility and Related Issues (2010) 7 – 13 for a 
discussion on some of the difficulties with electronic evidence, including: ease of manipulation, difficulty of 
detecting manipulation, changing technology and evolving software and hardware.  See also South African Law 
Reform Commission  Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence (2014) 27 – 46. 
171 Tienda v State supra note 153 at 638. 
172 La Consortium supra note 31 para 19. 
173 Papadopoulos & Snail op cit note 4 at 322 – 323; Davey & Dahms-Jansen op cit note 3 at 287 – 296. 
174 See the discussion on the foreign position in para 5.6 below. 
175 Based on art 9 of the Model Law, 1996. 
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(3)  In assessing the evidential weight of a data message, regard must be had to: 
(a)  the reliability of the manner in which the data message was generated, stored 
or communicated; 
(b) the reliability of the manner in which the integrity of the data message was 
maintained; 
(c) the manner in which its originator was identified; and 
(d) any other relevant factor. 
 
In S v Meyer,176 the court explained the operation of s 15(2) and s 15(3) of the ECT Act as 
follows:  
 
Only once a data message is admitted into evidence, it must be given the due evidential weight 
in terms of s15(2) of the ECT Act. In assessing the evidential weight of a data message, regard 
must be had to the reliability of the process of generation, storage and communication of the 
data, of the preservation of integrity, of the identification of the originator (proof of authenticity 
and any other relevant factor (s 15 (3)) 
 
In LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA Enterprises v MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd177 the 
court applied s 15(2) and s 15(3) of the ECT Act to find accounting software evidence was 
admissible: 
 
A data message must, according to s 15(2) of the ECT Act, be given 'due evidential weight'. In 
assessing the evidential weight of a data message, s 15(3) requires that regard must be had to 
the manner in which it was generated, stored or communicated; the reliability of the manner in 
which its integrity was maintained; the manner in which its  originator was identified; and any 
other relevant factor.  
 
The primary guidance in so far as evidentiary weight of data messages is concerned is found is 
s 15(3) of the ECT Act. In addition, the factors contained in s 14(2), which deals with assessing 
integrity, can also be considered – but this really adds nothing new.178  
In S v Ndiki179 the court found that where there are doubts as to the accuracy of the 
technology in question, these concerns should be reflected in the weight a court accords the 
evidence – ultimately, the final decision as to the weight evidence receives in particular 
circumstances is down to the discretion of the judicial officer in question. Watney180 and 
Hofman181 point out that it is likely a court will rely on expert evidence when assessing 
evidential weight – although each judicial officer must clearly retain a discretion in making a 
                                                             
176 S v Meyer supra note 54 para 308. See also S v Miller supra note 31. 
177 La Consortium supra note 31. 
178 Hofman & de Jager op cit note 4 at 781. 
179 S v Ndiki supra note 23. 
180 Watney op cit note 10 at 10. 
181 Hofman op cit note 25 at 269. 
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final decision.  For example, in Jafta v Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife,182 in one of the first reported 
decisions dealing with the ECT Act, the court relied on expert evidence to determine issues 
relating to the conclusion of a contract via data message.   
 
5.5.3 Data message evidentiary weight: South African law reform proposals  
 
In the context of evidentiary weight, the SALRC ask whether s 15(3) is sufficient: 
 
[W]hether these guidelines for evidential weight are adequate to guide parties and the courts 
when addressing issues of admissibility, authentication or reliability; or whether additional 
guidance should be provided?183 
 
On evidentiary weight, advocate Eiselen in a response to the SALRC’s 2010 issue paper184 
notes: ‘15(3) provides clear guidance, and... this is an issue that should be considered on a case 
by case basis rather than by tying the courts‘ hands’.185 The Law Society of South Africa, also 
in response to the SALRC’s 2010 issue paper, notes that the current statutory regime in the 
context of evidentiary weight is adequate and points out that a court should retain discretion to 
test the authenticity of evidence as it deems appropriate.186  Heyink, similarly, cautioned 
against fettering the discretion of judicial officers,187 while the NPA noted that the current 
position is satisfactory and that authenticity should not be conflated with truth of the 
contents.188  In my view, in so far as evidentiary weight is concerned, the current position is 
satisfactory for the short to medium term, and a court or tribunal has sufficient guidance in the 
ECT Act. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
182 (2009) 30 ILJ 131 (LC) para 17 – 29 where experts from both sides produced a substantially agreed set of facts 
regarding e-mail usage and Google Mail. 
183 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) 72. 
184 South African Law Reform Commission Issue Paper 27 (Project 126) Electronic Evidence in Criminal and 
Civil Proceedings: Admissibility and Related Issues (2010) 28 – 49. 
185 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) 72. 
186 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) 72. 
187 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) 73. 
188 Ibid. 
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5.6. COMPARATIVE POSITION IN FOREIGN LAW  
 
5.6.1 United Kingdom  
 
Although South Africa’s law of evidence is based on English law, it is worth noting the primary 
distinction between the two legal systems: In England and Wales, criminal matters are 
determined by a jury189 (unless the offence is deemed minor), whereas in South Africa all 
matters are determined by a judge or magistrate (a trained legal expert).  However, that 
distinction aside, the systems of evidence are remarkably similar. As with South Africa, 
evidence is primarily considered admissible if relevant – subject to several exclusions.190  In 
England and Wales, weight and sufficiency of evidence is largely left to the jury to decide, 
unless it is a matter with no jury, in which case, the judicial officer will decide.191  A clear 
distinction is drawn between admissibility and weight of evidence: 192 
 
Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence must be distinguished from those relating 
to its weight.  The former is a matter of law for the judge; the weight of evidence, on the other 
hand, is a question of fact. 
 
In the context of electronic evidence, to be admissible, it must be authentic.193 Authentic means 
‘the record is what it claims to be’.194 Mason and Stanfield note:195 
Each case is necessarily considered on its merits, and in the case of authenticating 
electronic evidence, there is very little clear guidance on how to determine authenticity, 
since traditional rules look at individual documents rather than the digital system in 
which digital data are created. 
 
According to Mason and Stanfield,196 challenges to authenticity include: 
 
1. Claiming that records were altered, manipulated or damaged between the time they were 
created and the time they appeared in court as evidence. 
2. Questioning the reliability of the program that generated the record. 
3. Disputing the identity of the author of the electronic evidence: for instance, the person 
ostensibly responsible for writing a letter in the form of a word processing file, SMS or email 
                                                             
189 C Tapper Cross and Tapper on Evidence 12 ed (2010) at 6. 
190 S Mason & D Seng ‘Foundations of evidence in electronic form’ in S Mason & D Seng (eds) Electronic 
Evidence 4 ed (2017) 57. 
191 Mason & Seng op cit note 190 at 58. At times, South Africa’s exclusionary rules (designed to protect a jury 
from hearing prejudicial evidence) appear outdated when one considers a jury system has long since been 
abolished in South Africa, and that the trier of fact in a South African context will invariably be a trained legal 
expert working within the conscripts of a Constitutional democracy. 
192 Tapper op cit note 189.  
193 D Seng ‘Computer output as evidence’ (1997) Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 161 – 163. 
194 S Mason & A Stanfield ‘Authenticating electronic evidence’ in S Mason & D Seng (eds) Electronic Evidence 
4 ed (2017) 193. 
195 Ibid 193 – 194. 
196 Mason & Stanfield op cit note 194 at 196 – 197. 
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may dispute he wrote the text, or sufficient evidence has not been adduced to demonstrate the 
nexus between the evidence and the person responsible for writing the communication. 
4. Questioning the reliability of the evidence from a social networking website. 
5. Even if it might be agreed that an act was carried out and recorded in an electronic message, 
failing to prove the message was directed to a particular person, especially where others might 
have access to the device (such as a mobile telephone) that produced the message. 
6. Questioning whether the person alleged to have used his PIN, password or clicked the ‘I accept’ 
icon was the person who actually carried out the action.  
 
In Nobel Resources SA v Gross197 the court relied on expert evidence to determine the 
authenticity of electronic evidence – in this case, SMS messages sent to a Blackberry mobile 
phone, the court held: 
Prior to the start of the trial Mr. Gross attempted to cast doubt on the reliability or authenticity 
of the SMS evidence. However the technical evidence subsequently served by Noble 
explaining: (a) how the SMS messages were identified and recovered; (b) that it was not 
possible to alter an SMS message on a BlackBerry once it has been received or sent; and (c) 
that it would be very difficult to alter data on a server back-up, meant that when it came to trial 
there was no realistic attack by Mr. Gross on the reliability or authenticity of the SMS messages 
or any suggestion to the effect that they had been doctored or deleted. 
Electronic evidence has become a natural part of most trials; in the recent criminal appeal of 
Khan v R,198 for example, the court was required to consider Blackberry messages, Facebook 
messages, and Instagram messages when coming to a decision. Moreover, in Kay v R,199 the 
basis of the appeal was again evidence from social media – the conviction was ultimately 
quashed, and the court noted: 
Fresh evidence in the form of Facebook messages are now available that go directly to A's 
credibility. Edited and misleading copies of the Facebook messages were adduced at trial.200 
 
Kay v R shows the inherent danger of electronic evidence where it is relied upon without proper 
authentication.  In the court a quo the accused was convicted – the conviction was based, in no 
small part, on inaccurate and misleading Facebook messages. Often, electronic evidence will 
be decisive – for example, in Burns v R,201 in the context of stirring up racial hatred on 
Facebook, the key evidence was electronic in nature; the court had to consider offensive 
comments directed at the Afro-Caribbean and Jewish communities posted on Facebook, and 
the appropriateness of the sentence imposed.202 
                                                             
197 [2009] EWHC 1435 (Comm) para 60.  See discussion in Mason & Stanfield op cit note 194 at 196. 
198 [2015] EWCA Crim 1816 para 9. 
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201 [2017] EWCA Crim 1466. 
202 Ibid para 2 – 7. See also R v Sheppard and Whittle [2010] EWCA Crim 65 in the context of where publication 
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 127 
What considerations should be taken into account when authenticating data? This will 
very much depend on the electronic evidence in question, the statute being relied upon for 
admissibility, and no rigid hard-and-fast rules should exist. Mason and Stanfield note:203 
 
The tests of authenticity for digital data…will vary, depending on the source and type of the 
data. Lawyers must look to the digital forensic professionals for guidance. For instance, the 
print-out from a mainframe computer will demand a different approach in comparison to the 
data held on a personal computer; this in turn will be different if data is stored with a cloud 
service provider.  
 
5.6.2 United States 
 
Electronic evidence, and machine output in particular has been at issue in legal proceedings for 
many years in the United States, and has been actively discussed for decades.204 Although a 
‘machine does not exhibit a character for dishonesty or suffer from memory loss’,205 the 
conveyances206 cannot always be trusted – even if a machine generated the result without any 
apparent human involvement. Roth notes: 
 
a machine's programming, whether the result of human coding or machine learning, could cause 
it to utter a falsehood by design. A machine's output could be imprecise or ambiguous because 
of human error at the programming, input, or operation stage, or because of machine error due 
to degradation and environmental forces. And human and machine errors at any of these stages 
could also lead a machine to misanalyze an event. 
 
However, machine learning (and technology in general) has advanced to a sophisticated state, 
and can be relied upon:  
 
machine learning algorithms are used to detect patterns in data in order to automate complex 
tasks or make predictions. Today, such algorithms are used in a variety of real-world 
commercial applications including Internet search results, facial recognition, fraud detection, 
and data mining. Machine learning is closely associated with the larger enterprise of “predictive 
analytics” as researchers often employ machine learning methods to analyze existing data to 
predict the likelihood of uncertain outcomes.207 
 
                                                             
203 Mason & Stanfield op cit note 194 at 193 – 194. 
204 The Harvard Law Review Association ‘Scientific Gadgets in the Law of Evidence’ (1939) 53 Harvard Law 
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207 H Surden ‘Machine Learning and Law’ (2014) 89 Washington Law Review 89 – 95.  See also R Susskind 
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Some point out that this type of evidence should be ‘subject to a heightened showing of 
reliability and testability’.208 Teppler notes:209 
 
Digital data is inherently malleable or mutable. The inherently mutable nature of computer-
generated data creates new issues that have a significant and detrimental effect on reliability, 
authentication, and ultimately on the issue of admissibility. This mutability, in turn, exposes 
the inherent frailty of digital data sought to be introduced as evidence.  
 
In Perfect 10 Inc v Cybernet Ventures Inc210 the court noted the position in so far as 
authentication of electronic evidence is concerned: ‘[T]he foundational requirement of 
authentication is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question 
is what its proponent claims’.211  In re FP,212 the court confirmed that admission of evidence 
is in the discretion of the judicial officer, and that a wide variety of methods may be used to 
authenticate electronic evidence.213 
In Tienda v State,214 in a criminal appeal, the court took a common sense approach in 
finding that there is no specific procedure applicable when authenticating electronic evidence 
– best practice and procedure is very much dependant on the nature of the evidence. In Tienda, 
the appellant was convicted of murder in what appeared to be a gang related shooting involving 
three moving vehicles on a major highway.  On appeal, the court found that the trial court did 
not misdirect itself, nor did it abuse its discretion in admitting social media posts from MySpace 
as evidence.  The posts in question appeared incriminating and seemingly boasted about a gang 
shooting with a direct reference to the deceased in question: ‘You aint BLASTIN You aint 
Lastin; I live to stay fresh!!; I kill to stay rich!!’ – all made under the heading ‘RIP David 
Valadez’. In so far as authentication is concerned, the court noted as follows: 
 
Evidence may be authenticated in a number of ways, including by direct testimony from a 
witness with personal knowledge, by comparison with other authenticated evidence, or by 
circumstantial evidence. Courts and legal commentators have reached a virtual consensus that, 
although rapidly developing electronic communications technology often presents new and 
protean issues with respect to the admissibility of electronically generated, transmitted and/or 
stored information, including information found on social networking web sites, the rules of 
evidence already in place for determining authenticity are at least generally adequate to the 
task.215 
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As with South Africa, the bedrock admissibility requirement in the United States is 
relevance.216 In order to be relevant, the evidence must be authentic – it follows then that 
evidence has no relevance if it is not authentic.217 It is submitted that although differences exist, 
American jurisprudence218 can assist in unlocking some of the debate surrounding 
classification and treatment of real data message evidence in South Africa.219  
 
For example, courts in South Africa must categorically reject the notion that all 
electronic evidence is hearsay.220  Further, it should be a requirement that all electronic 
evidence is authentic before it is admissible.221  Consequently, as with the United States – 
which requires a ‘prima facie showing of authenticity’222 before evidence is admissible – South 
Africa ought to confirm the KwaZulu-Natal Singh and Ramgobin rationales, which require 
relevance and authenticity for admissibility.223 Conversely, according to the Gauteng cases via 
Baleka (1) and Baleka (3) (and supported by two appeal decisions), authenticity is an issue to 
consider when considering the weight of evidence.  Moreover, the Baleka cases believe that 
originality affects admissibility, and should be considered as part of an admissibility enquiry.   
 
In the digital context, originality is not a relevant consideration – an ‘original’ is not a concept 
that assists with determining the veracity of the evidence (as is the case with paper documents).  
Rather, the key factor must be authenticity, and determining whether the evidence is otherwise 
admissible. As a result, the proposition that authenticity should only be considered with 
determining weight of evidence is flawed when considering electronic evidence – manipulation 
of data and determining authenticity is critical, not considering whether data is original.  
Accordingly, South Africa’s appeal court, when it gets the opportunity, should reject an 
approach which categorises all electronic evidence as hearsay, and should further find that all 
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electronic evidence must be authenticated (whether real or documentary evidence) before it is 
admissible.  Further, there must also be recognition that electronic evidence is subject to the 
same evidentiary regime as all other evidence – it is not automatically admissible.224  Finally, 
South Africa’s appeal court should note the distinction between automatically produced 
electronic evidence (real evidence – which is not subject to the hearsay rules), and documentary 
electronic evidence (which is subject to the hearsay rules).225 
 
5.7 SECTION 15(4)226 OF THE ECT ACT AND BUSINESS RECORDS 
 
In the context of admissibility of electronic evidence, s 15(4) creates a statutory exemption for 
data messages where the data message is created in a business context; and certified to be 
correct – a so-called business records or shopbook exception.227  The section is a departure 
from the Model Law, 1996228 and has been criticized by courts229 and academics.230   That 
notwithstanding, in Director of Public Prosecution v Modise,231  Lamont J seemed to indicate 
that section 15(4) is an intentional step by South Africa's legislature to foster efficiency and 
properly deploy limited resources:232 
 
[Section 15(4) is] specifically designed to enable [persons] to avoid the need to lead the evidence 
of a witness by way of producing him and then leading viva voce evidence. The facts and matters 
in a document are the evidence. The evidence is admissible if the provisions of this section are 
complied with. Nothing more is required. The section enables [persons] to easily produce evidence 
which will generally be of a formal and uncontested nature and to place same in documentary form 
before a court without the need to call the witness… [A person] does not have to send its experts to 
a variety of courts countrywide to give evidence which generally is uncontested with the 
concomitant waste of money and time. In addition the expert becomes free to perform other work. 
These sections allow limited resources to be properly and adequately used.233 
 
                                                             
224 See chapter 5, paragraph 5.4.2 above. 
225 See chapter 5, paragraph 5.4.5 above. 
226 Section 15 (4) is discussed above in para 3.5.4 in the context of hearsay evidence where the section appears in 
full.  It is discussed here in the context of data message admissibility in general for the sake of completeness.   
227 M Takombe ‘The rise of the machines – understanding electronic evidence’ De Rebus August 2014 at 153 – 
155. 
228 Hofman & de Jager op cit note 4 at 771 – 772. 
229 LA Consortium supra note 31 para 12. 
230 Hofman op cit note 25 at 268; D De Villiers ‘Old 'Documents', 'Videotapes' and New 'Data Messages' – A 
Functional Approach to the Law of Evidence (part 2)’ (2010) 4 TSAR 733 – 734; Hofman & de Jager op cit note 
4 at 771 – 772. 
231 Director of Public Prosecution v Modise supra note 82. See also Sublime Technologies (Pty) Ltd v Jonker 2010 
(2) SA 522 (SCA) para 13 where the section is superficially referred to. 
232 See A Duvenhage An evidential analysis of section 15 (4) of the Electronic Communications and Transactions 
Act 25 of 2002 (LLM thesis, University of Pretoria, 2016) 34 – 38 where the author notes that s 15(4) of the ECT 
Act is an intentional departure from the Model Law, 1996, but concludes that the ‘radical’ provision ought to be 
repealed in its entirety.   
233 Director of Public Prosecution v Modise supra note 82 at 557. 
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Section 15(4)234 is in addition to the existing statutory exceptions created for business records 
and hearsay in: Section 34 of the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965; s 221 – 222 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977; and s 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 
1988.  
The current application of s 15(4) is as follows: If a data message is reduced to a print-
out (if created during a business context), then if that copy of the data message is certified to 
be correct by a person in the service of that business, that printout is admissible in evidence, 
and rebuttable proof of the facts contained therein.235 
 
5.8 CONCLUSION  
 
The admissibility and weight of data message evidence does not require drastic overhaul.236 
Common law principles – read together with the ECT Act, and recent case law – are largely 
adequate for the time being.    
Section 15(1) deals with admissibility, while s 15(2) and s 15(3) provide guidance in 
so far as assessing evidential weight is concerned; finally, s 15(4) creates a further statutory 
exception  to the hearsay rule by introducing an exception for business records.  These sections 
ensure electronically stored and produced information will be admissible in evidence, and that 
it should be accorded appropriate evidential weight. These provisions are based on the Model 
Law, 1996 which has been implemented in one hundred and fifty jurisdictions world-wide.237 
South Africa’s common law of evidence, read together with the ECT Act is largely consistent 
with global best practice, and unless there are cogent reasons to repeal and amend s 15, for the 
short to medium term, the section should remain unamended. 
South Africa ought to ensure that new forms of technology remain admissible in evidence, and 
that when assessing admissibility and weight of evidence – whether electronic or otherwise – 
the judiciary should retain a discretion, rather than over legislating or adopting a rigid, tick-
box approach.  Currently, s 15 achieves the desired result and although reform may be required 
                                                             
234 On s 15(4) of the ECT Act, see Duvenhage op cit note 221 9 – 34.  See also P Fourie Using Social Media as 
Evidence in South African Courts (LLM thesis, North-West University, 2016) 8 – 14. 
235 See the cases and discussion above in paragraph 3.5.4. 
236 However, as noted above, law reform is desirable in at least the following areas: The definition of data message; 
definition of document in the statutes applicable to hearsay exceptions; a distinction between types of electronic 
evidence in so far as computer-generated evidence with human intervention, and without human intervention is 
concerned; and more cohesion and alignment with the statutory exceptions.   
237 United Nations ‘Status: UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce (1996)’ 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/electronic_commerce/1996Model_status.html, accessed on 4 
August 2018 where the United Nations Secretariat lists member states that comply with the Model Law, 1996.  
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in the greater scheme of the ECT Act and electronic evidence, s 15 of the ECT Act is adequate 
to regulate the admissibility and weight of electronic evidence. 
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ARE THERE DIFFERENT EVIDENTIARY CONSIDERATIONS APPLICABLE TO 
DATA MESSAGE EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS? 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter seeks to determine whether it is appropriate to apply different evidentiary 
considerations to data messages in civil and criminal proceedings.  It may well be trite, but in 
order to appropriately discuss this issue it is worth repeating the fundamental distinction in 
South Africa’s legal system: in criminal matters, guilt must be proved beyond reasonable 
doubt; and a court will presume an accused person is innocent until the state proves otherwise.1  
Conversely, in civil matters, there is no presumption of innocence;2 and a litigant must satisfy 
a court of on a balance of probabilities.  When discussing these concepts, the key terms that 
arise are: onus of proof, evidentiary burden, and ‘shifting’ of the onus of proof. These terms 
will be analysed in the context of data messages, and this chapter will comment on whether 
different evidentiary considerations should apply to electronic evidence in civil and criminal 
proceedings.3  
 
6.2 ONUS OF PROOF AND EVIDENTIARY BURDEN 
The onus of proof (sometimes referred to as the burden of proof) is a legal expression used to 
describe the duty on a litigant to satisfy a court that he or she is correct4 – it sets out who has 
the duty to satisfy a court that his or her claim or defence should succeed.  This is sometimes 
also referred to as the ‘full’ onus,5 the ‘overall’ onus,6 onus ‘proper,7 or ‘true’ onus.8  The onus 
                                                             
1 Section 35 (3)(h) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See also P Schwikkard & S van der Merwe 
Principles of Evidence 4 ed (2016) ch 2, ch 31 and ch 32; D Zeffertt & A Paizes The South African Law of 
Evidence 2 ed (2009) ch 3 and ch 5; A Paizes ‘The law of evidence: Seven wishes for the next twenty years’ 
(2014) 3 SACJ 273 – 278.   
2 Prinsloo v van der Linde 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC). See also Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 1 at 45 – 48.   
3 For a broader discussion on the state of the law of evidence in South Africa, see Paizes op cit note 1 at 272 – 
292. 
4 Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 1 at 45 – 50, 27 – 128; Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 1 at 34 – 36, 602 
– 603; DT Zeffertt and A Paizes Essential evidence (2010) 13 – 16. 
5 Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 1 at 128. 
6 South Cape Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Engineering Management Services (Pty) Ltd 1977 (3) SA 534 (A) 548 
where the court referred to Ogilvie Thompson JA in Brand v Minister of Justice 1959 (4) SA 712 (AD). 
7 South Cape Corporation (Pty) Ltd supra note 6 at 548 – 549. 
8 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 1 at 602. 
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of proof must be distinguished from an evidentiary burden,9 which is the duty on a litigant to 
either adduce evidence to combat prime facie evidence,10 or to adduce evidence to call upon 
the other litigant to answer a case – depending on the context. 
For example, in a criminal matter, the state bears the onus of proof: the prosecution 
must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.  Conversely, in a civil matter, the onus of proof 
rests with the party instituting civil proceedings to satisfy a court that they have a valid claim. 
The onus of proof will never shift in criminal matters, it will always remain on the state to 
prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.  Similarly, in civil matter,11 the onus of proof rests on a 
civil litigant who instituted proceedings to satisfy a court as to the correctness of their 
propositions.12 However, the evidentiary burden does move or shift throughout the course of a 
trial.13   To illustrate the shift in evidentiary burden – and the static nature of the onus of proof 
– consider a civil dispute relating to defamatory comments on social media: the plaintiff will 
carry the onus of proof to satisfy a court that he or she should, on a balance of probabilities, 
succeed in a damages claim based on the actio injuriarum.14  The duty to begin typically rests 
with the party who instituted action15 – following the maxim he who alleges must prove.16  
Consequently, the evidentiary burden will, at first, be on the plaintiff. However, during the 
trial, if the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, then the evidentiary burden will shift to the 
defendant17 to adduce evidence to avoid liability.  
Therefore, in a civil defamation matter, in addition to the onus of proof, an evidentiary 
burden is on the plaintiff to adduce evidence to call upon the defendant to answer a case.  In a 
case of civil defamation, the evidentiary burden will only shift from the plaintiff to the 
defendant if the plaintiff establishes a publication that is defamatory and that refers to the 
plaintiff – however, in the internet age, this is usually straight forward to prove and invariably 
                                                             
9 Brooks v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2017 (1) SACR 701 (SCA) para 75. See also South African 
Human Rights Commission v Qwelane 2018 (2) SA 149 (GJ) para 14 where the Appellate Division’s approach in 
Pillay v Krishna 1946 AD 946 is endorsed. 
10 In this context prima facie means contrary proof is still possible, see Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 
1 at 22.  
11 Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 1 at 890. Generally, the plaintiff has a duty to begin.  If there is a dispute as to 
which party bears the burden of proof, a court must give a ruling. 
12 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 1 at 602. 
13 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 1 at 602 – 603. 
14 Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 5 SA 401 (CC) para 17 – 18. 
15 Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 4 at 51 – 53 for an overview of the duty to begin in civil and criminal proceedings. 
16 Cecilia Goliath v Member of the Executive Council for Health, Eastern Cape 2015 (2) SA 97 (SCA) para 8 
where the court notes: ‘The general rule is that she who asserts must prove’.  However, see Paizes op cit note 1 at 
282 – 284 for a critique of this position.  
17 Social media defamation cases in civil law are instituted by way of summons (as opposed to an application), 
therefore the party accused of making defamatory statements is known as the defendant and not the respondent 
(as would be the case in application proceedings). 
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in civil defamation matters in the context of social media and data messages, the evidentiary 
burden typically shifts from the plaintiff to defendant.   
Once a defamatory publication is established, it is presumed to be both intentional and 
unlawful.18 As a result, a defendant will be required to adduce evidence to show a lack of fault, 
or that the publication was not in the circumstances unlawful. Typically, a defendant in a 
defamation case has several defences open to her.  Briefly, these defences are: 1) truth for the 
public benefit (the published material must be true and in the publics’ interest to receive); 2) 
fair comment (editorial comment or satirical piece); and 3) privilege (where there is a moral or 
social duty to publish the defamatory matter, and the recipient has a similar interest or duty in 
receiving it).19   
The overall or true onus, however, will always remain on the plaintiff to satisfy a court 
that her version, on a balance of probabilities, is correct and that she should obtain the relief 
she seeks. 
To continue the defamation analogy,20 in a criminal defamation case,21 the onus of 
proof rests on the prosecution to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The state 
will bear the evidentiary burden at the start of the trial, and the prosecution must prove every 
element of the crime beyond reasonable doubt: 1) unlawful; 2) intentional; 3) publication 4) 
defamatory statement concerning another person.22   As pointed out by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal: 
A criminal sanction is indeed a more drastic remedy than the civil remedy but that disparity is 
counterbalanced by the fact that the requirements for succeeding in a criminal defamation 
matter are much more onerous than in a civil matter. In a civil action for defamation 
unlawfulness and animus injuriandi are presumed once the publication of defamatory material 
is admitted or proved and the onus is on the defendant to prove whatever he relies upon in 
justification. In the case of criminal defamation not only is there no presumption of 
                                                             
18 Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 5 SA 401 (CC) para 18. 
19 Ibid. 
20 D Milo ‘The Timely demise of criminal defamation law’ available at http://www.polity.org.za/article/the-
timely-demise-of-criminal-defamation-law-2015-10-05, accessed on 24 April 2018.  The author cogently argues 
that criminal defamation is unconstitutional in that it amounts to an unjustifiable limitation on the right to freedom 
of the media.  However, in Motsepe v S 2015 (5) SA 126 (GP) at para 50 the North Gauteng High Court Pretoria 
confirmed that in its view, the ‘crime of defamation is not inconsistent with the constitution’ and that ‘even though 
the defamation crime undoubtedly limits the right to freedom of expression, such limitation is reasonable and 
justified in an open and democratic society and consistent with the criteria laid down in Section 36 of the 
Constitution’. See also S v Hoho 2009 (1) SACR 276 (SCA). 
21 S v Hoho 2009 (1) SACR 276 (SCA) para 33 where the court notes: ‘the requirements for succeeding in a 
criminal defamation matter are much more onerous than in a civil matter.’ See also Motsepe v S 2015 (5) SA 126 
(GP). In a civil law context, see Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 5 SA 401 (CC) para 18. 
22 S v Hoho 2009 (1) SACR 279 SCA at para 23; Motsepe v S 2015 (5) SA 126 (GP) para 46. 
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unlawfulness or animus injuriandi, the state has to prove both elements and has to do so beyond 
reasonable doubt. 
 
 The evidentiary burden can shift23 from one party to another during the course of a trial, but 
the onus of proof remains on the same party from start to end – regardless of whether the matter 
is criminal or civil.24   
In South Cape Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Engineering Management Services (Pty) Ltd25 
the Appellate Division confirmed the nature of the onus of proof and its distinction with the 
evidentiary burden; the court held:  “the [true] onus can never shift from the party upon whom 
it originally rested… the burden of adducing evidence in rebuttal…may shift or be transferred 
in the course of the case, depending upon the measure of proof furnished by the one party or 
the other.”  More recently, in Mohunram v National Director of Public Prosecutions,26 the 
Constitutional Court approved the distinction made in South Cape Corporation.  
In civil matters the allocation of the  onus of proof is determined  by substantive law.27 
Given the plethora of potential legal sources it is ‘quite impossible for anyone to present an 
exhaustive litany of all the rules of substantive law that lay down who bears the onus on every 
given issue’.28 
In what is often referred as one of the seminal judgments in this area of law,29 in Tregea 
v Godart,30 the Appellate Division – in a judgment questioned by some academics31 – held that 
substantive law lays down what must be proved, and who must prove it;32 and that the rules of 
evidence relate to the manner of proof.33 In Pillay v Krishna,34 the Appellate Division 
(confirming Tregea) had occasion to deal with the onus of proof in civil cases in a matter 
relating to non-payment of a promissory note – this case is often referred to as the locus 
classicus in judgments.35 The court confirmed the basic proposition: if one person institutes 
                                                             
23 Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 4 at 13 – 16. 
24 Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 1 at 127 – 130; Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 1 at 602 – 603. 
25 1977 (3) SA 534 (A). See also Zefferttt & Paizes op cit note 1 at 45 – 46. 
26 2007 (2) SACR 145 (CC) para 75. 
27 Tregea v Godart 1939 AD 16; Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 4 at 14. 
28 Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 4 at 14. 
29 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 1 at 35 where this case is referred to as the ‘leading’ but ‘doubtful’ 
authority.  See also Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 4 at 35 – 55. 
30 1939 AD 16.  See also Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 1 at 35 – 36. 
31 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 1 at 36; Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 4 at 13 – 21. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 1 at 36. 
34 1946 AD 946. 
35 See Brooks v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2017 (1) SACR 701 (SCA) para 75; South African 
Human Rights Commission v Qwelane 2018 (2) SA 149 (GJ) para 14; Strydom v Engen Petroleum Ltd 2013 (2) 
SA 187 (SCA) para 46 where the Appellate Division’s approach in Pillay v Krishna 1946 AD 946 is endorsed. 
 137 
action against another, that person must satisfy a court that they are entitled to the relief they 
seek.  The court referred to Corpus Juris, and in particular: ‘semper necessitas probandi 
incumbit illi qui agit’ (if one person claims something from another in a court of law, then he 
has to satisfy the court that he is entitled to it).  Further, the court confirmed that the principle 
must be read together with the following proviso: ‘agere etiam is videtur, qui exceptione utitur: 
nam reus in exceptione actor est’ (where the person against whom the claim is made is not 
content with a mere denial of that claim, but sets up a special defence, then for his defence to 
be upheld he must satisfy the Court that he is entitled to succeed on it).36 
Although criticized by some authors for conceptual ambiguity,37 the position set out in 
Tregea, confirmed in Pillay and South Cape Corporation, amongst others, has also been 
confirmed by the Constitutional Court and is the current leading authority in this area of law. 
 
6.3 DOES THE ECT ACT REQUIRE DIFFERENT CONSIDERATIONS OF DATA 
MESSAGES IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CONTEXTS?  
 
Do different considerations exist in so far as data message evidence is concerned in civil and 
criminal matters? In principle, in terms of the ECT Act,38 no.  Data messages are functional 
equivalents of paper, and considered in terms of the same provisions of the ECT Act, with the 
same considerations.39  Consider this brief analogy: would it be appropriate to apply different 
considerations in criminal proceedings (as opposed to civil proceedings) when considering the 
admissibility of a traditional paper document? No.  The considerations would be the same – 
this applies equally to data messages as it does to all forms of evidence.  
However, the standard of proof usually dictates that in criminal matters further and 
more conclusive evidence is required than in civil matters.  Data message evidence should be 
treated the same as all other forms of evidence (subject to legislation), and no different 
considerations should apply across civil and criminal matters: other than the inherent 
differences already apparent in civil and criminal proceedings. 
                                                             
36 1946 AD 946 at 951 – 952. 
37 Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 4 at 13 – 20; Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 1 at 36. 
38 See Part 1 of the ECT Act Legal requirements for data messages, sections 11 – 20, read together with section 
1 of the ECT Act.   
39 S v Miller 2016 (1) SACR 251 (WCC) para 52; LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA Enterprises v MTN Service 
Provider (Pty) Ltd 2011 (4) SA 577 (GSJ) para 12 – 13. 
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Interestingly, the ECT Act is based on the Model Law, 1996 which applies to civil law 
only.40  However, as noted by the SALRC,41 and other academics,42 the ECT Act clearly applies 
to civil and criminal law.43  Furthermore, a variety of criminal44 and civil45 cases have 
interpreted the provisions of the ECT Act in a similar manner.  Hofman,46 points out that the 
ECT Act does not contain a provision limiting it to commercial matters – as the Model Law 
clearly does in article 1..47 Moreover, if the ECT Act did not apply to criminal law, it would 
leave a ludicrous lacuna in the regulation of electronic evidence for criminal matters – an 
absurd result that would never be intended. 
Data messages, subject to concessions48 or directives in legislation, should be treated 
the same as traditional evidence as far as possible: the functional equivalent.  Consequently, it 
would not be appropriate to apply different evidentiary considerations to data messages in civil 
and criminal proceedings: the onus of proof and applicable standard of proof must dictate what 
considerations are applicable with data message evidence.  If one has regard to recent criminal 
cases – for example S v Meyer, and S v Brown from a criminal perspective, and LA Consortium 
& Vending CC t/a LA Enterprises from a civil perspective, it appears the same considerations 
apply.  The same can be said for earlier cases – such as in S v Ndiki, and Ndlovu v Minister of 
Correctional Services, where regardless of whether the matter was civil or criminal, the 
relevant sections of the ECT Act were applied in similar manner – in summary: the cases reflect  
no clear difference in treatment of data messages across civil and criminal law. 
                                                             
40 United Nations 1996 Model Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment 1996 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/electcom/05-89450_Ebook.pdf, article 1. See also South African Law 
Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence (2014) 31 – 32; J Faria 
‘E-commerce and international legal harmonization: Time to go beyond functional equivalence?’ (2004) SA 
MERC LJ 529-555. 
41 Section 4 of the ECT Act states that it applies in respect of any electronic transaction or data message. See also 
South African Law Reform Commission Issue Paper 27 (Project 126) Electronic Evidence in Criminal and Civil 
Proceedings: Admissibility and Related Issues (2010) 27 – 30 where the South African Law Reform Commission 
also conclude that the ECT Act applies to both civil and criminal proceedings.  
42 D van der Merwe et al Information and Communications Technology Law 2 ed (2016) 77 – 82; C 
Theophilopoulos ‘The admissibility of data, data messages, and electronic documents at trial’ (2015) 3 TSAR 461; 
J Hofman ‘Electronic evidence in criminal cases’ (2006) 3 SACJ 260 – 261. 
43 This interpretation is given irresistible flavour when one considers that the ECT Act specifically regulates cyber-
crime – although, as noted by the court in S v Miller 2016 (1) SACR 251 (WCC) para 56, a cyber-inspector has 
yet to be appointed.  See also van der Merwe et al op cit note 43 at 85 – 86. 
44 S v Ndiki 2007 2 All SA 185 (Ck); S v Meyer 2017 JDR 1728 (GJ); S v Brown 2016 (1) SACR 206 (WCC). 
45 Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services 2006 4 All SA 165 (W); LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA 
Enterprises v MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd In re: MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd v LA Consortium & Vending 
CC t/a La Enterprises 2011 4 SA 577 (GSJ). 
46 Hofman op cit note 43 at 260 – 261. 
47United Nations 1996 Model Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment 1996 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/electcom/05-89450_Ebook.pdf at article 1. 
48 Such as in the ECT Act, the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965, the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 
1977, and the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988. 
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6.4 IN A CRIMINAL MATTER, MUST ALL DATA MESSAGE EVIDENCE BE 
PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT? 
 
It has been said that all evidence requires a court to engage in inferential reasoning.49 Where a 
court must consider a ‘second tier of inferential reasoning in addition to the first’, this is 
referred to as circumstantial evidence.50  As discussed above in the context of admissibility and 
weight of data message evidence,51 a court will likely have to rely on circumstantial evidence 
and inferential reasoning when assessing weight (cogency) of data message evidence, amongst 
others.52  
Do all facts in a murder trial need to be proved beyond reasonable doubt? For example, 
must the existence or reliability of all data message evidence be proved beyond reasonable 
doubt?  In short: it depends on the facts of the case and evidence available, but most likely no.  
An analogy from Paizes is useful in this regard: Some facts can be likened to links in a chain 
– without proof thereof beyond reasonable doubt there can be no conviction.  Conversely, some 
facts can be likened to strands in a cable; the more facts that are relied upon to support the 
inference, the less likely it is that each must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.53 Put 
differently,54 as set out by the Appellate Division in R v De Villiers,55 a court should consider 
the cumulative effect of the evidence.   
However, it should be noted that when evaluating circumstantial evidence, there are 
different standards applied in civil and criminal trials.56  These ‘rules’ are referred to as the 
cardinal rules of logic, and were set out by the Appellate Division in R v Blom,57 where the 
court held: 
In reasoning by inference there are two cardinal rules of logic which cannot be ignored: 
                                                             
49 Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 1 at 99.   
50 Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 4 at 23; Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 1 at 23. 
51 See ch 4 para 2; ch 3 para 3. 
52 Also, for example, when considering whether a document is an original in terms of ECT Act. 
53 Paizes op cit note 1 at 281 – 282 where reference is made to the Australian case of Shepherd v The Queen 
(1990) 170 CLR 573 where the court notes at 2-510: ‘Generally, no particular fact or circumstance relied upon in 
a circumstantial case needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. There may, however, be a circumstantial case 
where one or more of the facts relied upon by the Crown is, or are, so fundamental to the process of reasoning to 
the guilt of the accused that the fact or facts must be proved beyond reasonable doubt’.  See also Davidson v R 
(2009) 75 NSWLR 150; Burrell v R (2009) 196 A Crim R 199. 
54 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 1 at 578. 
55 1944 AD 493 508 – 509. 
56 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 1 at 578 – 579. 
57 1939 AD 188 202 – 203.  This case is often referred to as the locus classicus, for example, see Malebo v S 
[2015] ZAFSHC 61 para 6 and Jantjies v S [2014] ZASCA 153 para 14. 
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(1) The inference sought to be drawn must be consistent with all the proved facts. If it is not, 
the inference cannot be drawn. 
 
(2) The proved facts should be such that they exclude every reasonable inference from them 
save the one sought to be drawn. If they do not exclude other reasonable inferences, then 
there must be a doubt whether the inference sought to be drawn is correct.’   
 
In civil cases, the second consideration set out in Blom does not apply.58 This takes account of 
the differing standards of proof, namely, a balance of probabilities will not require a court to 
be sure that all other reasonable inferences are excluded, rather, in a civil matter, a court must 
determine that the inference which is drawn is the most acceptable or probable inference from 
all the available inferences.59  
 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
 
The ECT Act applies to both civil and criminal proceedings.60  Other than the difference in the 
standard of proof, data message evidence should be considered similarly whether in civil or 
criminal proceedings: in my view, it is not appropriate to apply different considerations; the 
ECT Act makes no distinction, and the case law suggests that the same considerations should 
apply. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
58 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 1 at 579. 
59 AA Onderling Assuransie Bpk v De Beer 1982 (2) SA 603 (A); Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 1 at 
578 – 579. 
60 Section 15 (1) which states that it applies in any legal proceedings. 
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CHAPTER 7: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MOST RECENT SOUTH AFRICAN LAW REFORM 
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE  
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In its most recent investigation into the law of evidence, the SALRC suggest three options for 
law reform in the context of electronic evidence.1 The three options are: retention of the current 
regulatory landscape with minor reform; alternatively, electronic evidence specific legislation, 
regulations or guidelines; alternatively, complete reform of the current regulatory 
environment.2 The suggested approaches to law reform are intended to resolve areas of 
confusion3 which have been exacerbated by swift technological development; a relative lack 
of authoritative precedent in this area; and deliberate, unrushed regulation in the information, 
communication and technology environment.  In this context – importantly – it is an undeniable 
fact that technology is becoming more pervasive,4 and smarter;5 consequently, electronic 
evidence will be an unavoidable part of legal proceedings and areas of confusion must be 
resolved as soon as possible.  
The SALRC recommend implementing the most aggressive of the three options,6 and 
proposes drastic reform in the form of a Law of Evidence Bill which seeks to regulate, inter 
alia: the admissibility of evidence in the context of hearsay evidence; the admissibility and 
proof of business records; and evidence produced by machines in all legal proceedings.7  This 
recommendation follows a lengthy review and investigation into the state of evidence in civil 
and criminal proceedings in South Africa – which began soon after the SALRC’s establishment 
in 1973 following the promulgation of the South African Law Reform Commission Act 19 of 
                                                             
1 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) 86 – 88 for a summary of the three proposed options for law reform. For further context into this 
investigation, see also South African Law Reform Commission Issue Paper 27 (Project 126) Electronic Evidence 
in Criminal and Civil Proceedings: Admissibility and Related Issues (2010). 
2 Ibid. 
3 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) 22. 
4 Van Breda v Media 24 Limited 2017 (5) SA 533 (SCA) para 2. 
5 W Erlank & L Ramokanate ‘Allocating the risk of software failures in automated message systems (autonomous 
electronic agents)’ 2016 SAMLJ LJ 201 – 202. 
6 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) 87 where the SALRC are aware that the third option for law reform – the most aggressive – may be 
controversial, and state: ‘[T]his option does, however, present a fairly extensive departure from the status quo and 
would therefore require further reflection and feedback from the various stakeholders.’ 
7 See Annexure A Draft Law of Evidence Bill B2014 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 
131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence (2014) 89. 
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1973.8 Ultimately, the decades-long research and discussion has culminated in the 
recommendations discussed in this chapter.9  Consequently, this chapter will critically analyse 
the eleven issues identified by the SALRC, and conclude with comments on each relevant 
section of the proposed Law of Evidence Bill. 
 
7.2 BACKGROUND TO SOUTH AFRICAN LAW REFORM IN THE CONTEXT OF 
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE 
 
The original intention of the SALRC in relation to the law of evidence was to suggest the 
enormous task of complete codification in one piece of legislation.10  However, once it 
commenced its work, the SALRC realised that such a task would probably take years to 
complete, and entail resources outside of its reach – consequently, it decided against the 
complete codification approach, and rather elected to ascertain which aspects of the law of 
evidence were unsatisfactory; and to formulate suggestions for reform.11   
As discussed above,12 soon after the 1976 matter of Narlis v South African Bank of 
Athens,13 the Clearing Bankers Association of South Africa instructed Judge Didcott14 to 
prepare a report and draft legislation regulating the admissibility of electronic evidence.15  The 
report and draft legislation16 was presented to the SALRC, who in turn produced the first 
research report into electronic evidence: the 1982 Admissibility in Civil Proceedings of 
Evidence Generated by Computers (Project 6) Review of the Law of Evidence. As a result of 
the SALRC’s recommendations in this first report on the issue, the Computer Evidence Act 57 
of 1983 commenced operation on 1 October 1983. 
                                                             
8 This legislation was originally known as the South African Law Commission Act 19 of 1973.  It changed names 
to the South African Law Reform Commission Act 19 of 1973 in terms of section 5 of the Judicial Matters 
Amendment Act 55 of 2002 on 17 January 2003. For more on the SALRC see 
http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/objects.htm#sthash.OIkeTaHM.dpbs, accessed on 3 June 2018. 
9 I was advised in June 2018 by a South African State Law Advisor that these recommendations are currently 
pending before the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development.   
10 South African Law Reform Commission Issue Paper 27 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence Electronic 
Evidence in Criminal and Civil Proceedings: Admissibility and Related Issues (2010) para 1.6 at 3. 
11 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) para 1.2 at 12. 
12 See chapter 2 para 2.3.1 above. 
13 1976 (2) SA 573 (A). 
14 D van der Merwe et al Information and Communications Technology Law 2 ed (2016) at 111. 
15 South African Law Reform Commission Issue Paper 27 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence Electronic 
Evidence in Criminal and Civil Proceedings: Admissibility and Related Issues (2010) para 4.3 at 19. 
16 Van der Merwe et al op cit note 14 at 111. 
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As noted by many,17 the Computer Evidence Act was a failure.18 The SALRC 
recommended its repeal in 199519 after first expressing satisfaction with its enactment in 
1987.20 In the interim, further research papers explored cybercrime,21 and despite first 
recommending the Computer Evidence Act’s repeal in 1995, new legislation in the form of the 
ECT Act only commenced operation in 2002; section 92 of the ECT repealed the Computer 
Evidence Act entirely.22 
It is worth mentioning that in 1996, instead of preparing and releasing what were known 
as working papers, the SALRC opted to start exploring law reform with issue papers, and 
discussion papers. The purpose of an issue paper is to ‘announce an investigation, or to clarify 
the aim and extent of the investigation, and to suggest the options available for solving existing 
problems.’ These research papers ‘involve the community actively at an earlier stage, the 
[SALRC] publishes issue papers for appropriate investigations as the first step in the 
consultation process.’23  Conversely, discussion papers are: ‘documents in which the 
[SALRC]’s preliminary research results are contained.  In most cases discussion papers also 
contain draft legislation.  The main purpose of these documents is to test public opinion on 
solutions identified by the [SALRC].’ 
The promulgation of the ECT Act in 2002 notwithstanding, the SALRC in 2010 felt 
that an issue paper dealing with the use of electronic evidence in criminal and civil proceedings 
was necessary.24 Following the 2010 issue paper, which suggested eleven main areas of 
concern,25 the SALRC released in 2014 a discussion paper which ultimately recommended the 
                                                             
17 P Schwikkard & S van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 4 ed (2016) at 440; D van der Merwe et al op cit note 
14 at 111-112; South African Law Reform Commission Issue Paper 27 (Project 126) Review of the Law of 
Evidence Electronic Evidence in Criminal and Civil Proceedings: Admissibility and Related Issues (2010) para 
4.5 at 19; J Hofman & J de Jager ‘South Africa’ in Mason (ed) Electronic Evidence 3 ed (2012) para 18.06 at 763; 
D Zeffertt and A Paizes The South African Law of Evidence 2 ed (2009) at 431 – 432. 
18 S v Brown 2016 (1) SACR 206 (WCC) para 16 where the court noted: ‘the Computer  Evidence Act 57 of 1983, 
was generally considered to have failed to achieve its purpose… and, in any event, [did not] regulate criminal 
proceedings’.  See also S Mapoma A critical study of the authentication requirements of Section 2 of the Computer 
Evidence Act No 57 of 1983 (LLM thesis, University of South Africa, 1997) 3 – 32. 
19 South African Law Commission Working Paper 60 (Project 95) Investigation into the Computer Evidence Act 
57 of 1983 (1995) at iv. 
20 South African Law Commission Report (Project 6) Review of the Law of Evidence (1987) 28.  See also J Hofman 
‘Electronic evidence in criminal cases’ (2006) 3 SACJ 257. 
21 South African Law Commission Issue Paper 14 (Project 108) Computer related crime (1998) para 19; South 
African Law Commission Discussion Paper 99 (Project 108) Computer related crime (2001) at para 2.5. 
22 Hofman op cit note 20 at 258. 
23South African Law Reform Commission ‘Issue Papers’ available at http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/ipapers.htm, 
accessed 5 May 2018. 
24 South African Law Reform Commission Issue Paper 27 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence Electronic 
Evidence in Criminal and Civil Proceedings: Admissibility and Related Issues (2010) at iii. 
25 South African Law Reform Commission Issue Paper 27 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence Electronic 
Evidence in Criminal and Civil Proceedings: Admissibility and Related Issues (2010) at 28 – 49 where eleven 
areas for comment are identified.   
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overhaul of the current regulatory framework governing electronic evidence.26 The period for 
public comment on the recommendations contained in the 2014 discussion paper was extended 
into 2015, and the discussion paper findings finalised in November 2016; the final 
recommendations are pending before the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
in 2018.27  
 
7.3 THE ADEQUACY OF THE ECT ACT: QUESTIONS RAISED IN THE SALRC’S 
ISSUE PAPER 27; AND RECOMMENDATIONS MADE IN DISCUSSION PAPER 
131 (PROJECT 126) REVIEW OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 
 
7.3.1  Should the ECT Act be reviewed regularly?  
The SALRC start with the most obvious question: ‘Should the ECT Act be reviewed on a 
regular basis to take account of advances in technology?’28 In response, the SALRC note: 
By and large, there seems to be consensus on the need for regular review of the provisions of 
the ECT Act. The SALRC invites further suggestions on the appropriate technical forum (which 
must be in a position to facilitate the engagement of multiple stakeholders) for such review. 
 
The LSSA propose a multidisciplinary panel comprising of, inter alia, the SALRC, applicable 
government representation from the department of Justice and Constitutional Development, 
the Department of Communications, the Information Regulator,29 and ICT experts.   In 
addition, in my view, any review panel must also include diverse legal skills in the form of: an 
experienced practicing attorney, an experienced practicing advocate of a recognised Bar 
Council in South Africa, and an academic professor.   Clearly, the review panel should ensure 
foreign developments are monitored and that where possible (and desirable) South Africa is 
consistent therewith.30  The recommendations made by the LSSA – or something similar – 
should be implemented as soon as possible. In summary, a multidisciplinary team should be 
                                                             
26 See a summary of the SALRC’s findings in South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 
(Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence (2014) para 1.27 – 1.38 at 20 – 25. 
27 Based on my own discussions with the SALRC, a State Law Advisor, and staff members of the Department of 
Justice and Constitutional Development. 
28 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) para 4.2 – 4.11 at 46 – 48. 
29 The Information Regulator created by the Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013 – this regulator also 
regulates freedom of information disputes in terms of the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000. 
30 Law Society of South Africa ‘Comments to the South African Law Reform Commission in relation to issues 
raised in Discussion Paper 131: Review of the Law of Evidence’, available at 
http://lssa.org.za/upload/LSSA%20comments%20on%20SALRC%20Discussion%20Paper%20131%20LAw%20
of%20Evidence%2029%20July%202015.pdf at 1 – 3, accessed on 8 May 2017. 
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appointed with a mandate to review the ECT Act, and to report to Parliament periodically to 
monitor the dynamic, business-critical ICT landscape.   
Despite the recommendations of the SALRC, a review of recent (and all relevant) case 
law suggests there is no urgent need to adopt new legislation;31 however, there is certainly a 
need for an on-going review of the ECT Act and the surrounding regulatory landscape.  
Moreover, there is definitely a pressing need for reform in certain areas, and given the 
explosion of internet connectivity in the last 5 to 10 years,32 and the likely importance 
electronic evidence will have in all forms of legal proceedings going forward, this review 
project should receive urgent attention.  
 
7.3.2 Are the provisions in the ECT Act adequate to regulate the admissibility33 of 
electronic evidence in criminal and civil proceedings? 
 
The SALRC points out that the ECT Act, including s 15 which specifically regulates evidence, 
is based on the UNCITRAL Model Law, 1996 that only applies to commercial activities, and 
poses the following question: are the provisions of the ECT Act adequate for both civil and 
criminal law? By proposing an aggressive overhaul of the current regulatory environment, the 
SALRC appears to believe the current provisions of the ECT are not adequate.   However, in 
discussing this issue the following pertinent observation is made:34 
The fact that the admissibility of electronic evidence is regulated by not only the provisions of 
the ECT Act, but also by common law principles and by provisions in the CPA and CPEA, may 
take the pressure off the ECT Act to accommodate nuanced differences in criminal and civil 
proceedings. 
 
In addition to the provisions mentioned by the SALRC directly above – the Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act35 is also relevant and applicable,36 and the ECT Act certainly does not stand 
                                                             
31 S v Meyer 2017 JDR 1728 (GJ), S v Miller 2016 (1) SACR 251 (WCC), and S v Brown supra note 18 for three 
recent criminal law examples. See also Trustees for the time being of the Delsheray Trust v ABSA Bank Ltd [2014] 
4 All SA 748 (WCC), and LA Consortium & Vending CC t/a LA Enterprises v MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd 
2011 (4) SA 577 (GSJ) for two recent civil law examples. 
32 Internet World Stats 2018 http://www.internetworldstats.com/africa.htm#za, roughly 53.7% of South Africa's 
population had Internet access as at December 2017. In 2008, the South African internet penetration rate was 
roughly 9%: This is remarkable growth in one decade.  
33 Admissibility and weight of electronic evidence is discussed above in chapter 5. 
34 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) para 4.17 at 50. 
35 Act 45 of 1988, particularly s 3 thereof.   
36 See the discussion above in chapter 2 and 3. 
 146 
alone. That being the case, the LSSA37 believe the current position is adequate, and that the 
standard of proof38 will accommodate any differences in civil and criminal matters, and state:  
evidence submitted in criminal or civil proceedings is essentially the same, but that ―the onus 
of proof … in criminal and civil matters … will differ. The yardstick is proof beyond reasonable 
doubt in criminal matters and a lower one in civil matters namely, a balance of probabilities. 
 
Accordingly, the LSSA believe it is not necessary to regulate the use and admissibility of 
electronic evidence outside the ECT Act.39  Similarly, the NPA are of the view that the current 
position is adequate and state: ‘There is no real reason why there should be a separate piece of 
legislation to provide for the admissibility of electronic evidence in criminal and civil 
proceedings outside the provisions of the ECT Act 25 of 2002.’40 
Conversely, Legal Aid South Africa41 believe that the current approach is fragmented 
and the common law inadequate, and that law ‘dealing with [electronic evidence] in a single 
piece of legislation is eminently desirable.’  It may well be desirable, but at this stage of South 
Africa’s jurisprudence relating to e-commerce and technology, it is probably not practical 
without further, more comprehensive review. 
Be that as it may, Advocate Eiselen, arguing on behalf of Nedbank and what the 
SALRC refer to as the banking industry42 in my view cogently summarises some of the key 
issues that require urgent attention: 
[T]here are good grounds for streamlining this part of the law of evidence by aligning the 
provisions of section 26-32 of the CPEA , section 221 of the CPA and section 15(4) of the ECT 
Act. We further submit that the approach contained in section 221 of the CPA and section 15(4) 
of the ECT Act is preferable to that contained in the CPEA. 
 
The current position – although slightly fragmented, and in need of amendment in certain areas 
is adequate for the time being.  For example, from S v Ndiki,43 the early seminal criminal case 
                                                             
37 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) para 4.18 at 51.  Law Society of South Africa ‘Comments to the South African Law Reform Commission 
in relation to issues raised in Discussion Paper 131: Review of the Law of Evidence’, available at 
http://lssa.org.za/upload/LSSA%20comments%20on%20SALRC%20Discussion%20Paper%20131%20LAw%20
of%20Evidence%2029%20July%202015.pdf at 1 – 3, accessed on 8 May 2017. 
38 See the discussion above in chapter 6 para 6.2. 
39 Law Society of South Africa ‘Comments to the South African Law Reform Commission in relation to issues 
raised in Discussion Paper 131: Review of the Law of Evidence’, available at 
http://lssa.org.za/upload/LSSA%20comments%20on%20SALRC%20Discussion%20Paper%20131%20LAw%20
of%20Evidence%2029%20July%202015.pdf at 3 – 4, accessed on 8 May 2017. 
40 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) para 4.21 at 51. 
41 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) para 4.19 at 51. 
42 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) para 4.119 at 75. 
43 [2007] 2 All SA 185 (Ck). Also reported as S v Ndiki 2008 (2) SACR 252 (Ck). 
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dealing with electronic evidence to the more recent cases of S v Brown,44 S v Meyer,45 and S v 
Miller,46 the current legislation has been no obstacle to courts receiving electronic evidence, 
and courts have adequately dealt with differing forms of electronic evidence.  Similarly, in civil 
courts, from Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services47 to the more recent LA Consortium 
& Vending CC v MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd,48 courts have adequately dealt with and 
received electronic evidence (although sometimes superficially, inconsistently, and often 
without sufficient detail in so far as its admissibility and weight are concerned).   
Since the promulgation of the ECT Act in 2002, there are no reported cases – civil or 
criminal – where the ECT Act (or related legislation) posed a specific impediment to the 
reception of electronic evidence.  Consequently, although the ECT Act is not perfect, it can 
certainly be said that is has achieved its goal of facilitating the admissibility of electronic 
evidence in civil and criminal proceedings.  Consequently, before introducing new concepts 
and legislation, a further review is necessary – and more time should elapse to allow the 
medium to develop and mature.  This would also allow the SALRC or any ECT review team 
to consider new cases and further international developments.  
The LSSA and NPA view should be supported – the ECT Act is adequate in the short-
term, but minor reform is required, including reform to related legislation, particularly: 
consistency with the term ‘document’ in the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act, and the Criminal 
Procedure Act.49  In addition, consideration must be given to the express inclusion of the term 
‘data message’ in appropriate legislation, such as: the Law of Evidence Amendment Act, the 
Civil Proceedings Evidence Act, the Criminal Procedure Act, the Uniform Rules of Court, and 
the Magistrates Court Act Rules.  Further, and as will be discussed further below,50 
consideration must be given to an amendment of court rules to specifically incorporate 
electronic discovery51 and discovery of meta data.52 
 
                                                             
44 Supra note 18. 
45 Supra note 31. 
46 Supra note 31. 
47 [2006] 4 All SA 165 (W). 
48 Supra note 31. 
49 The Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965 defines document as: ‘includes any book, map, plan, drawing 
or photograph.’  Conversely, s 221 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 defines document as: ‘includes any 
device by means of which information is recorded or stored.’  It is not sustainable that the civil definition of 
document is narrower than the criminal definition – this anomaly should be rectified. 
50 See para 7.3.11 below. 
51 B Hughes ‘The rise of electronic discovery’ De Rebus January/February 2012 at 24 – 26. 
52 F Cassim ‘The use of electronic discovery and cloud-computing technology by lawyers in practice: Lessons 
from abroad’ Journal for Juridical Science (2017) 42 (1) 21 – 23. 
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7.3.3 Should the current definition of “data message” in the Act be revised?  
Should the ECT Act include definitions of “electronic”, “copy”, and 
“original”? 
 
The current definition in the ECT Act reads as follows: 
‘data message’ means data generated, sent, received or stored by electronic means and includes-  
 
(a)  voice, where the voice is used in an automated transaction; and  
(b)  a stored record  
 
Conversely, the Cybercrimes Bill53 will define the term as: 
 
‘data message’ means data generated, sent, received or stored by electronic means, where any 
output of the data is in an intelligible form 
 
As discussed in chapter 2,54 according to s 58 of the Cybercrimes Bill, the term data message 
in the ECT Act will have a different meaning to that in the Bill – this will therefore lead to a 
situation where data message has two different definitions.  Granted, this could potentially have 
very little practical effect, but is it clearly not desirable, and either the Cybercrimes Bill should 
repeal the term ‘data message’ in section 1 of the ECT Act, or when Bill is promulgated, the 
final version should not include a definition for data message.  
 Some point out that the term data record may be preferable to data message55 – and 
although there is certainly merit in that argument, my view is that South Africa ought to 
exercise caution when moving away from internationally accepted terminology,56 and at the 
very least complete a review of the ECT Act before amending key definitions. That 
notwithstanding, the SALRC (referring to the ECT Act definition of ‘data message’) state:  
There is clearly concern around the inclusion of the term ―voice, where the voice is used in 
an automated transactionin the definition of data message, and there do not appear to be 
compelling reasons to retain the term in the definition. The SALRC therefore proposes that the 
term be deleted or amended. 
 
In relation to the proposed Cybercrimes Bill definition of ‘data message’, there is a 
potential concern in so far as the final part of the definition is concerned (the relevant portion 
reads: where any output of the data is in an intelligible form).  One should ask, when 
considering the admissibility of traditional evidence, is it necessary for that evidence to be in 
                                                             
53 Bill B6B – 2017. 
54 Para 2.2. 
55 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) para 4.23 – para 4.33 at 52- 53.   
56 Ibid at 53. 
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an intelligible form? As long as a document is relevant, it does not need to be intelligible as a 
condition to being admissible.  in light of functional equivalence, I would argue that a preferred 
definition of data message must exclude the additional requirement of the data being 
intelligible.  Granted, some may argue that this may mean a court has a proliferation of issues 
to deal with when potentially considering unintelligible data.  However, even if data message 
evidence is unintelligible, its admission may provide context or add a strand of cable to the 
narrative.57 Holistically, any definition should be neutral, concise and comply with functional 
equivalence where possible.   My suggestion is: ‘data message’ means data generated, sent, 
received or stored by electronic means.  
Consequently, my view is that the definition proposed by the Cybercrimes Bill is 
superior to the current ECT Act definition (even with the extra condition of intelligibility as it 
stands).  Accordingly, s 58 of the Cybercrimes Bill should be amended to include the repeal of 
the definition of data message in s 1 of the ECT Act to avoid conflicting definitions.  Ideally, 
the promulgated version of the Bill will also remove the condition of intelligibility from the 
definition of data message. 
In so far as further clarity on the meaning of ‘original’, ‘electronic’ and ‘copy’ – the 
ECT Act already deals comprehensively with an original.58  The section reads as follows: 
14. Original 
(1) Where a law requires information to be presented or retained in its original form, 
that requirement is met by a data message if – 
(a) the integrity of the information from the time when it was first generated in its final 
form as a data message or otherwise has passed assessment in terms of subsection (2); 
and 
(b) that information is capable of being displayed or produced to the person to whom 
it is to be presented. 
 
(2) For the purposes of subsection 1(a), the integrity must be assessed- 
(a) by considering whether the information has remained complete and unaltered, 
except for the addition of any endorsement and any change which arises in the normal 
course of communication, storage and display; 
(b) in the light of the purpose for which the information was generated; and 
(c) having regard to all other relevant circumstances. 
 
However, in S v Koralev,59 a matter in the Natal Provisional Division relating to child 
pornography, and offences in terms of the Films and Publications Act 65 of 1996, and the 
Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957, the court found that digital images were not original images: 
                                                             
57 A Paizes ‘The law of evidence: Seven wishes for the next twenty years’ (2014) 3 SACJ 281. 
58 Section 14 of the ECT Act.  See also, C Theophilopoulos ‘The admissibility of data, data messages, and 
electronic documents at trial’ (2015) 3 TSAR 468 – 470; Hofman op cit note 20 at 263 – 264. 
59 2006 2 SACR 298 (N). 
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‘we are also not in agreement with the finding by the learned magistrate that the images were 
'original' since [it was] common cause that they had been either downloaded from [the] Internet 
or transferred from a digital camera…’ and that ‘original images would be those contained in 
camera or in original source from which they had been loaded onto an Internet site.’60  This 
position is clearly incorrect. This interpretation61 does not take account of s 14 of the ECT Act 
– a digital image, in terms of s 14, will be regarded as an original if: a) the image’s integrity 
has been assessed;62 and b) the information is capable of being displayed.  A digital image is 
usually capable of being displayed.  The key issue in determining whether an image will be 
original is to ascertain whether: ‘the integrity of the information from the time when it was first 
generated… has passed assessment.’ Assessment, according to s 14 (2) requires considering all 
relevant factors, but specifically in s 14(2)(a): ‘considering whether the information has 
remained complete and unaltered, except for the addition of any endorsement and any change 
which arises in the normal course of communication, storage and display.’ As noted by S v 
Meyer63 when passing judgment in August 2017:  
 
Section 14 requires that the integrity of the information contained in the data message be 
assessed: has it remained complete and unaltered except for the addition or endorsements or 
changes which arise in the normal course of communication, storage or display… also … the 
information [must] be capable of being displayed or produced to the person to whom it is to be 
presented. 
In many instances a digital image should properly be considered original without it having to 
be on the original device. As pointed out by Zeffertt and Paizes,64 the decision in Koralev is 
‘difficult to reconcile’ with the Supreme Court of Appeal decision in Botha v S65 (and even 
more difficult to reconcile with recent cases, including Meyer discussed above).  In Botha, in 
the context of an attorney being convicted of fraud, forgery and uttering, the court found: 
For each charge, the State adduced documentary proof, sometimes the original documents and 
sometimes copies. Botha’s legal representative in the trial argued at length that no reliance 
                                                             
60 2006 2 SACR 298 (N) 307 – 308.  
61 S v Koralev 2006 (2) SACR 298 (N) was heard on 18 May 2006 – the judgment was delivered on 6 June 2006.  
The ECT Act was assented to on 31 July 2002 and commenced operation on 30 August 2002.   
62 Section 14 (1).  See also Meyer supra note 31 para 302.  
63 S v Meyer supra note 31 para 302. 
64 D Zeffertt and A Paizes Essential evidence (2010) 128.  As an aside, the reference used by the authors in this 
text at footnote 11 on page 128 contains a small anomaly.  It reads [2010] 2 All SA 116 (SCA) which refers to a 
Supreme Court of Appeal case – also Botha v S – but a matter that deals section 20 (1) of the Arbitration Act 42 
of 1965.  The editors of electronic law library LexisNexis appear to have made the same mistake (as have a number 
of other authors).  The correct neutral reference is Botha v S [2009] ZASCA 125 (29 September 2009) – it is 
available at http://www.justice.gov.za/sca/judgments/sca_2009/sca09-125.pdf, accessed 21 June 2018. 
65 Botha v S [2009] ZASCA 125 (29 September 2009) para 27. 
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could be placed on copies. But no evidence was adduced by him to show that they were not 
authentic copies. And since many of the documents were computer-generated it cannot be said 
that the documents were not the originals. While clearly it is preferable for original documents 
to be produced as evidence, where this is not possible or practicable, there is no reason, in the 
absence of countervailing evidence as to its lack of authenticity, not to accept it as the best 
evidence available... [my emphasis] 
 
This view is preferable as it allows a data message to be considered an original in terms of s 
14 of the ECT Act even where it is not the initial data message created.  For example, on the 
interpretation in Koralev, a data message can only be original if it is on the device (camera, 
phone etc.) – this view is clearly incompatible with s 14 of the ECT Act and an evolving digital 
environment.  However, in Botha v S,66 even though – surprisingly –  the ECT Act was not 
expressly referred to, the court’s opinion expressed above is compatible with s 14 of the ECT 
Act. 
 In the more recent S v Brown,67 the Western Cape Division of the High Court found 
that the ‘potential mutability and transient nature of images’ means it is better to treat digital 
images as documentary evidence rather than real evidence.  Be that as it may, the court applied 
section14 of the ECT Act and found:  
As regards the images being in their original form, s 14 of ECTA provides that a data message 
satisfies the requirements of original form if it meets the conditions in that section. These are, 
in short, that the integrity of the information, from the time when it was first generated  in its 
final form as a data message , has passed assessment in terms of s 14(2) and, secondly, that 
information is capable of being displayed or produced to the person to whom it is to be 
presented.68 
 
In my view, on a conspectus of this evidence, the requirements of original form and of s 14 of 
ECTA have been met. In any event, s 15(1)(b) of ECTA gives data messages a further 
exemption from the requirement of original form 'if it is the best evidence that the person 
adducing it could reasonably be expected to obtain'.69 
 
The more recent decisions in Meyer, Botha, and Brown,70  read together with the ECT Act, 
certainly mean that the term original is adequately dealt with at present. The SALRC appears 
to agree,71 and states: ‘given the existing provisions of the ECT Act regarding an ‘original’ and 
the ‘best evidence rule’, no further reform is proposed at this stage.  
                                                             
66 Ibid. 
67 S v Brown supra note 18 paras 19 – 22. 
68 Ibid at para 22. 
69 Ibid para 24. 
70 Supra note 31 above. 
71 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) para 4.39 at 55. 
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On copy and electronic, most agree a definition for ‘electronic’ is not required, but 
some72 propose the introduction of a definition for ‘copy’ in order to foster greater clarity and 
conceptual certainty.  What further conceptual clarity is required?  It appears courts and 
attorneys must first familiarise themselves with the ECT Act, together with information 
communication technology in general, before introducing definitions that may well be 
superfluous.  As noted by the LSSA, there is no pressing need for the introduction of new 
definitions at this stage;73  particularly in light of the fact there are no reported decisions (or 
any published South African litreture) suggesting that such a distinction is necessary, or even 
whether it is feasible.  As a result, before the introduction of new terms, some of which may 
conflict with internationally accepted terminology, the ECT Act and related legislation should 
first be comprehensively reviewed as outlined above in paragraph 7.3.1 and suggested by the 
SALRC. 
 
7.3.4 Should the ECT Act be amended to extend its sphere of application? 
 
Currently, s 4(3) and s 4(4) of the ECT Act provide certain exclusions from the operation of 
the ECT Act – these relate to four specific pieces of legislation: The Wills Act 7 of 1953; the 
Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981; the Bills of Exchange Act 34 of 1964; and the Stamp Duties 
Act 77 of 1968.   These exclusions, found in Schedule 2, relate to four items: i) the execution 
of wills; ii) the sale of immoveable property; iii) an agreement for the long-term lease of 
immovable property in excess of 20 years; and iv) the execution of a bill of exchange.   
Although this particular issue has largely fallen outside the scope of this research, for 
the sake of completeness, the SALRC questions whether the ECT Act should be amended to 
include the previously excluded pieces of legislation (although the Stamp Duties Act was 
mentioned as a possible area for extension, this legislation was repealed with effect from 1 
April 2009 and therefore cannot be included in the operation of the ECT Act).74   
                                                             
72 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) para 4.34 – 4.38 at 54 where the National Prosecuting Authority, Nedbank, and the South African Police 
Services argue that a definition for copy is required.  However, the Law Society of South Africa, and Legal Aid 
South Africa do not believe copy or electronic should be defined. 
73 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) para 4.36 at 54; Law Society of South Africa ‘Comments to the South African Law Reform Commission 
in relation to issues raised in Discussion Paper 131: Review of the Law of Evidence’, available at 
http://lssa.org.za/upload/LSSA%20comments%20on%20SALRC%20Discussion%20Paper%20131%20LAw%20
of%20Evidence%2029%20July%202015.pdf at 1 – 5, accessed on 8 May 2017. 
74 Section 103 of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 60 of 2008. 
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Certain submissions to the SALRC on this issue suggest a large amount of scepticism 
concerning electronic commerce in general, with the tone being that given the ‘high risks 
involved’75 the ‘excluded transactions mentioned in Schedule 2 should not be included in the 
ECT Act, at this stage of electronic commerce development.’76 However, other submissions – 
such as from the LSSA and Legal Aid South Africa – are more progressive and suggest that 
technological advances dictate that there should no longer be exclusions.  However, there is a 
cogent argument that wills should remain excluded from execution via data messages77 because 
of the fast-paced nature of ICT development; the LSSA note: 
Wills also have a potentially very long ‘shelf-life’. In this regard, the LSSA has also noted the 
reservations of some practitioners regarding the potential for even advanced security methods 
of signing documents to be exploited in the future. For example, where a document is signed 
with an advanced electronic signature today, practitioners have questioned whether that 
technology would still be relatively tamper proof in 30 to 40 years’ time (or would a future 
grandchild with a degree in Computer Science be able to easily decrypt the technology of 2015 
and alter the contents of his or her grandparent’s electronic will)? 
 
That objection notwithstanding, provided a data message is properly authenticated,78 then a 
person should be able to execute a will, enter in an agreement for a long-lease, enter into an 
agreement for the sale of immoveable property, and to execute a bill of exchange, as the case 
may be, with a data message.  Consequently, in order to ensure equal treatment of mediums, 
the scope of the ECT Act should be extended.79  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
75 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) para 4.41 at 55. 
76 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) para 4.42 at 56. 
77 Law Society of South Africa ‘Comments to the South African Law Reform Commission in relation to issues 
raised in Discussion Paper 131: Review of the Law of Evidence’, available at 
http://lssa.org.za/upload/LSSA%20comments%20on%20SALRC%20Discussion%20Paper%20131%20LAw%20
of%20Evidence%2029%20July%202015.pdf at 5 – 7, accessed on 8 May 2017. 
78 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) para 5.14 at 84 where the SALRC state key concerns ‘revolve around issues of authentication and 
reliability’. 
79 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) para 4.42 at 56 where the Law Society of South Africa also believe the ECT Act’s application should be 
extended.  
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7.3.5 Should the distinction between “advanced electronic signature” and 
“electronic signature” be abolished in the ECT Act? 
 
Although this issue has fallen outside the scope of this research, it has been explored three80 
times in recent peer-reviewed publications in South Africa. Some 16 years after the 
promulgation of the ECT Act, the advanced electronic signature remains a white elephant: rare 
and cumbersome.81  Its high barrier to entry – together with prohibitive accreditation processes 
– means that all but a few elite corporate entities will ever use an advanced electronic 
signatures.  A pilot project in 2014 to 2015 which saw the roll-out of advanced electronic 
signatures to certain attorneys in Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal also appears to have failed 
spectacularly.82 A number of responses to the SALRC recommend the abolition of the 
distinction between advanced electronic signature and electronic signature.83   
In Spring Forest Trading v Wilberry (Pty) Ltd,84 the Supreme Court of Appeal had 
occasion to deal with the distinction between electronic signatures and advanced electronic 
signatures, and described an electronic signature as follows: 
 
The Act describes an electronic signature – which is not to be confused with an advanced 
electronic signature – as ‘data attached to, incorporated in, or logically associated with other 
data and which is intended by the user to serve as a signature’. Put simply, so long as the ‘data’ 
in an email is intended by the user to serve as a signature and is logically connected with other 
data in the email the requirement for an electronic signature is satisfied. This description 
accords with the practical and non-formalistic way the courts have treated the signature 
requirement at common law.  
 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Appeal found that a person’s name, typed at the end of an e-
mail (such as, for example: Sincerely, Bob Marley) will constitute a signature for purposes of 
s 13(3) of the ECT Act.85  
                                                             
80 S Eiselen ‘Fiddling with the ECT Act – Electronic Signatures’ (2014) 17(6) Potchefstroom Electronic Law 
Journal 2805-2820; Y Mupangavanhu ‘Electronic signatures and non-variation clauses in the modern digital 
world: The case of South Africa’ (2016) SALJ 133 (4) 853-873; L Swales ‘The Regulation of Electronic 
Signatures: Time for Review and Amendment’ (2015) 132 (2) SALJ 257-270. See also Spring Forest Trading 599 
CC v Wilberry (Pty) Ltd t/a Ecowash 2015 (2) SA 118 (SCA) para 27 – 29. 
81 Eiselen op cit note 80 at 2814. 
82 These views are my own and based on participation in this project as a consultant attorney for a Durban law 
firm in 2014 – 2015.  I was also a member of the Law Society of South Africa e-law committee from 2012 to 
2015 which managed this project. 
83 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) para 4.46 – 4.65 at 57 – 60.  
84 2015 (2) SA 118 (SCA). 
85 Ibid para 28. 
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The SALRC recommends that the ECT Act review panel discussed above review this 
issue, together with biometric technology.  Electronic signatures have received extensive 
attention by the LSSA,86 who are scathing in their criticism of the manner in which the ECT 
Act regulates the issue by stating:  
when dealing with electronic signatures and the concept of advanced electronic signatures, the 
drafters of the ECT Act misunderstood the issues.  
 
Be that as it may, as I stated elsewhere in 2015,87 the distinction in the ECT Act ought to be 
abolished, and if necessary, certification and authentication to be dealt with in secondary law 
such as regulations to the ECT Act.  
 
7.3.6 Should section 15 of the ECT Act prescribe that a data message is automatically 
admissible as evidence in terms of section 15(2) and a court’s discretion merely 
relates to an assessment of evidential weight based on the factors enumerated 
in section 15(3)?  
 
Should a “data message” constitute hearsay88 within the meaning of section 3 
of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act? 
 
As discussed above,89 in terms of the ECT Act a data message is certainly not automatically 
admissible – nor should it be.  This approach would destroy any semblance of functional 
equivalence.90  Our courts have accepted – universally – that s 15 of the ECT Act correctly 
interpreted does not exempt data messages from the rules regulating hearsay.91   
 
As to the question of whether a data message should constitute hearsay in terms of the 
Law of Evidence Amendment Act,92 in LA Consortium,93 a full bench of the South Gauteng 
                                                             
86 Law Society of South Africa ‘Comments to the South African Law Reform Commission in relation to issues 
raised in Discussion Paper 131: Review of the Law of Evidence’, available at 
http://lssa.org.za/upload/LSSA%20comments%20on%20SALRC%20Discussion%20Paper%20131%20LAw%20
of%20Evidence%2029%20July%202015.pdf at 8 – 16, accessed on 8 May 2017. 
87 Swales SALJ op cit note 80 at 269 – 270. 
88 See the discussion in chapter 2 above.      
89 Chapter 5 para 5.4. 
90 Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services supra note 47 at 173 – 174; LA Consortium supra note 31 para 11 – 
15; S v Brown supra note 31 at para 18; S v Meyer supra note 31 at para 299; South African Law Reform 
Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence (2014) para 4.68 at 63. 
91 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) para 4.69 at 63 where the seminal Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services is cited as authority.   
92 Act 45 of 1988. 
93 LA Consortium supra note 31 para 13. 
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High Court answered conclusively: ‘[A]ny hearsay contained in a data message must pass the 
criteria set out in section 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988.’  As noted 
above,94 if data messages were to be exempt from the rules regulating hearsay this would 
clearly elevate electronic forms of evidence over other traditional forms of evidence.95  All 
courts and commentators are ad idem that if a data message depends upon the credibility of a 
person, it must be considered hearsay.  This follows from the definition in the Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act,96 which defines hearsay as: ‘[E]vidence, whether oral or in writing, the 
probative value of which depends upon the credibility of any person other than the person 
giving such evidence’ [my emphasis].   
Consequently, where the credibility of data message evidence does not depend on a 
person – for example in automated telephone records97– it cannot be subject to hearsay 
considerations. Theophilopolous points out98 that these distinctions created in Ndiki99 and 
Ndlovu100 (using terminology derived from the Law of Evidence Amendment Act) are 
problematic because they are ambiguous.101 Ambiguity and the precise choice of terms 
notwithstanding, a survey of the international position102 suggests that a distinction between 
automated computer output (akin to real evidence) and computer output subject to hearsay 
(akin to documentary hearsay) is necessary.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
94 See the discussion in chapter 3 para 3.4.  
95 S v Brown supra note 31 para 16 – 18; Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services supra note 47 at 172. 
96 Section 3 of Act 45 of 1988. 
97 Ex parte Rosch [1998] 1 All SA 319 (W) 328 where telephone records were admitted as real evidence.  The 
court notes: ‘The printout is real evidence in the sense that it came about automatically and not as result of any 
input of information by a human being. There is therefore no room for dishonesty or human error. The printout in 
the present case is similar to the radar diagram produced in the English case of The Statue of Liberty: Owners of 
the Motorship Sapporo Maro v Owner of Steam Tanker, Statue of Liberty [1968] 2 All ER 195 (PDA) where such 
a document was admitted as evidence’. In a South African context, see S v Ndiki supra note 43 para 7; S v Brown 
supra note 31 at para 18. 
98 Theophilopolous op cit note 58 at 474. 
99 S v Ndiki supra note 43. 
100 Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services supra note 47. 
101 Theophilopolous op cit note 58 at 474. 
102 Discussed above in chapter 3. 
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7.3.7 Should the ECT Act (or other relevant legislation) make a clear distinction 
between mechanically produced evidence without the intervention of the human 
mind (akin to real evidence) and mechanically produced evidence with the 
intervention of the human mind (hearsay)?103  
There is no clear consensus on how to treat data produced by a largely automated process; as 
pointed out by the SALRC: ‘There is less consensus… on the approach to be followed when 
the probative value of a statement in a printout is dependent upon the “credibility” of the 
computer itself.’   
As recently pointed out in the Western Cape High Court by Bozalek J in S v Brown:104 ‘the 
admissibility of an electronic communication will depend, to no small extent, on whether it is 
treated as an object (real evidence) or as a document.’ Crucially, when considering the 
distinction between real and documentary electronic evidence, the court in Ndiki105 referred to 
a 1998 academic article by Bilchitz106 and suggested  obiter, that because it may be difficult to 
make the distinction between real and documentary electronic evidence at times, all computer 
output should be regarded hearsay. The court noted that if all electronic evidence were hearsay, 
then: 
 
It does away with the necessity to distinguish in each case between what would constitute 
hearsay evidence and what real evidence, a task that is not always without its difficulties. I do 
not, however, find it necessary for purposes of this judgment to make any finding in this regard. 
 
This obiter statement notwithstanding, it must be borne in mind that Ndiki is also clear authority 
for the proposition that automated data message evidence should be classified as real 
evidence.107  
In LA Consortium,108 the court was faced with what will probably be the norm in many 
civil and criminal trials involving data message evidence: a combination of automated data 
messages with no human input, and hearsay data messages where the credibility of the data 
depends on a person.  The court noted: ‘The data messages relied upon in this case are not only 
                                                             
103 See the discussion in chapter 2 and 3 above.  
104 S v Brown supra note 18 para 18. 
105 S v Ndiki supra note 43. 
106 D Bilchitz ‘Law of Evidence’ in C Lewis et al (eds) Annual Survey of South African Law (1998) 735-821.  See 
also Hofman & de Jager op cit note 17 at 776 – 777; Theophilopoulos op cit note 58 at 464. 
107 S v Ndiki supra note 43 para 7. 
108 LA Consortium supra note 31 para 12. 
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real evidence but includes hearsay’ and that ‘[t]he definition of 'data message' in s 1 [of the 
ECT Act] is sufficiently wide to include not only real, but also hearsay evidence.’109 
As discussed above in chapter 3, the position that all computer-generated evidence is 
hearsay is not consistent with South African case law,110 and international best practice111 
where data messages are routinely categorised as real evidence if the data message is automated 
and requires substantially no human input.  Ultimately, in a South African context, although it 
is clear that a distinction should be made between automated data messages and data messages 
subject to human input, the question as to how to best achieve this remains unanswered. For 
the short term, it is prudent for the ECT Review committee referred to above to consider this 
issue with a mandate to determine how best to achieve this distinction.  As I see it, there are no 
alarming issues present at the moment, and the distinction can be achieved within the current 
legal framework (leaving a measure of interpretation to the judiciary when a particular court 
determines whether evidence is admissible or not).  
Moreover, the SALRC112 notes that a handbook on obtaining and producing electronic 
evidence will provide clarity for practitioners and judicial officers. This recommendation is 
sensible, and the ECT Review committee ought to delegate this task to the appropriate persons 
or group. 
7.3.8 In view of the fragmented nature of case law focusing on authentication of 
specific types of evidence, is a review of the principle of authentication 
necessary in view of the nature and characteristics of electronic evidence that 
raise legitimate concerns about its accuracy and authenticity? 
The SALRC is of the view that the ECT Act is somewhat ‘laconic’ on best practice and 
international standards.113 It should be stressed that both the LSSA114 and the NPA115 assert 
                                                             
109 Ibid. 
110 For example, see the cases cited in note 31 above.  See also S v Ndiki supra note 43 para 7 where the ratio finds 
that computer generated evidence can be real in nature if it ‘depends solely upon the reliability and accuracy of 
the computer itself.’ 
111 Chapter 3 para 3.7 above. 
112 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) para 4.104 at 70. 
113 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) para 4.109 at 72. 
114 Law Society of South Africa ‘Comments to the South African Law Reform Commission in relation to issues 
raised in Discussion Paper 131: Review of the Law of Evidence’, available at 
http://lssa.org.za/upload/LSSA%20comments%20on%20SALRC%20Discussion%20Paper%20131%20LAw%20
of%20Evidence%2029%20July%202015.pdf at 19 – 21, accessed on 8 May 2017.  
115 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) para 4.21 at 51 where the NPA states: ‘There is no real reason why there should be a separate piece 
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that a new Law of Evidence Bill is not necessary at present.  The LSSA points out: ‘The 
granularity that may be desirable should rather be dealt with in secondary law, for instance 
regulations or rules of court.’  The LSSA argues that courts should develop and test authenticity 
further as required.116 The position of the LSSA and NPA is far more desirable in the short 
term while electronic evidence (and the manner in which local and international courts deal 
with the various issues) matures further.  Additional case law and academic opinion will point 
out lacunas or issues that require urgent attention. In the short term, the current position is 
satisfactory in that a court will be seized with determining whether a data message is authentic 
(using its discretion to determine authorship).  For example, in S v Meyer,117 the court noted: 
The ECT Act does not attempt to enumerate any specific criteria that should be applied, this is 
due to the fact that there are different types of data messages so it would be difficult to formulate 
prerequisites for authentication which would apply to all types. 
As discussed above,118 in Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services,119 when dealing with 
data messages, the court interpreted the requirement of authenticity to mean ‘proof that a 
document was written or executed by the person who purports to have done so’.120  Most 
academic opinion suggests that authenticity relates to tendering evidence relating to 
authorship.121  As a result, in S v Meyer,122 the court again confirmed that authenticity relates 
to evidence as to the authorship of the particular data message.  Further, it is submitted that a 
party ought to also adduce evidence that identifies the use of software and/or manual 
methodologies that prevented the data from being altered prior to its presentation to court.123 
The fragmented case law notwithstanding, there is no reported decision (post the promulgation 
of the ECT Act) in which authentication has proved a particular issue for courts who will often 
rely on expert evidence. Consequently, for the short-term, other than guidelines for 
                                                             
of legislation to provide for the admissibility of electronic evidence in criminal and civil proceedings outside the 
provisions of the ECT Act’. 
116 Law Society of South Africa ‘Comments to the South African Law Reform Commission in relation to issues 
raised in Discussion Paper 131: Review of the Law of Evidence’, available at 
http://lssa.org.za/upload/LSSA%20comments%20on%20SALRC%20Discussion%20Paper%20131%20LAw%20
of%20Evidence%2029%20July%202015.pdf at 19 – 21, accessed on 8 May 2017.    
117 S v Meyer supra note 31 para 306. 
118 See chapter 5 above.  
119 Supra note 31 at 174. 
120 S v Brown supra note 18 para 19 - 22. 
121 Schwikkard & van der Merwe op cit note 17 at 434 – 435; Zeffertt and Paizes op cit note 17 at 837 – 838; R 
Davey & L Dahms-Jansen Social Media in the Workplace (2017) at 290. 
122 S v Meyer op cit note 31 para 306. 
123 S v Meyer op cit note 31 para 305.  See also South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 
(Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence (2014) para 4.105 – 4.115 at 70 – 74 for issue 8, a discussion of 
authentication. See further, Ireland Law Reform Commission Consultation Paper 57 Documentary and Electronic 
Evidence (2009) at 141 – 146 for a discussion of authentication in the context of electronic evidence.  
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practitioners and judicial officers (and amendment to existing legislation as noted above) the 
position is adequate. 
7.3.9 Should section 15(4) be reviewed to give a restrictive interpretation to the words 
“in the ordinary course of business”? 
Should section 15(4) as applicable in criminal cases be reviewed in view of the 
current law on reverse onus provisions? 
As discussed above,124 section 15(4) has been described by a full bench of the South Gauteng 
High Court as ‘controversial’.125 In the court a quo, in MTN Service Provider (Pty) Limited v 
LA Consoritum & Vending CC,126 print-outs from accounting software were declared 
admissible in terms of section 15(4) of the ECT Act.  However, on appeal, in LA Consortium127 
the South Gauteng High Court took a different view.  Although the print-outs were ultimately 
admissible, the appeal court in Johannesburg held that any hearsay contained in a data message 
must be admitted to court via an exception contained in s 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment 
Act. In my view, this interpretation does not take account of the literal wording of section 15(4) 
which appears to be an intentional step by South Africa’s legislature to subjugate the hearsay 
rule with an internationally acceptable (and common-place) business records exception.    
In so far as the SALRC proposals are concerned, the recommendation is the repeal of 
section 15(4) and the introduction of a new piece of legislation.  Regarding a restrictive 
interpretation128 on the phrase ‘ordinary course of business’, both the LSSA and the NPA adopt 
a pragmatic and common-sense approach with their suggestions.  The LSSA are of the view 
that a restrictive interpretation is not necessary, and that it may ‘hamper electronic commerce’.  
Further, it is clear that the onus or proof129 (read together with our flexible common law 
approach) will accommodate the inherent differences between civil and criminal proceedings 
– as noted by the SALRC, ‘the NPA expresses a similar view to that of the LSSA.’130 In 
                                                             
124 See chapter 3 para 3.5.4 above. 
125 LA Consortium op cit note 31 para 18.   
126 2011 (4) SA 562 (W). 
127 LA Consortium op cit note 31. See also Hofman & de Jager op cit note 17 at para 18.26 at 772 – 774.    
128 This would keep s 15(4) intact, but enjoin courts to interpret the provisions in a restrictive manner.   
129 Discussed above in detail in chapter 6 para 6.2.    
130 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) para 4.118 at 75. 
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addition, on behalf of Nedbank, it is suggested that s 15(4) should not be given a restrictive 
interpretation, nor should it be reviewed.131  
Conversely, Legal Aid and the South African Police Services believe s 15(4) may be 
unconstitutional as it creates a ‘reverse onus’.132 A reverse-onus provision is one where, 
according to the Constitutional Court in S v Zuma,133 a ‘presumption with the legal burden of 
rebuttal on the accused’ is created.  Are all reverse-onus provisions unconstitutional?  The 
Constitutional Court134 in S v Bhulwana135 rejected the notion that a reverse-onus provision 
could be ‘read down’ to an evidential presumption.  However, the Constitutional Court when 
considering this issue for the first time in the seminal case of Zuma136 noted that reverse-onus 
provisions are not automatically unconstitutional,137 and noted: 
[This judgment] does not decide that all statutory provisions which create  presumptions in 
criminal cases are invalid. This Court recognises the pressing social need for the effective 
prosecution of crime, and that in some cases the prosecution may require reasonable 
presumptions to assist it in this task. Presumptions are of different types. Some are no more 
than evidential presumptions, which give certain prosecution evidence the  status of prima facie 
proof, requiring the accused to do no more than produce credible evidence which casts doubt 
on the prima facie proof. 
Although a reverse-onus clause may survive constitutional scrutiny in certain limited instances, 
for the most part, the Constitutional Court has been consistent138 in its finding that these types 
of clauses offend the presumption of innocence.  Paizes suggests139 that in criminal matters, 
these types of reverse onus clauses should never operate and opines as follows:  
It is my wish, in short, that the courts recognise the foundational nature of the proposition that 
the onus should rest on the state and, moreover, treat it as an absolute rule permitting of no 
exceptions. Absolute rules are out of fashion in our post-constitutional culture. But there is a 
place, in my view, for at least this one. 
                                                             
131 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) para 4.119 at 75. 
132 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) para 4.120 – 4.121 at 76. 
133 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) para 19. 
134 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 189 – 190.  
135 1996 (1) SA 388 (CC) para 25–29.   
136 Supra note 133. 
137 Supra note 133 para 40. 
138 1996 (2) SA 464 (CC) para 10. See also Currie & de Waal op cit note 159 at 758.   
139 Paizes op cit note 57 at 278. 
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However, the question remains whether s 15(4), in criminal matters, is a justifiable limitation 
of the presumption of innocence.140  For example, in S v Meaker141 a reverse onus provision in 
the Road Traffic Act 29 of 1989 was found to be a permissible departure – in terms of s 36 of 
the Bill of Rights – from the presumption of innocence.142 However, holistically, given the 
Constitutional Court’s jealous protection of the presumption of innocence, jurisprudence since 
the first reverse onus case of Zuma in 1995 suggests that a provision of the nature of s15(4) in 
criminal cases is unlikely to be justifiable in terms of s 36 of the Bill of Rights.  Academic 
opinion appears to favour an approach that s 15(4) should not apply to criminal matters.143 
In summary, in so far as s 15(4) of the ECT is concerned, holistically, the hearsay 
exceptions should be better aligned and the Law of Evidence Amendment Act, the Civil 
Proceedings Evidence Act, and the Criminal Procedure Act must be amended to make specific 
reference to data messages: consequently, amendment is certainly required in some areas,144 
but as pointed out above, a review of recent case law and foreign developments suggest that 
the current regulatory regime is satisfactory, and the drastic reform suggested by the SALRC 
is not required at this time; the approach put forward by the LSSA, the NPA, and the banking 
industry should be preferred.  
7.3.10 Should the law of evidence prescribe a presumption of regularity in relation to 
mechanical devices (involving automated operations such as speedometers and 
breath-testing devices)?  
As discussed above,145 in Trustees for the time Being of the Delsheray Trust v ABSA Bank 
Limited146 the Western Cape High Court found: a ‘presumption [of reliability] is not generally 
applied in South African case law … but the underlying principles … are indeed established.’ 
It based this decision on an Appellate Division case in relation to judicial notice.147  Rather 
than a flexible common law approach, the SALRC suggest a statutory presumption of 
                                                             
140 Paizes op cit note 57 at 275; Currie & de Waal op cit note 159 at 756. 
141 1998 (2) SACR 73 (W). 
142 See also S v Manamela 2000 (1) SACR 414 (CC) where a divided Constitutional Court bench considered 
reverse onus provisions. 
143 Hofman op cit note 20 at 267 – 268; Theophilopolous op cit note 58 at 476; Hofman & De Jager op cit note 17 
at 780 – 781; Paizes op cit note 57 at 273 – 278. 
144 My findings are summarised below in chapter 8 para 8.2. 
145 See chapter 4 para 4.5. 
146 [2014] 4 All SA 748 (WCC). 
147 S v Mthimkulu 1975 (4) SA 759 (A). 
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reliability applicable to only civil law.148  The current legal position, reading in the common 
law should be preferred over these proposed amendments. South Africa ought to only 
implement law reform that applies to both civil and criminal proceedings. In the short term, the 
ECT Act, read together with the common law, is far superior to the proposed SALRC reforms 
which will leave a lacuna in relation to the regulation of criminal law in this context, and 
potentially introduce confusion to civil proceedings.   
7.3.11 In general, are the provisions in the ECT Act sufficient to regulate the 
admissibility of computer generated evidence?  
In general, the banking industry appear satisfied with ECT Act.  Advocate Eiselen, on behalf 
of Nedbank, 149 concludes: 
We submit that in general the provisions of the ECT Act have proven to be effective and 
sufficient to regulate the admissibility of electronic evidence. We submit that there may be a 
need for some smaller amendments to the Act, especially in regard to section 13 dealing with 
electronic signatures. 
Holistically, the LSSA also appear satisfied with the ECT Act,150 but insist on minor 
amendment and further amendment to the rules of court (to be discussed below): 
The LSSA is of the view that the ECT Act is sufficient to regulate the admissibility of computer 
generated evidence. However, the LSSA also supports the recommendation that the Rules 
Board consider amendments to the rules of court to provide for the discovery and inspection of 
electronic documents and submits that such revisions would greatly promote the administration 
of justice. 
A private company Infology151 further raises a valid issue relating to discovery by noting an 
issue in relation to metadata:152 
                                                             
148 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) para 4.125 – 4.133 at 78 – 79.  The provisions of the proposed Law of Evidence Bill are discussed below 
at para 7.4. 
149 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) para 4.135 at 80. 
150 Law Society of South Africa ‘Comments to the South African Law Reform Commission in relation to issues 
raised in Discussion Paper 131: Review of the Law of Evidence’, available at 
http://lssa.org.za/upload/LSSA%20comments%20on%20SALRC%20Discussion%20Paper%20131%20LAw%20
of%20Evidence%2029%20July%202015.pdf at 26, accessed on 8 May 2017. 
151 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) para 4.139 at 81. 
152 According to an Internet version of the Oxford English Dictionary, metadata is defined as:  ‘A set of data that 
describes and gives information about other data.’ https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/metadata, 
accessed on 12 May 2018.   For example, metadata on a word document will reveal when it was created (which 
may reveal whether it was used on a Macintosh or Windows machine), when it was last modified, when it was 
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 A printed copy of a data message ―would lack the embedded information [metadata] 
normally retained in an electronic copy that evidences when, and by whom, the document was 
originally created, whether it was revised or edited, to whom it may have been sent and when 
it was received  
Consequently, when assessing data messages, it can be said that metadata must be analysed  to 
reach a credible result. Although the ECT Act makes provision for an original, and creates a 
statutory best-evidence rule, the rules relating to discovery require amendment, and in this 
context, the SALRC state: 
Infology refers to legislation and rules regulating the discovery and production of evidence, in 
particular Rule 35 of the Uniform Rules applicable to the High Court. Rule 35 regulates such 
discovery and inspection, but does not expressly address the manner or format in which 
discovered documents must be produced, except at the hearing of a matter where the original 
may be required by a party to the proceedings. The production of an original data message is 
further circumscribed by section 14 of the ECT Act, read with section 4(2)(a). Infology argues 
that there are significant shortcomings in the procedural rules regulating the discovery and 
production of electronically stored evidence. 
The South Gauteng High Court in Johannesburg153 notes: 
The purpose of discovery is to enable the parties to become aware of documentary evidence 
that is available and to identify factual issues. In addition, discovery results in the production 
of documents that can be used in the course of interrogation of witnesses. 
 Cassim154 further points out that the purpose of discovery is to ensure that parties to 
proceedings are aware of all relevant information or documentation that exists prior to any trial  
so that parties can prepare properly.155  It is undeniable that information communication 
technologies have changed the way society interacts and the law must adapt.156 Part of this 
adaption must entail the appropriate and adequate discovery of information stored 
electronically. However, currently, the rules relating to discovery require further and direct 
amendment to accommodate full and proper discovery; and for the production of metadata 
where appropriate.  Many lawyers still – in 2018 –  ‘drown unnecessarily in seas of paper’.157 
                                                             
last opened, where it was stored, its size, access permissions, and potentially, a host of other useful information 
(the document I am typing in, for example, was created on 3 April 2018 on a Macintosh machine – one can also 
determine the date it was last modified and various other critical pieces of information.  Furthermore, on a PDF 
(portable document format), one is able to determine the total number of pages in the file, whether it is encrypted,  
encoding software, and when the document was last opened. 
153 STT Sales (Pty) Ltd v Fourie 2010 BIP 298 (GSJ) para 14. 
154 Cassim op cit note 52 at 20. 
155 Ibid.  
156 R Susskind The End of Lawyers? Rethinking the Nature of Legal Services (2010) at 1. 
157 Hughes op cit note 51. 
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The advantages and efficiencies of electronic discovery are numerous, and as Hughes correctly 
notes: 
Ask a lawyer a meaningless factual question like what the weight of the largest pumpkin ever 
grown is and he would probably be able to turn to the internet to produce the correct answer 
within 60 seconds. Why then should a lawyer take any longer to determine more important 
facts, like whether a potentially relevant document exists within his client’s documentary 
records? Electronic information management rewards practitioners with significant efficiency 
benefits that clients have come to appreciate and are now beginning to expect. 
However,  as noted by Cassim, there are many perceived problems with electronic discovery, 
including: ‘[T]he huge volume and number of data messages; the problem of metadata; the 
changing status of electronic contents; the impact of technological changes on data; the use of 
different locations of electronic data, and the expenses involved’.158 
Be that as it may, Rule 35 of the Uniform Rules of Court still refers to ‘tape recordings’.  
This should be replaced with data messages.  Moreover, Rule 35 should include provision for 
the mandatory production of metadata as part of the discovery process.  If a party to 
proceedings is of the reasonable view that full and proper metadata has not been disclosed, 
courts should be able to direct the other party to properly discover.  Although recent cases 
interpret ‘tape recordings’ and documents widely,159 direct reference should be made to data 
messages.  
In Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd160 the court found that electronic documents fell within 
the scope of discovery of Rule 35 of the Uniform Rules of Court, and this finding illustrates 
how courts have adapted legislation designed in a time before computer technology to fit the 
needs of society today.  As a result of outdated terminology in the court rules, Infology makes 
the following recommendation in the context of electronic discovery:161  
[Substitute] the phrase “documents and tape recordings” with the phrase “documents and tape 
recordings including electronically stored information and related metadata”;  
 
inserting the following words at the end of section 35(2)(a): ―…and the manner in which such 
documents and tape recordings are retained including, in the case of electronically stored 
information, the electronic file formats in which they are retained”; and  
 
                                                             
158 Cassim op cit note 52 at 22 – 23. 
159 Cassim op cit note 52 at at 26. 
160 2014 (1) SA 191 (GSJ). 
161 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) para 4.139 at 81. 
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inserting the words ― “in a format reasonably specified by such party or, if not so specified, in 
the form in which they are ordinarily retained or another reasonably usable form” after the 
words “make available for inspection” in Rule 35(6). 
Rule 35(1) currently reads: 
(1) Any party to any action may require any other party thereto, by notice in writing, to make 
discovery on oath within twenty days of all documents and tape recordings relating to any 
matter in question in such action …  
 
In these critical court rules, ‘documents and tape recordings’ should be replaced with 
documents and data messages.  As discussed above162 the definition of data messages is wide 
enough to include all electronically stored information.  Moreover, all instances of ‘tape 
recordings’ should be replaced with ‘data message’, and as Infology suggests above, the 
mandatory production of metadata (although I suggest different terms – the use of the term tape 
recordings is archaic and should be removed).  Finally, provision must be made for parties to 
inspect data messages, and data message systems that may potentially hold metadata. 
In respect of the magistrates’ courts,  Rule 23 of the Magistrates Court Act 32 of 1944 
reads as follows: 
(1) (a) Any party to any action may require any other party thereto, by notice in writing, to make 
discovery on oath within 20 days of all documents and tape, electronic, digital or other forms of 
recordings relating to any matter in question in such action... [my emphasis]. 
 
It together with the High Court Rule 23 ought to be amended to remove reference to ‘tape 
recordings’, and to include ‘data messages’.  Moreover, once data messages is inserted in Rule 
23 the superfluous phrase ‘electronic, digital or other forms of recordings’ may also be 
removed.   
As with the High Court Rules, two further amendments are crucial: 1) the mandatory provision 
of metadata in discovery; and 2) provision for parties to inspect data messages (and/or data 
message systems where appropriate). 
 The SALRC recommend that the Rules Board for Courts of Law163 assisted by a 
standing committee or working group assess amendments to the rules of court that may be 
required.  This proposal should be supported and implemented as soon as possible.   
 
 
 
                                                             
162 See chapter 2 para 2.1 above. 
163 A statutory body established in terms of Rules Board for Courts of Law Act 107 of 1985. 
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7.3.12 Overview of law reform  
 
The SALRC  is correct that law reform is desirable in this environment – but my view 
is that instead of reform in the guise of a new Law of Evidence Bill, South Africa ought to 
rather adopt a more pragmatic approach and retain the current regime with reform of current 
legislation to foster greater clarity and consistency.  These issues are immensely complicated, 
carry great importance for commerce and evidence in general, and there are no straight forward 
answers. Before implementing drastic reform, South Africa ought to adopt a ‘wait-and-see’ 
approach: the current position is adequate (with minor reform of the current relevant 
legislation), and a more comprehensive review is ideally required before implementing drastic 
law reform.  This  approach will allow South Africa a further period of two to five years to 
monitor international trends,164 and follow the development of emerging jurisprudence in this 
rapidly-developing area. 
As noted by the Law Society of South Africa in its scathing criticism of Discussion 
Paper 131: Review of the Law of Evidence, an ‘abundance of caution’165 is required before 
drastic reform.  The LSSA support the retention of the current regulatory landscape, with minor 
reform. Moreover, that a further comprehensive review of the ECT Act be conducted.  
South Africa should be cautious when deviating from the Model Law, 1996 and must have 
cogent reasons to do so, particularly where such change does not appear to be supported by the 
majority. Electronic evidence covers ‘every nook and cranny of our daily lives’ and South 
Africa must ensure ‘harmonisation of our law with developments in other countries’.166 
Moreover: 
there are vast tracts of the ECT Act, not based on the Model Law, which were ill-conceived 
at the time of inception, have never been implemented and should be dealt with by other 
entities within government.167 
                                                             
164  For example, see the discussion in paragraph 5.4.2 above where it is concluded that South Africa should: reject 
the notion that all electronic evidence is hearsay; confirm that electronic evidence is not automatically admissible; 
and confirm that all electronic evidence (real or documentary) should be subject to authentication (prima facie 
proof that the evidence is what it purports to be). 
165 Law Society of South Africa ‘Comments to the South African Law Reform Commission in relation to issues 
raised in Discussion Paper 131: Review of the Law of Evidence’, available at 
http://lssa.org.za/upload/LSSA%20comments%20on%20SALRC%20Discussion%20Paper%20131%20LAw%20
of%20Evidence%2029%20July%202015.pdf at 34, accessed on 8 May 2017.  
166 Law Society of South Africa ‘Comments to the South African Law Reform Commission in relation to issues 
raised in Discussion Paper 131: Review of the Law of Evidence’, available at 
http://lssa.org.za/upload/LSSA%20comments%20on%20SALRC%20Discussion%20Paper%20131%20LAw%20
of%20Evidence%2029%20July%202015.pdf at 2 - 3, accessed on 8 May 2017.  
167 Ibid 2 – 3. 
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Simply put: to answer the overall question posed by the SALRC in terms of the adequacy of 
the ECT Act and its ability to regulate the admissibility of computer generated evidence, in 
general, the ECT Act is sufficient in the short term.  However, there are several areas that 
require amendment to foster greater consistency, clarity, and certainty.   
7.4 AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED LAW OF EVIDENCE BILL 
 
It is necessary to consider the Law of Evidence Bill proposed by the SALRC,168 which is 
intended to clarify, consolidate and align the rules for the admissibility of business records and 
electronic evidence, while leaving certain other existing legislation in tact. For example,  the 
admissibility of official and public documents.  It is express that the common law applies where 
appropriate. Contrary to the stated aim of the Law of Evidence Bill, for reasons set out below, 
the intended legislation requires further consideration, and should be held in abeyance until at 
least a comprehensive review of the ECT Act as envisioned in issue 1 of the SALRC Discussion 
Paper 131 has been completed by a diverse, multi-skilled group including experienced 
practicing legal professionals, and academics, with experience in this environment.  
 
7.4.1  Section 1: Definitions  
 
On a review of the SALRC 2010 Issue Paper 27,169 and the SALRC’s 2014 Discussion Paper 
on the review of the law of evidence,170 it is not entirely clear why a definition is required for 
the word copy in an ever-evolving digital context.  What clarity is required?  Whether a data 
message is original, or a copy, should make very little difference to authentication.  Originals 
can be infinite with digital data, and an original is no guarantee that the data can be trusted.  
These terms are no longer so relevant as they once were (with paper).  Authentication of 
evidence is key; South Africa ought to move away from definitions configured for a traditional, 
paper-based world.  Importantly, one must bear in mind that our courts have, thus far, 
                                                             
168 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) 89 – 95. 
169 South African Law Reform Commission Issue Paper 27 (Project 126) Electronic Evidence in Criminal and 
Civil Proceedings: Admissibility and Related Issues (2010) para 6.13 at 33. 
170 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) at 54 – 55. 
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satisfactorily dealt with the reception of electronic evidence since the promulgation of the ECT 
Act.  The SALRC171 itself states: 
Electronic evidence arguably requires a shift in emphasis away from the exclusion from 
admissibility based on hearsay and the best evidence rule, to the question of reliability. 
For reliability, the concepts of authentication and integrity become important. This is 
particularly so given the concern that electronic records may be more susceptible to 
undetected modification than are traditional paper-based records 
 
In addition, some further issues to consider with the proposed definitions: 
 
i) The proposed Law of Evidence Bill only mentions an electronic signature once 
in the entire Bill [at s 4 (2)(i)(b)] Why define Electronic Signature when it is 
comprehensively dealt with in s 13 of ECT Act and already defined therein?   
 
ii) The Law of Evidence Amendment Act172 adequately deals with hearsay 
evidence and the Law of Evidence Bill repeats, verbatim, the definition of 
hearsay evidence.  Although this issue does require alignment, and consistency, 
there are less disruptive and far easier methods to achieve clarity in so far as 
electronic hearsay evidence is concerned – amendment to existing legislation, 
for example.  Further, there is no need to introduce a definition for hearsay 
evidence in this Bill (it already exists), nor is there a need for this Law of 
Evidence Bill to regulate the giving of notice for hearsay or documentary 
evidence.  These issues, assuming they even need to be regulated in the first 
place, should be dealt with by amendments to existing legislation or procedural 
rules of court. 
 
iii) Why define writing when it is adequately dealt with in the ECT Act?  What 
basis exists to define the term statement and records?  How will these 
definitions align themselves with the ECT Act data message definition?  How 
will these definitions foster or hamper international trade? What rationale exists 
to deviate from the Model Law, 1996? 
                                                             
171 Ibid at para 3.49 at 40.  Note that the Law Society of South Africa ‘wholeheartedly’ endorse this position, see 
Law Society of South Africa ‘Comments to the South African Law Reform Commission in relation to issues 
raised in Discussion Paper 131: Review of the Law of Evidence’, available at 
http://lssa.org.za/upload/LSSA%20comments%20on%20SALRC%20Discussion%20Paper%20131%20LAw%20
of%20Evidence%2029%20July%202015.pdf at 34, accessed on 8 May 2017. 
172 Section 3 of Act 45 of 1988.  
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iv) The definition for computer system will conflict with the proposed definition in 
section 1 of the Cybercrimes Bill.  Further, what basis exists to define electronic 
documents system?  Before venturing out of the comfort of the Model Law, 
1996 with ill-conceived definitions, South Africa ought to adopt a more 
rigorous review.  This further review must consider more recent case law, and 
international developments first; then to remedy the short-comings in the ECT 
Act – practicing, experienced legal practitioners must also be involved.173  
 
7.4.2 Application of Act 
 
Similar to section 4 (sphere of application) of the ECT Act, or article 1 of the Model Law, 
1996, legislation of this nature should simply state it applies to all data messages unless 
otherwise expressly stated.   
The strict rules of evidence is a term not defined in South African statute and is open 
to interpretation.  In what context would the strict rules of evidence not apply?  And, in that 
case, what rules governing electronic evidence and hearsay would apply?   
 Moreover, s 2(2) is open to interpretation.  It currently states its does not affect any law 
‘except the rules relating to hearsay, authentication and best evidence in relation to certain 
types of documentary evidence’.  This is too wide and vague.  It should be removed. 
 
7.4.3 Admissibility of hearsay evidence174 and notice of intention to produce  
 
Section 3 (1) of the Law of Evidence Bill, almost verbatim, repeats the contents of s 3 of the 
Law of Evidence Amendment Act, while s 3(2) closely mirrors s 3(3) of the Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act. The primary difference is that the proposed legislation requires a party to 
give notice of their intention to produce hearsay evidence.   
In terms of s 6 of the Law of Evidence Bill, notice must be given in writing and in 
‘sufficient’ time.  Section 6 (3) contains several exceptions where notice may be dispensed 
                                                             
173 Law Society of South Africa ‘Comments to the South African Law Reform Commission in relation to issues 
raised in Discussion Paper 131: Review of the Law of Evidence’, available at 
http://lssa.org.za/upload/LSSA%20comments%20on%20SALRC%20Discussion%20Paper%20131%20LAw%20
of%20Evidence%2029%20July%202015.pdf at 34, accessed on 8 May 2017.  See also South African Law 
Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence (2014) at para 4.21 at 
51.  
174 See chapter 5 above.   
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with, and s 6 (6) outlines some of the potential consequences for lack of compliance with the 
proposed section. 
 The current position, with minor amendment, is far superior to the proposed solution, 
which requires more in-depth analysis and discussion.   
 
7.4.4 Admissibility of business records and repeal 
 
Section 4 is intended to be a replacement for s 15(4) of the ECT Act.  As discussed in detail 
above,175 this section has been referred to as ‘controversial’.176 However, it is an internationally 
accepted legislative mechanism,177 and as Lamont J points out, is an intentional step by South 
Africa's legislature to subjugate the hearsay rule178 (whether in the ECT Act or in this proposed 
legislation). 
 That aside, the Law of Evidence Bill recommends the repeal of s 15(4), and it appears 
the drafters were unsure whether to repeal s 15 entirely.  Section 11, ‘Repeal of sections of 
statutes’ confirms that the SALRC is unclear as to whether s 15 should be repealed entirely, 
and if so, whether it should be replaced by an amendment Bill.   
As discussed above in chapter 5, a comprehensive review of all existing case law 
dealing with s 15 of the ECT Act from inception of the act to December 2018 suggests the ECT 
Act, and s 15 in particular, is no impediment to the reception of electronic evidence, and it 
would be premature to repeal s 15 before a further review of recent trends and developments.  
 
7.4.5 Evidence produced by electronic means; Authenticity and integrity  
 
Section 5 of the Law of Evidence Bill attempts to distinguish between automated machine 
generated evidence and evidence which is subject to the credibility of a person.  The key 
question whether electronic evidence is hearsay relates to whether its credibility depends on a 
person, or a machine. Consequently, and in this context: what does wholly generated by a 
machine mean?  
At some point in its development and creation, a human will always be involved in a 
computer program or electronic device in its design, implementation, maintenance, 
                                                             
175 See chapter 3 above. 
176 LA Consortium supra note 31 above para 12. 
177 See 3 above.  
178 Director of Public Prosecution v Modise 2012 (1) SACR 553 (GSJ). 
 172 
configuration etc.  Rather, if a section of this nature is to be implemented, the word 
substantially should be inserted instead of wholly, so that it would read: A statement which has 
been substantially generated by a machine, device or technical process does not constitute 
hearsay evidence.   
In so far as integrity and authenticity is concerned, and as discussed in detail above,179 
the ECT Act provides a framework that is adequate for the time being and these issues are best 
left, for now, to the courts to interpret (which has served South Africa satisfactorily to date), 
or to create secondary law in the form of regulations to the ECT Act, or amendments to existing 
law. It is now globally accepted that evidence produced substantially or partly by a machine, 
device, or technical process is potentially admissible.  And not since the 1970’s and Narlis,180 
has South Africa had a situation where evidence is excluded solely on the grounds of it being 
electronic in nature. The judiciary’s interpretation of these issues does not appear, currently, to 
suggest there are any major problems or lacunas.  It may be prudent to allow further time to 
elapse, a further review to take place, and then to revisit this issue.  A number of options could 
be taken: an amendment Act (similar to the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988) that 
deals only with these two issues; an amendment to the ECT Act; regulations to the ECT Act; 
or entirely new legislation. However, the codification approach, as the SALRC has noted, is a 
route that will require a plethora of further resources: with this in mind, what benefit would 
such an undertaking achieve? To use a business analogy, the costs and effort far outweigh the 
potential profit or benefit, and this project should be shelved for the time-being. 
 
7.4.6  General comment on the Law of Evidence Bill 
 
Although the aims of the Law of Evidence Bill are laudable, it would be premature to enact the 
legislation as it currently stands, and if codification and aggressive reform is the route South 
Africa elects to take, then this legislation requires further thought, consistency, and alignment 
with existing legislation, and comprehensive amendment.  Portions of the Bill appear to be a 
copy and paste of various international laws, brought together to make one inconsistent end-
product that creates a cacophony of noise in one’s head when reading it.  South Africa should 
not be seeking to codify trite and settled principles.  Moreover, one should be wary of over-
regulating. 
                                                             
179 See chapter 5 above. 
180 1976 2 SA 573 (A). 
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7.5  CONCLUSION   
 
Although amendment is required in certain areas, aggressive reform is not the prudent option 
at this stage in the development of e-commerce jurisprudence.  A further review is required, 
analysing more recent case law, and international trends and developments.  This will allow 
South Africa to enact consistent and clear legislation.  Consequently, and as pointed out by the 
LSSA and NPA, the Law of Evidence Bill is not the best option at this stage. Option 1 as 
suggested by the SALRC (a more cautious amendment of the existing environment) will 
facilitate a clearer and more certain regulatory framework. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
CHAPTER 8  
8.1  OVERVIEW 
The regulatory environment governing electronic evidence is in need of reform.  In addition, 
given rapid technological development, and the importance of e-commerce to South Africa’s 
economy, it is prudent to establish a working-group comprised of multi-disciplinary experts to 
ensure periodic and thorough reviews of e-commerce related legislation. 
 Although reform is required, an overhaul of the current legal position by promulgating 
legislation similar to the Law of Evidence Bill (see Annexure A) may be harmful for South 
African law.  Rather, a more thorough review should be undertaken (including multi-
disciplinary experts and practicing legal professionals), more recent case law must be analysed, 
and international trends should be monitored.  In the short term, current legislation ought to be 
amended to ensure certainty, clarity, and consistency with international best practice. 
  
8.2  SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
8.2.1 Functional equivalence, and the definition of data message1 
In the context of ICT legislation, South Africa ought to ensure it promulgates law that achieves 
functional equivalence in a technologically neutral manner.  The key definitional concept in 
the ECT Act is data message.  The promulgation of the current version of the Cybercrimes Bill 
will result in South Africa having two definitions for the term.  This oversight, although of 
little practical consequence, should be corrected.  In addition, the definition itself should remain 
concise and simple. 
8.2.2 Hearsay electronic evidence2 
South African courts and academics have been almost entirely ad idem in their view that 
electronic evidence can constitute hearsay within the meaning of the Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act.  Moreover, electronic evidence is not automatically admissible.  The ECT 
Act does however provide a business records exception (which is common around the world), 
                                                             
1 Chapter 2 above. 
2 Chapter 3 above. 
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and evidence will be rebuttably presumed true if the provisions of the relevant section are 
complied with.  
 To determine whether electronic evidence is real or documentary in nature, one must 
consider the nature of the data message, and the requirements of the relevant legislation (or 
common law requirements).  If the electronic evidence is largely automated or relies 
substantially upon a machine, computer, or mechanical process, it should be classified as real 
evidence.  Conversely, if the data message depends upon human assertions or observations, 
then it should be documentary evidence.    
The issue that remains unclear relates to the admissibility of real evidence in the form 
of data messages.  On the one hand, in cases that follow the logic of Baleka (3), real evidence 
in the form of a data message need only be relevant in order for it to be admissible.  Conversely,  
on the basis of Ramgobin's rationale, real evidence in the form of a data message must be 
relevant and authentic.  As is the case with Canada,3 and the United States of America,4 South 
Africa ought to adopt an approach where real electronic evidence must be authenticated prior 
to it being admissible.   As correctly observed in Tienda v State, in the context of electronic 
data, ‘evidence has no relevance if it is not authentically what its proponent claims it to be.’5 
8.2.3 A presumption of regularity6 
The ECT Act adequately facilitates the admission of electronic evidence. However, the ECT 
Act applies in addition to the common law, and as was the case in Delsheray Trust v ABSA, a 
court has the ability to receive electronic evidence via the express mechanism created in the 
ECT Act, or it can equally rely on the common law.   
In the absence of evidence, the presumption that mechanical instruments were working 
at the relevant time is probably too simplistic. In 2018, the advanced nature of technology 
means we cannot simply accept ‘the machine was working’.   If the common law is to be relied 
upon, a person must show the relevant court, whether on affidavit or via viva voce evidence, 
                                                             
3 Section 31.1 of the Canada Evidence Act, 1985 which provides: ‘Any person seeking to admit an electronic 
document as evidence has the burden of proving its authenticity by evidence capable of supporting a finding that 
the electronic document is that which it is purported to be.’ 
4 Lorraine v Markel American Insurance Company 241 FRD 534 (2007) at 541 – 542; Tienda v State 358 SW3d 
633 Texas Criminal Appeal (2012) at 639. 
5 Tienda v State supra note 4 at 638. 
6 Chapter 4 above. 
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that the evidence is reliable and can be trusted – there must be some basis for a court to confirm 
its reliability and veracity (as is the case with, for example, Canada).7 
8.2.4 Authentication and weight of electronic evidence8 
Relatively speaking, in terms of e-commerce, a decade is a significant period of time.  The 
ECT Act has been in place since 2002, but that notwithstanding, the admissibility and weight 
of data message evidence does not require drastic overhaul – and it does not require the entire 
repeal and re-promulgation as suggested by the SALRC in the Law of Evidence Bill (Annexure 
A).  The current provisions are adequate for the short term.  In addition, if South Africa is to 
move away from the Model Law, 1996, it should only do so with cogent reasons. 
8.2.5 Is it appropriate to apply different evidentiary considerations to electronic evidence in 
civil and criminal proceedings?9 
Other than those existing at common law there is no reason to apply different evidentiary 
considerations to electronic evidence in civil and criminal proceedings. The ECT Act applies 
to both civil and criminal proceedings and does not distinguish between civil and criminal 
proceedings.  Further, the case law from inception of the ECT Act to date suggests that no 
differing evidentiary considerations are applicable to electronic evidence in civil and criminal 
proceedings. 
8.2.6 South African Law Reform Commission recommendations10  
The SALRC suggest three options for law reform in the context of electronic evidence.  Rather 
than opting to pursue the most aggressive option, law reform in the guise of the Law of 
Evidence Bill attached as Annexure A, South Africa ought to adopt a more cautious and 
pragmatic approach.  Namely, an amendment to existing legislation rather than a drastic 
overhaul.  A summary of recommendations follows immediately below in para 8.3. 
 
 
                                                             
7 Section 31.3 of the Canada Evidence Act, 1985. 
8 Chapter 5 above. 
9 Chapter 6 above. 
10 Chapter 7 above. 
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8.3 SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 
SOUTH AFRICAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION’S REVIEW OF THE 
LAW OF EVIDENCE 
The moderate success of the ECT Act notwithstanding – particularly in comparison to the 
dismal Computer Evidence Act – the current regulatory environment does require amendment 
given its age, and by way of summary, at least the following is required: 
A. Regular review of the ECT Act by a multi-disciplinary panel (as suggested by the 
SALRC),11 reporting to the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development at least 
every two or three years.  The panel should consider: 
A1 the Law of Evidence Bill and the codification approach suggested by the 
SALRC. 
A2 A1 notwithstanding, an extension of the ECT Act and the ECT Act’s adequacy 
in general. 
 A3 whether to abolish the distinction between advanced electronic signatures and
 electronic signatures, and biometric technologies. 
A4 whether the legislature should distinguish between automated computer 
evidence and computer output subject to hearsay – or to leave this to the 
judiciary. 
A5 whether the legislature should provide further direction on authentication (such 
as in secondary law in the form of regulations to the ECT Act), or whether this 
should be left to the judiciary. 
B. Definition of data message  
B1. Amendment and alignment of the definition of data message in the current 
version of the Cybercrimes Bill,12 and the ECT Act. 
B2. Inclusion of the term data message in applicable legislation, such as the 
Criminal Procedure Act, Civil Proceedings Evidence Act, Law of Evidence 
                                                             
11 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 131 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence 
(2014) para 5.10 at 84. 
12 Bill B6B – 2017. 
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Amendment Act, and legislation relevant to rules of South Africa’s various 
courts. 
C. Amendment and alignment of hearsay exceptions  
C1. Consider whether s 15(4) of the ECT Act should apply to criminal proceedings. 
C2.  Aligning the hearsay exceptions in the Criminal Procedure Act, Civil 
Proceedings Evidence Act and ECT Act. 
D. Definition of document in Civil Proceedings Evidence Act and Criminal Procedure Act 
 D1. Consistency in definitions with the term document. 
E. Electronic discovery  
E1. Amendment of various legislation to provide for change to court rules to deal 
with electronic discovery and disclosure of metadata.  
8.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
There can be no doubt that technology and the internet have changed the way society 
communicates and interacts.  The law has had to adapt.  In order to foster certainty and clarity, 
the SALRC has been reviewing electronic evidence since its inception in 1982 when it first 
mooted the possibility of a codified law of evidence in the form of a statute.   
While electronic evidence is certainly susceptible13 to manipulation and evolving 
technology, its use is now commonplace, and a plethora of expertise is readily available to 
detect and comment on manipulation where that may be at issue. The law must adapt.14 South 
Africa cannot sustain a legal position where the exclusion of evidence is justified because it is 
new or uncertain.  The traditional principles of evidence need not be re-written, but in certain 
instances, some adaptation or amendment is required. 
In its latest findings, pending before the responsible Minister, the SALRC again 
suggested the codification route, in the form of a Law of Evidence Bill.  The promulgation of 
                                                             
13 South African Law Reform Commission Issue Paper 27 (Project 126) Electronic Evidence in Criminal and 
Civil Proceedings: Admissibility and Related Issues (2010) 7 – 13 where apparent difficulties with electronic 
evidence are discussed in detail. 
14 CMC Woodworking Machinery (Pty) Ltd v Pieter Odendaal Kitchens 2012 (5) SA 604 (KZD) para 2 where it 
was stated: ‘it is …not unreasonable to expect the law to recognise such [technological] changes and accommodate 
[them]’.  
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this Bill will lead to uncertainty, and will arguably be harmful for South African law.  To ensure 
a clear and accessible legal framework, amendment should be made to existing legislation, and 
a further expert working-group should further consider the Law of Evidence Bill in light of 
more recent case law, and international trends.  
Finally, in terms of our current interpretation regarding the admissibility and weight of 
electronic evidence, when the occasion arises in the Supreme Court of Appeal, South Africa’s 
judiciary should reject the notion that all electronic evidence is hearsay – this proposition is 
flawed, and destroys functional equivalence.  Moreover, our courts should clearly distinguish 
between automatically produced electronic evidence (which is not subject to the hearsay rules 
– real evidence), and documentary electronic evidence (which is subject to the hearsay rules).  
Equally, to the extent that any doubt still exists, our courts should confirm that electronic 
evidence is not automatically admissible, and that in order to be admissible, the evidence must 
be authentic (whether classified as real or documentary evidence). 
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10. ANNEXURE A 
 
DRAFT LAW OF EVIDENCE BILL 
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA 
________ 
LAW OF EVIDENCE 
BILL 
_________ 
(As introduced) 
__________ 
(MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT) 
[B B2014] 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
GENERAL EXPLANATORY NOTE: 
[ ]  Words in bold type in square brackets indicate omissions from existing enactments. 
_____  Words underlined with a solid line indicate insertions in existing enactments. 
 
BILL 
To regulate the admissibility of evidence so as to provide for the admissibility of hearsay 
evidence, and for the admissibility and proof of business records and evidence produced by 
processes, machines and other devices in all legal proceedings; and to provide for matters 
connected therewith. 
_________ 
BE IT ENACTED by the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, as follows: 
 
Preamble15 
 
1. Definitions 
 
“Business” includes any activity regularly carried on, whether for profit or not, by any organ of state 
or any organisation or person; 
“Business records” includes those records created or received in the ordinary course of business by 
any organ of state or any trade, profession or other organisation or person; 
“Computer system” means a device or a group of interconnected or related devices, which perform 
functions pursuant to computer programs; 
                                                             
204 The Act is intended to clarify, consolidate and align the rules for the admissibility of business records and 
evidence produced by processes, machines and other devices, while leaving intact existing legislation on 
(for example) the admissibility of official and public documents 
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“Copy” in relation to a document means anything onto which information recorded in the document 
has been copied, by whatever means and whether directly or indirectly, and regardless of how many 
removes from the original; 
“Document” means anything in which information of any description is recorded, and includes a copy; 
“Electronic document” means data that are recorded or stored on any medium in or by a computer 
system or other similar device, and includes a display, printout or other output of that data; 
“Electronic documents system” includes a computer system or other similar device by or in which 
data are recorded or stored, and any procedures related to such recording or storage or electronic 
document; 
“Electronic signature” means electronic representations of information attached to, incorporated in, 
or logically associated with other information and which are intended by the user to serve as a signature; 
“Hearsay evidence” means evidence, whether oral or in writing, the probative value of which depends 
upon the credibility of a person other than the person giving such evidence; 
“Records” means anything in which information of any description is recorded; 
“Officer” includes any person occupying a responsible position in relation to the relevant activities of 
a business or public authority, or in relation to its records; 
“Public authority” includes any public or statutory undertaking, or any government department; 
“Statement” means any representation of fact or opinion, however made; 
“writing” means information contained in a document. 
 
2. Application 
 
2.1 This Act applies to all criminal and civil proceedings or the legal proceedings before any tribunal 
in which the strict rules of evidence apply, whether as a matter of law or by agreement of the parties. 
2.2 The provisions of this Act do not affect any rule of law relating to the admissibility of evidence, 
except the rules relating to hearsay, authentication and best evidence in relation to certain types of 
documentary evidence. 
 
3. Admissibility of hearsay evidence 
 
3.1 Subject to the provisions of this Act or any other law, hearsay evidence, whether oral or in writing, 
shall not be admissible as evidence at criminal or civil proceedings, unless – 
(a) each party against whom the evidence is to be adduced agrees to the admission thereof as 
evidence at such proceedings; or 
(b) the person upon whose credibility the probative value of such evidence depends, testifies at 
such proceedings; or 
(c) the court, having regard to - 
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(i) the nature of the proceedings; 
(ii) the nature of the evidence; 
(iii) the purpose for which the evidence is tendered; 
(iv) the probative value of the evidence; 
(v) the reason why the evidence is not given by the person upon whose credibility the 
probative value of such evidence depends; 
(vi) any prejudice to a party which the admission of such evidence mightentail; and 
(vii) any other factor which should in the opinion of the court be taken into account, is of the 
opinion that such evidence should be admitted in the interests of justice. 
 
3.2 Hearsay evidence admitted in terms of subsection 3.1(b) may be left out of account if the person 
upon whose credibility the probative value depends subsequently does not testify at the proceedings, 
unless the hearsay evidence is admitted in terms of paragraph (a) or (c) of subsection 3.1. 
 
3.3 No hearsay evidence shall be admitted in evidence under this section unless the party intending to 
produce the hearsay evidence has given notice in terms of section 6. 
 
4. Admissibility of business records in legal proceedings 
 
4.1 In any proceedings in which direct evidence of a fact would be admissible, any statement made in 
the ordinary course of business, whether by a person or wholly or partially by a machine, device or 
technical process; and contained in a document and tending to establish that fact, shall, upon production 
of the document, be admissible as evidence of that fact. 
 
4.2 In the absence of a witness or witnesses to produce and give testimony regarding the 
admissibility of the document produced in terms of this section – 
(i) such document must be accompanied by a certificate to the effect that the document forms part 
of the records of a business or public authority, signed by an officer of the business or public 
authority to which the records belong. 
For this purpose – 
(a) a document purporting to be a certificate signed by an officer of a business or public 
authority shall be deemed to have been duly given by such an officer and signed by him or her; 
and 
(b) a certificate shall be treated as signed by a person if it purports to bear an electronic signature 
or a facsimile of his or her signature. 
(ii) the party intending to produce the document as evidence must give notice in terms of section 
6. 
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4.3 Nothing in this section shall render admissible as evidence in any legal proceedings a record made 
in the course of obtaining or giving legal advice or in contemplation of a legal proceeding. 
 
4.4 The court may, having regard to the circumstances of the case, require additional evidence, whether 
oral or in writing, including an affidavit in respect of a document produced in terms of this section; or 
may direct that all or any of the provisions of this section do not apply in relation to a particular 
document or record made in the ordinary course of business. 
 
5. Evidence produced by processes, machines and other devices 
 
5.1 Subject to the provisions of this Act and any other law, evidence that is produced wholly or partly 
by a machine, device, or technical process – 
(i) is admissible in all legal proceedings; and 
(ii) may be produced as an electronic document. 
 
5.2 A statement which has been generated wholly by a machine, device or technical process does not 
constitute hearsay evidence. 
 
5.3 Subject to the provisions of this Act or unless the Court orders otherwise, the admissibility of 
evidence produced in terms of this section should be established by the oral testimony of a witness or 
witnesses. 
 
6. Notice of intention to produce hearsay evidence and documentary evidence 
 
6.1 Notice of an intention to produce evidence in terms of subsections 3, 4 or 5 must be given – 
(a) in writing to every other party to the proceeding, and must include the contents of the statement 
and (where applicable) the name of the maker of the statement; and if a document is to be produced, 
the document including any related metadata must be attached to the notice; and 
(b) in sufficient time before the hearing to provide all other parties to the proceeding with a fair 
opportunity to prepare to meet the statement. 
 
6.2 A party to the proceeding who is given notice in terms of subsection (1) must, if that party objects 
to the admission of the statement as evidence, give notice of objection as soon as practicable to the party 
proposing to offer the statement. 
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6.3 Subsections (1) and (2) may be excluded by agreement of the parties, or by waiver of the party to 
whom notice is required to be given; or the presiding officer may dispense with the requirement to give 
notice under subsections (1) or (2) – 
(a) if having regard to the nature and contents of the hearsay statement, no party is substantially 
prejudiced by the failure to give notice under subsection (1); or 
(b) if giving notice was not reasonably practicable in the circumstances; or 
(c) in the interests of justice. 
 
6.4 In any civil proceedings, where the notice in terms of subsection (1) relates to documentary evidence 
and no party objects to the notice in terms of subsection (1), or if the court dismisses an objection on 
the ground that no useful purpose would be served by requiring the party concerned to call a witness to 
produce the documents, – 
(a) the document, if otherwise admissible, may be admitted in evidence; and 
(b) it will be presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the nature, origin, and 
contents of the document are as shown on its face. 
 
6.5 Provision may be made by the Rules of Court specifying the manner in which the duties imposed 
by this section are to be complied with, including the time allowed for such compliance. 
 
6.6 A failure to comply with this section or any Rules of Court provided in terms of 
subsection (5) does not affect the admissibility of the evidence, but may be taken into 
account by the court – 
(a) in considering the exercise of its powers over the proceedings and in respect of costs; and 
(b) as a matter that might adversely affect the weight to be given to the evidence. 
 
7. Authenticity and integrity of documentary evidence 
 
7.1 Subject to the provisions of this Act, a person seeking to admit documentary evidence in terms of 
the Act has the burden of proving the authenticity and integrity of the document. 
 
7.2 For the purposes of determining whether an electronic document is admissible in terms of this 
section, evidence may be presented in respect of any standard, procedure, usage or practice concerning 
the manner in which electronic documents are to be recorded or stored; having regard to the type of 
business, enterprise or endeavour that used, recorded or stored the electronic document, and the nature 
and purpose of the electronic document. 
 
 200 
7.3 The integrity of an electronic documents system may be established by evidence capable of 
supporting a finding that at all material times the computer system or other similar device used by the 
electronic documents system was operating properly; or, if it was not, the fact of its not operating 
properly did not affect the integrity of the electronic document and there are no other reasonable grounds 
for doubting the integrity of the electronic documents system. 
 
7.4 Evidence in terms of subsections (2) and (3) may be produced orally or by affidavit. 
 
7.5 A party may cross-examine a deponent of an affidavit introduced into evidence in terms of 
subsection (4) if the deponent is an adverse party or is under the control of an adverse party; or with 
leave of the court. 
 
7.6 In any civil proceeding where a party is permitted under the Rules of Court relating to discovery to 
inspect a document – 
(a) the requirement to prove the authenticity and integrity of the document may be dispensed with 
in circumstances described in those Rules; and 
(b) the procedure to be adopted by a party seeking to require proof of the authenticity 
and integrity of the document is that set out in those Rules; and 
(c) the production of secondary evidence to prove the authenticity and integrity of the document 
may be permitted in circumstances described in those Rules. 
 
7.7 The signature, execution, or attestation of a document, whether electronic or otherwise, that is 
required by law to be attested may be proved by any satisfactory means, provided that an attesting 
witness need not be called to prove that the document was signed, executed or attested as it purports to 
have been signed, executed, or attested. 
 
8 Weight to be attached to documentary evidence 
 
In estimating the weight to be attached to documentary evidence admitted in terms of this Act, regard 
shall be had to all the circumstances from which any inference may reasonably be drawn as to the 
accuracy or otherwise of the information contained in the document, and in particular – 
(d) where the information was directly provided by a person, regard shall be had to whether or not 
the person who supplied the information did so contemporaneously with the occurrence or 
existence of the facts stated; and to whether or not that person or any person concerned with making 
or keeping the record containing the statement had any incentive to conceal or misrepresent the 
facts. 
(e) where the information is contained in an electronic document, regard shall be had to – 
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(i) the reliability of the manner in which the data message was generated, stored or 
communicated; 
(ii) the reliability of the manner in which the integrity of the data message was maintained; 
(iii) the manner in which its originator was identified; and 
(iv) any other relevant factor. 
 
9. Discretion to exclude or limit the use of documentary evidence 
 
The court may refuse to admit documentary evidence or may limit the use to be made of such evidence; 
if a particular use of the evidence might be unfairly prejudicial to a party or might be misleading or 
confusing. 
 
10. Provisional admission of evidence 
 
If a question arises concerning the admissibility of any evidence, the Judge may admit the 
evidence in question, subject to further evidence being offered later on to establish its 
admissibility. 
 
11. Repeal of sections of statutes 
 
Repeals: section 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 
Repeals: section 15(4) of the ECT Act [whole of section 15 and incorporate it in an Amendment Bill?] 
Repeals: sections 27 – 38 of the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 
Repeals: sections 221, 222, and 236 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
